Mercurial > dropbear
diff fuzzer-verify.c @ 1675:ae41624c2198
split signkey_type and signature_type for RSA sha1 vs sha256
author | Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au> |
---|---|
date | Sun, 17 May 2020 23:58:31 +0800 |
parents | f52919ffd3b1 |
children | d5cdc60db08e |
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--- a/fuzzer-verify.c Mon Apr 06 23:18:26 2020 +0800 +++ b/fuzzer-verify.c Sun May 17 23:58:31 2020 +0800 @@ -27,15 +27,25 @@ if (setjmp(fuzz.jmp) == 0) { sign_key *key = new_sign_key(); - enum signkey_type type = DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_ANY; - if (buf_get_pub_key(fuzz.input, key, &type) == DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) { - if (buf_verify(fuzz.input, key, verifydata) == DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) { + enum signkey_type keytype = DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_ANY; + if (buf_get_pub_key(fuzz.input, key, &keytype) == DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) { + enum signature_type sigtype = (enum signature_type)keytype; + if (keytype == DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_RSA) { + /* Flip a coin to decide rsa signature type */ + int flag = buf_getbyte(fuzz_input); + if (flag & 0x01) { + sigtype = DROPBEAR_SIGNATURE_RSA_SHA256; + } else { + sigtype = DROPBEAR_SIGNATURE_RSA_SHA1; + } + } + if (buf_verify(fuzz.input, key, sigtype, verifydata) == DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) { /* The fuzzer is capable of generating keys with a signature to match. We don't want false positives if the key is bogus, since a client/server wouldn't be trusting a bogus key anyway */ int boguskey = 0; - if (type == DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_DSS) { + if (keytype == DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_DSS) { /* So far have seen dss keys with bad p/q/g domain parameters */ int pprime, qprime, trials; trials = mp_prime_rabin_miller_trials(mp_count_bits(key->dsskey->p));