Mercurial > dropbear
diff libtomcrypt/src/pk/rsa/rsa_verify_hash.c @ 435:337c45621e81
merge of 'a9b0496634cdd25647b65e585cc3240f3fa699ee'
and 'c22be8b8f570b48e9662dac32c7b3e7148a42206'
author | Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au> |
---|---|
date | Thu, 22 Feb 2007 14:53:49 +0000 |
parents | 0cbe8f6dbf9e |
children | f849a5ca2efc |
line wrap: on
line diff
--- a/libtomcrypt/src/pk/rsa/rsa_verify_hash.c Thu Feb 22 14:52:46 2007 +0000 +++ b/libtomcrypt/src/pk/rsa/rsa_verify_hash.c Thu Feb 22 14:53:49 2007 +0000 @@ -6,75 +6,156 @@ * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. * - * Tom St Denis, [email protected], http://libtomcrypt.org + * Tom St Denis, [email protected], http://libtomcrypt.com */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file rsa_verify_hash.c - RSA PKCS v2 PSS signature verification, Tom St Denis -*/ + RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 or v2 PSS signature verification, Tom St Denis and Andreas Lange +*/ #ifdef MRSA /** - (PKCS #1, v2.0) de-sign then PSS depad + PKCS #1 de-sign then v1.5 or PSS depad @param sig The signature data @param siglen The length of the signature data (octets) @param hash The hash of the message that was signed @param hashlen The length of the hash of the message that was signed (octets) + @param padding Type of padding (LTC_PKCS_1_PSS or LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) @param hash_idx The index of the desired hash @param saltlen The length of the salt used during signature @param stat [out] The result of the signature comparison, 1==valid, 0==invalid @param key The public RSA key corresponding to the key that performed the signature @return CRYPT_OK on success (even if the signature is invalid) */ -int rsa_verify_hash(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen, - const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hashlen, - int hash_idx, unsigned long saltlen, - int *stat, rsa_key *key) +int rsa_verify_hash_ex(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen, + const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hashlen, + int padding, + int hash_idx, unsigned long saltlen, + int *stat, rsa_key *key) { - unsigned long modulus_bitlen, modulus_bytelen, x; - int err; - unsigned char *tmpbuf; - + unsigned long modulus_bitlen, modulus_bytelen, x; + int err; + unsigned char *tmpbuf; + LTC_ARGCHK(hash != NULL); - LTC_ARGCHK(sig != NULL); - LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL); - LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); + LTC_ARGCHK(sig != NULL); + LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL); + LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); /* default to invalid */ *stat = 0; - - /* valid hash ? */ - if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) { - return err; + + /* valid padding? */ + + if ((padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) && + (padding != LTC_PKCS_1_PSS)) { + return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_PADDING; } - + + if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) { + /* valid hash ? */ + if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) { + return err; + } + } + /* get modulus len in bits */ - modulus_bitlen = mp_count_bits(&(key->N)); + modulus_bitlen = mp_count_bits( (key->N)); /* outlen must be at least the size of the modulus */ - modulus_bytelen = mp_unsigned_bin_size(&(key->N)); + modulus_bytelen = mp_unsigned_bin_size( (key->N)); if (modulus_bytelen != siglen) { return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET; } - + /* allocate temp buffer for decoded sig */ tmpbuf = XMALLOC(siglen); if (tmpbuf == NULL) { return CRYPT_MEM; } - + /* RSA decode it */ x = siglen; - if ((err = rsa_exptmod(sig, siglen, tmpbuf, &x, PK_PUBLIC, key)) != CRYPT_OK) { + if ((err = ltc_mp.rsa_me(sig, siglen, tmpbuf, &x, PK_PUBLIC, key)) != CRYPT_OK) { XFREE(tmpbuf); return err; } - - /* PSS decode it */ - err = pkcs_1_pss_decode(hash, hashlen, tmpbuf, x, saltlen, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, stat); + + /* make sure the output is the right size */ + if (x != siglen) { + XFREE(tmpbuf); + return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET; + } + + if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) { + /* PSS decode and verify it */ + err = pkcs_1_pss_decode(hash, hashlen, tmpbuf, x, saltlen, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, stat); + } else { + /* PKCS #1 v1.5 decode it */ + unsigned char *out; + unsigned long outlen, loid[16]; + int decoded; + ltc_asn1_list digestinfo[2], siginfo[2]; + + /* not all hashes have OIDs... so sad */ + if (hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen == 0) { + err = CRYPT_INVALID_ARG; + goto bail_2; + } + + /* allocate temp buffer for decoded hash */ + outlen = ((modulus_bitlen >> 3) + (modulus_bitlen & 7 ? 1 : 0)) - 3; + out = XMALLOC(outlen); + if (out == NULL) { + err = CRYPT_MEM; + goto bail_2; + } + + if ((err = pkcs_1_v1_5_decode(tmpbuf, x, LTC_PKCS_1_EMSA, modulus_bitlen, out, &outlen, &decoded)) != CRYPT_OK) { + XFREE(out); + goto bail_2; + } + + /* now we must decode out[0...outlen-1] using ASN.1, test the OID and then test the hash */ + /* construct the SEQUENCE + SEQUENCE { + SEQUENCE {hashoid OID + blah NULL + } + hash OCTET STRING + } + */ + LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER, loid, sizeof(loid)/sizeof(loid[0])); + LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_NULL, NULL, 0); + LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE, digestinfo, 2); + LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, tmpbuf, siglen); + + if ((err = der_decode_sequence(out, outlen, siginfo, 2)) != CRYPT_OK) { + XFREE(out); + goto bail_2; + } + + /* test OID */ + if ((digestinfo[0].size == hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen) && + (XMEMCMP(digestinfo[0].data, hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OID, sizeof(unsigned long) * hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen) == 0) && + (siginfo[1].size == hashlen) && + (XMEMCMP(siginfo[1].data, hash, hashlen) == 0)) { + *stat = 1; + } + +#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK + zeromem(out, outlen); +#endif + XFREE(out); + } + +bail_2: +#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK + zeromem(tmpbuf, siglen); +#endif XFREE(tmpbuf); return err; } @@ -82,5 +163,5 @@ #endif /* MRSA */ /* $Source: /cvs/libtom/libtomcrypt/src/pk/rsa/rsa_verify_hash.c,v $ */ -/* $Revision: 1.3 $ */ -/* $Date: 2005/05/05 14:35:59 $ */ +/* $Revision: 1.11 $ */ +/* $Date: 2006/12/04 03:09:28 $ */