Mercurial > dropbear
diff src/pk/pkcs1/pkcs_1_oaep_decode.c @ 192:9cc34777b479 libtomcrypt
propagate from branch 'au.asn.ucc.matt.ltc-orig' (head 9ba8f01f44320e9cb9f19881105ae84f84a43ea9)
to branch 'au.asn.ucc.matt.dropbear.ltc' (head dbf51c569bc34956ad948e4cc87a0eeb2170b768)
author | Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au> |
---|---|
date | Sun, 08 May 2005 06:36:47 +0000 |
parents | 1c15b283127b |
children | 39d5d58461d6 |
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/src/pk/pkcs1/pkcs_1_oaep_decode.c Sun May 08 06:36:47 2005 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,186 @@ +/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis + * + * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic + * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. + * + * The library is free for all purposes without any express + * guarantee it works. + * + * Tom St Denis, [email protected], http://libtomcrypt.org + */ +#include "tomcrypt.h" + +/** + @file pkcs_1_oaep_decode.c + OAEP Padding for PKCS #1, Tom St Denis +*/ + +#ifdef PKCS_1 + +/** + PKCS #1 v2.00 OAEP decode + @param msg The encoded data to decode + @param msglen The length of the encoded data (octets) + @param lparam The session or system data (can be NULL) + @param lparamlen The length of the lparam + @param modulus_bitlen The bit length of the RSA modulus + @param hash_idx The index of the hash desired + @param out [out] Destination of decoding + @param outlen [in/out] The max size and resulting size of the decoding + @param res [out] Result of decoding, 1==valid, 0==invalid + @return CRYPT_OK if successful (even if invalid) +*/ +int pkcs_1_oaep_decode(const unsigned char *msg, unsigned long msglen, + const unsigned char *lparam, unsigned long lparamlen, + unsigned long modulus_bitlen, int hash_idx, + unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen, + int *res) +{ + unsigned char *DB, *seed, *mask; + unsigned long hLen, x, y, modulus_len; + int err; + + LTC_ARGCHK(msg != NULL); + LTC_ARGCHK(out != NULL); + LTC_ARGCHK(outlen != NULL); + LTC_ARGCHK(res != NULL); + + /* default to invalid packet */ + *res = 0; + + /* test valid hash */ + if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) { + return err; + } + hLen = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].hashsize; + modulus_len = (modulus_bitlen >> 3) + (modulus_bitlen & 7 ? 1 : 0); + + /* test hash/message size */ + if ((2*hLen >= (modulus_len - 2)) || (msglen != modulus_len)) { + return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_SIZE; + } + + /* allocate ram for DB/mask/salt of size modulus_len */ + DB = XMALLOC(modulus_len); + mask = XMALLOC(modulus_len); + seed = XMALLOC(modulus_len); + if (DB == NULL || mask == NULL || seed == NULL) { + if (DB != NULL) { + XFREE(DB); + } + if (mask != NULL) { + XFREE(mask); + } + if (seed != NULL) { + XFREE(seed); + } + return CRYPT_MEM; + } + + /* ok so it's now in the form + + 0x00 || maskedseed || maskedDB + + 1 || hLen || modulus_len - hLen - 1 + + */ + + /* must have leading 0x00 byte */ + if (msg[0] != 0x00) { + err = CRYPT_OK; + goto LBL_ERR; + } + + /* now read the masked seed */ + for (x = 1, y = 0; y < hLen; y++) { + seed[y] = msg[x++]; + } + + /* now read the masked DB */ + for (y = 0; y < modulus_len - hLen - 1; y++) { + DB[y] = msg[x++]; + } + + /* compute MGF1 of maskedDB (hLen) */ + if ((err = pkcs_1_mgf1(DB, modulus_len - hLen - 1, hash_idx, mask, hLen)) != CRYPT_OK) { + goto LBL_ERR; + } + + /* XOR against seed */ + for (y = 0; y < hLen; y++) { + seed[y] ^= mask[y]; + } + + /* compute MGF1 of seed (k - hlen - 1) */ + if ((err = pkcs_1_mgf1(seed, hLen, hash_idx, mask, modulus_len - hLen - 1)) != CRYPT_OK) { + goto LBL_ERR; + } + + /* xor against DB */ + for (y = 0; y < (modulus_len - hLen - 1); y++) { + DB[y] ^= mask[y]; + } + + /* now DB == lhash || PS || 0x01 || M, PS == k - mlen - 2hlen - 2 zeroes */ + + /* compute lhash and store it in seed [reuse temps!] */ + x = modulus_len; + if (lparam != NULL) { + if ((err = hash_memory(hash_idx, lparam, lparamlen, seed, &x)) != CRYPT_OK) { + goto LBL_ERR; + } + } else { + /* can't pass hash_memory a NULL so use DB with zero length */ + if ((err = hash_memory(hash_idx, DB, 0, seed, &x)) != CRYPT_OK) { + goto LBL_ERR; + } + } + + /* compare the lhash'es */ + if (memcmp(seed, DB, hLen) != 0) { + err = CRYPT_OK; + goto LBL_ERR; + } + + /* now zeroes before a 0x01 */ + for (x = hLen; x < (modulus_len - hLen - 1) && DB[x] == 0x00; x++) { + /* step... */ + } + + /* error out if wasn't 0x01 */ + if (x == (modulus_len - hLen - 1) || DB[x] != 0x01) { + err = CRYPT_OK; + goto LBL_ERR; + } + + /* rest is the message (and skip 0x01) */ + if ((modulus_len - hLen - 1) - ++x > *outlen) { + err = CRYPT_BUFFER_OVERFLOW; + goto LBL_ERR; + } + + /* copy message */ + *outlen = (modulus_len - hLen - 1) - x; + for (y = 0; x != (modulus_len - hLen - 1); ) { + out[y++] = DB[x++]; + } + + /* valid packet */ + *res = 1; + + err = CRYPT_OK; +LBL_ERR: +#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK + zeromem(DB, modulus_len); + zeromem(seed, modulus_len); + zeromem(mask, modulus_len); +#endif + + XFREE(seed); + XFREE(mask); + XFREE(DB); + + return err; +} + +#endif /* PKCS_1 */