diff rsa.c @ 285:1b9e69c058d2

propagate from branch 'au.asn.ucc.matt.ltc.dropbear' (head 20dccfc09627970a312d77fb41dc2970b62689c3) to branch 'au.asn.ucc.matt.dropbear' (head fdf4a7a3b97ae5046139915de7e40399cceb2c01)
author Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
date Wed, 08 Mar 2006 13:23:58 +0000
parents 3cea9d789cca
children 454a34b2dfd1 9a789fc03f40
line wrap: on
line diff
--- /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/rsa.c	Wed Mar 08 13:23:58 2006 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,398 @@
+/*
+ * Dropbear - a SSH2 server
+ * 
+ * Copyright (c) 2002,2003 Matt Johnston
+ * All rights reserved.
+ * 
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+ * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+ * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+ * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+ * 
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
+ * all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ * 
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+ * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE. */
+
+/* Perform RSA operations on data, including reading keys, signing and
+ * verification.
+ *
+ * The format is specified in rfc2437, Applied Cryptography or The Handbook of
+ * Applied Cryptography detail the general algorithm. */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "dbutil.h"
+#include "bignum.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "random.h"
+
+#ifdef DROPBEAR_RSA 
+
+static void rsa_pad_em(rsa_key * key,
+		const unsigned char * data, unsigned int len,
+		mp_int * rsa_em);
+
+/* Load a public rsa key from a buffer, initialising the values.
+ * The key will have the same format as buf_put_rsa_key.
+ * These should be freed with rsa_key_free.
+ * Returns DROPBEAR_SUCCESS or DROPBEAR_FAILURE */
+int buf_get_rsa_pub_key(buffer* buf, rsa_key *key) {
+
+	TRACE(("enter buf_get_rsa_pub_key"))
+	dropbear_assert(key != NULL);
+	key->e = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int));
+	key->n = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int));
+	m_mp_init_multi(key->e, key->n, NULL);
+	key->d = NULL;
+	key->p = NULL;
+	key->q = NULL;
+
+	buf_incrpos(buf, 4+SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA_LEN); /* int + "ssh-rsa" */
+
+	if (buf_getmpint(buf, key->e) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE
+	 || buf_getmpint(buf, key->n) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
+		TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_pub_key: failure"))
+		return DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	if (mp_count_bits(key->n) < MIN_RSA_KEYLEN) {
+		dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "rsa key too short");
+		return DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_pub_key: success"))
+	return DROPBEAR_SUCCESS;
+
+}
+
+/* Same as buf_get_rsa_pub_key, but reads a private "x" key at the end.
+ * Loads a private rsa key from a buffer
+ * Returns DROPBEAR_SUCCESS or DROPBEAR_FAILURE */
+int buf_get_rsa_priv_key(buffer* buf, rsa_key *key) {
+
+	dropbear_assert(key != NULL);
+
+	TRACE(("enter buf_get_rsa_priv_key"))
+
+	if (buf_get_rsa_pub_key(buf, key) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
+		TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_priv_key: pub: ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE"))
+		return DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	key->d = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int));
+	m_mp_init(key->d);
+	if (buf_getmpint(buf, key->d) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
+		TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_priv_key: d: ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE"))
+		return DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	/* old Dropbear private keys didn't keep p and q, so we will ignore them*/
+	if (buf->pos == buf->len) {
+		key->p = NULL;
+		key->q = NULL;
+	} else {
+		key->p = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int));
