Mercurial > dropbear
diff fuzzer-verify.c @ 1580:7f2be495dff6 coverity
merge coverity
author | Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au> |
---|---|
date | Sun, 04 Mar 2018 15:07:09 +0800 |
parents | 92c93b4a3646 |
children | f52919ffd3b1 |
line wrap: on
line diff
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/fuzzer-verify.c Sun Mar 04 15:07:09 2018 +0800 @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +#include "fuzz.h" +#include "session.h" +#include "fuzz-wrapfd.h" +#include "debug.h" + +static void setup_fuzzer(void) { + fuzz_common_setup(); +} + +static buffer *verifydata; + +/* Tests reading a public key and verifying a signature */ +int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size) { + static int once = 0; + if (!once) { + setup_fuzzer(); + verifydata = buf_new(30); + buf_putstring(verifydata, "x", 1); + once = 1; + } + + if (fuzz_set_input(Data, Size) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) { + return 0; + } + + m_malloc_set_epoch(1); + + if (setjmp(fuzz.jmp) == 0) { + sign_key *key = new_sign_key(); + enum signkey_type type = DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_ANY; + if (buf_get_pub_key(fuzz.input, key, &type) == DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) { + if (buf_verify(fuzz.input, key, verifydata) == DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) { + /* The fuzzer is capable of generating keys with a signature to match. + We don't want false positives if the key is bogus, since a client/server + wouldn't be trusting a bogus key anyway */ + int boguskey = 0; + + if (type == DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_DSS) { + /* So far have seen dss keys with bad p/q/g domain parameters */ + int pprime, qprime; + assert(mp_prime_is_prime(key->dsskey->p, 5, &pprime) == MP_OKAY); + assert(mp_prime_is_prime(key->dsskey->q, 18, &qprime) == MP_OKAY); + boguskey = !(pprime && qprime); + /* Could also check g**q mod p == 1 */ + } + + if (!boguskey) { + printf("Random key/signature managed to verify!\n"); + abort(); + } + + + } + } + sign_key_free(key); + m_malloc_free_epoch(1, 0); + } else { + m_malloc_free_epoch(1, 1); + TRACE(("dropbear_exit longjmped")) + /* dropbear_exit jumped here */ + } + + return 0; +}