+		key->q = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int));
+		m_mp_init_multi(key->p, key->q, NULL);
+
+		if (buf_getmpint(buf, key->p) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
+			TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_priv_key: p: ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE"))
+			return DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
+		}
+
+		if (buf_getmpint(buf, key->q) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
+			TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_priv_key: q: ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE"))
+			return DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
+		}
+	}
+
+	TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_priv_key"))
+	return DROPBEAR_SUCCESS;
+}
+	
+
+/* Clear and free the memory used by a public or private key */
+void rsa_key_free(rsa_key *key) {
+
+	TRACE(("enter rsa_key_free"))
+
+	if (key == NULL) {
+		TRACE(("leave rsa_key_free: key == NULL"))
+		return;
+	}
+	if (key->d) {
+		mp_clear(key->d);
+		m_free(key->d);
+	}
+	if (key->e) {
+		mp_clear(key->e);
+		m_free(key->e);
+	}
+	if (key->n) {
+		 mp_clear(key->n);
+		 m_free(key->n);
+	}
+	if (key->p) {
+		mp_clear(key->p);
+		m_free(key->p);
+	}
+	if (key->q) {
+		mp_clear(key->q);
+		m_free(key->q);
+	}
+	m_free(key);
+	TRACE(("leave rsa_key_free"))
+}
+
+/* Put the public rsa key into the buffer in the required format:
+ *
+ * string	"ssh-rsa"
+ * mp_int	e
+ * mp_int	n
+ */
+void buf_put_rsa_pub_key(buffer* buf, rsa_key *key) {
+
+	TRACE(("enter buf_put_rsa_pub_key"))
+	dropbear_assert(key != NULL);
+
+	buf_putstring(buf, SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA, SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA_LEN);
+	buf_putmpint(buf, key->e);
+	buf_putmpint(buf, key->n);
+
+	TRACE(("leave buf_put_rsa_pub_key"))
+
+}
+
+/* Same as buf_put_rsa_pub_key, but with the private "x" key appended */
+void buf_put_rsa_priv_key(buffer* buf, rsa_key *key) {
+
+	TRACE(("enter buf_put_rsa_priv_key"))
+
+	dropbear_assert(key != NULL);
+	buf_put_rsa_pub_key(buf, key);
+	buf_putmpint(buf, key->d);
+
+	/* new versions have p and q, old versions don't */
+	if (key->p) {
+		buf_putmpint(buf, key->p);
+	}
+	if (key->q) {
+		buf_putmpint(buf, key->q);
+	}
+
+
+	TRACE(("leave buf_put_rsa_priv_key"))
+
+}
+
+#ifdef DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_VERIFY
+/* Verify a signature in buf, made on data by the key given.
+ * Returns DROPBEAR_SUCCESS or DROPBEAR_FAILURE */
+int buf_rsa_verify(buffer * buf, rsa_key *key, const unsigned char* data,
+		unsigned int len) {
+
+	unsigned int slen;
+	DEF_MP_INT(rsa_s);
+	DEF_MP_INT(rsa_mdash);
+	DEF_MP_INT(rsa_em);
+	int ret = DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
+
+	TRACE(("enter buf_rsa_verify"))
+
+	dropbear_assert(key != NULL);
+
+	m_mp_init_multi(&rsa_mdash, &rsa_s, &rsa_em, NULL);
+
+	slen = buf_getint(buf);
+	if (slen != (unsigned int)mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->n)) {
+		TRACE(("bad size"))
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (mp_read_unsigned_bin(&rsa_s, buf_getptr(buf, buf->len - buf->pos),
+				buf->len - buf->pos) != MP_OKAY) {
+		TRACE(("failed reading rsa_s"))
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* check that s <= n-1 */
+	if (mp_cmp(&rsa_s, key->n) != MP_LT) {
+		TRACE(("s > n-1"))
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* create the magic PKCS padded value */
+	rsa_pad_em(key, data, len, &rsa_em);
+
+	if (mp_exptmod(&rsa_s, key->e, key->n, &rsa_mdash) != MP_OKAY) {
+		TRACE(("failed exptmod rsa_s"))
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (mp_cmp(&rsa_em, &rsa_mdash) == MP_EQ) {
+		/* signature is valid */
+		TRACE(("success!"))
+		ret = DROPBEAR_SUCCESS;
+	}
+
+out:
+	mp_clear_multi(&rsa_mdash, &rsa_s, &rsa_em, NULL);
+	TRACE(("leave buf_rsa_verify: ret %d", ret))
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_VERIFY */
+
+/* Sign the data presented with key, writing the signature contents
+ * to the buffer */
+void buf_put_rsa_sign(buffer* buf, rsa_key *key, const unsigned char* data,
+		unsigned int len) {
+
+	unsigned int nsize, ssize;
+	unsigned int i;
+	DEF_MP_INT(rsa_s);
+	DEF_MP_INT(rsa_tmp1);
+	DEF_MP_INT(rsa_tmp2);
+	DEF_MP_INT(rsa_tmp3);
+	
+	TRACE(("enter buf_put_rsa_sign"))
+	dropbear_assert(key != NULL);
+
+	m_mp_init_multi(&rsa_s, &rsa_tmp1, &rsa_tmp2, &rsa_tmp3, NULL);
+
+	rsa_pad_em(key, data, len, &rsa_tmp1);
+
+	/* the actual signing of the padded data */
+
+#ifdef RSA_BLINDING
+
+	/* With blinding, s = (r^(-1))((em)*r^e)^d mod n */
+
+	/* generate the r blinding value */
+	/* rsa_tmp2 is r */
+	gen_random_mpint(key->n, &rsa_tmp2);
+
+	/* rsa_tmp1 is em */
+	/* em' = em * r^e mod n */
+
+	mp_exptmod(&rsa_tmp2, key->e, key->n, &rsa_s); /* rsa_s used as a temp var*/
+	mp_invmod(&rsa_tmp2, key->n, &rsa_tmp3);
+	mp_mulmod(&rsa_tmp1, &rsa_s, key->n, &rsa_tmp2);
+
+	/* rsa_tmp2 is em' */
+	/* s' = (em')^d mod n */
+	mp_exptmod(&rsa_tmp2, key->d, key->n, &rsa_tmp1);
+
+	/* rsa_tmp1 is s' */
+	/* rsa_tmp3 is r^(-1) mod n */
+	/* s = (s')r^(-1) mod n */
+	mp_mulmod(&rsa_tmp1, &rsa_tmp3, key->n, &rsa_s);
+
+#else
+
+	/* s = em^d mod n */
+	/* rsa_tmp1 is em */
+	if (mp_exptmod(&rsa_tmp1, key->d, key->n, &rsa_s) != MP_OKAY) {
+		dropbear_exit("rsa error");
+	}
+
+#endif /* RSA_BLINDING */
+
+	mp_clear_multi(&rsa_tmp1, &rsa_tmp2, &rsa_tmp3, NULL);
+	
+	/* create the signature to return */
+	buf_putstring(buf, SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA, SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA_LEN);
+
+	nsize = mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->n);
+
+	/* string rsa_signature_blob length */
+	buf_putint(buf, nsize);
+	/* pad out s to same length as n */
+	ssize = mp_unsigned_bin_size(&rsa_s);
+	dropbear_assert(ssize <= nsize);
+	for (i = 0; i < nsize-ssize; i++) {
+		buf_putbyte(buf, 0x00);
+	}
+
+	if (mp_to_unsigned_bin(&rsa_s, buf_getwriteptr(buf, ssize)) != MP_OKAY) {
+		dropbear_exit("rsa error");
+	}
+	buf_incrwritepos(buf, ssize);
+	mp_clear(&rsa_s);
+
+#if defined(DEBUG_RSA) && defined(DEBUG_TRACE)
+	printhex("RSA sig", buf->data, buf->len);
+#endif
+	
+
+	TRACE(("leave buf_put_rsa_sign"))
+}
+
+/* Creates the message value as expected by PKCS, see rfc2437 etc */
+/* format to be padded to is:
+ * EM = 01 | FF* | 00 | prefix | hash
+ *
+ * where FF is repeated enough times to make EM one byte
+ * shorter than the size of key->n
+ *
+ * prefix is the ASN1 designator prefix,
+ * hex 30 21 30 09 06 05 2B 0E 03 02 1A 05 00 04 14
+ *
+ * rsa_em must be a pointer to an initialised mp_int.
+ */
+static void rsa_pad_em(rsa_key * key,
+		const unsigned char * data, unsigned int len, 
+		mp_int * rsa_em) {
+
+	/* ASN1 designator (including the 0x00 preceding) */
+	const unsigned char rsa_asn1_magic[] = 
+		{0x00, 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 
+		 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14};
+	const unsigned int RSA_ASN1_MAGIC_LEN = 16;
+
+	buffer * rsa_EM = NULL;
+	hash_state hs;
+	unsigned int nsize;
+	
+	dropbear_assert(key != NULL);
+	dropbear_assert(data != NULL);
+	nsize = mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->n);
+
+	rsa_EM = buf_new(nsize-1);
+	/* type byte */
+	buf_putbyte(rsa_EM, 0x01);
+	/* Padding with 0xFF bytes */
+	while(rsa_EM->pos != rsa_EM->size - RSA_ASN1_MAGIC_LEN - SHA1_HASH_SIZE) {
+		buf_putbyte(rsa_EM, 0xff);
+	}
+	/* Magic ASN1 stuff */
+	memcpy(buf_getwriteptr(rsa_EM, RSA_ASN1_MAGIC_LEN),
+			rsa_asn1_magic, RSA_ASN1_MAGIC_LEN);
+	buf_incrwritepos(rsa_EM, RSA_ASN1_MAGIC_LEN);
+
+	/* The hash of the data */
+	sha1_init(&hs);
+	sha1_process(&hs, data, len);
+	sha1_done(&hs, buf_getwriteptr(rsa_EM, SHA1_HASH_SIZE));
+	buf_incrwritepos(rsa_EM, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
+
+	dropbear_assert(rsa_EM->pos == rsa_EM->size);
+
+	/* Create the mp_int from the encoded bytes */
+	buf_setpos(rsa_EM, 0);
+	bytes_to_mp(rsa_em, buf_getptr(rsa_EM, rsa_EM->size),
+			rsa_EM->size);
+	buf_free(rsa_EM);
+}
+
+#endif /* DROPBEAR_RSA */