Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/pk/rsa/rsa_verify_hash.c @ 1772:0cc85b4a4abb
Move fuzzer-kex initialisation into a constructor function
Hopefully this can avoid hitting AFL timeouts
https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/pull/2474
author | Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au> |
---|---|
date | Thu, 29 Oct 2020 23:00:52 +0800 |
parents | 6dba84798cd5 |
children |
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file rsa_verify_hash.c RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 or v2 PSS signature verification, Tom St Denis and Andreas Lange */ #ifdef LTC_MRSA /** PKCS #1 de-sign then v1.5 or PSS depad @param sig The signature data @param siglen The length of the signature data (octets) @param hash The hash of the message that was signed @param hashlen The length of the hash of the message that was signed (octets) @param padding Type of padding (LTC_PKCS_1_PSS, LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5 or LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5_NA1) @param hash_idx The index of the desired hash @param saltlen The length of the salt used during signature @param stat [out] The result of the signature comparison, 1==valid, 0==invalid @param key The public RSA key corresponding to the key that performed the signature @return CRYPT_OK on success (even if the signature is invalid) */ int rsa_verify_hash_ex(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hashlen, int padding, int hash_idx, unsigned long saltlen, int *stat, rsa_key *key) { unsigned long modulus_bitlen, modulus_bytelen, x; int err; unsigned char *tmpbuf; LTC_ARGCHK(hash != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(sig != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); /* default to invalid */ *stat = 0; /* valid padding? */ if ((padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) && (padding != LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) && (padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5_NA1)) { return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_PADDING; } if (padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5_NA1) { /* valid hash ? */ if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } } /* get modulus len in bits */ modulus_bitlen = mp_count_bits( (key->N)); /* outlen must be at least the size of the modulus */ modulus_bytelen = mp_unsigned_bin_size( (key->N)); if (modulus_bytelen != siglen) { return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET; } /* allocate temp buffer for decoded sig */ tmpbuf = XMALLOC(siglen); if (tmpbuf == NULL) { return CRYPT_MEM; } /* RSA decode it */ x = siglen; if ((err = ltc_mp.rsa_me(sig, siglen, tmpbuf, &x, PK_PUBLIC, key)) != CRYPT_OK) { XFREE(tmpbuf); return err; } /* make sure the output is the right size */ if (x != siglen) { XFREE(tmpbuf); return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET; } if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) { /* PSS decode and verify it */ if(modulus_bitlen%8 == 1){ err = pkcs_1_pss_decode(hash, hashlen, tmpbuf+1, x-1, saltlen, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, stat); } else{ err = pkcs_1_pss_decode(hash, hashlen, tmpbuf, x, saltlen, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, stat); } } else { /* PKCS #1 v1.5 decode it */ unsigned char *out; unsigned long outlen; int decoded; /* allocate temp buffer for decoded hash */ outlen = ((modulus_bitlen >> 3) + (modulus_bitlen & 7 ? 1 : 0)) - 3; out = XMALLOC(outlen); if (out == NULL) { err = CRYPT_MEM; goto bail_2; } if ((err = pkcs_1_v1_5_decode(tmpbuf, x, LTC_PKCS_1_EMSA, modulus_bitlen, out, &outlen, &decoded)) != CRYPT_OK) { XFREE(out); goto bail_2; } if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) { unsigned long loid[16], reallen; ltc_asn1_list digestinfo[2], siginfo[2]; /* not all hashes have OIDs... so sad */ if (hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen == 0) { err = CRYPT_INVALID_ARG; goto bail_2; } /* now we must decode out[0...outlen-1] using ASN.1, test the OID and then test the hash */ /* construct the SEQUENCE SEQUENCE { SEQUENCE {hashoid OID blah NULL } hash OCTET STRING } */ LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER, loid, sizeof(loid)/sizeof(loid[0])); LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_NULL, NULL, 0); LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE, digestinfo, 2); LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, tmpbuf, siglen); if ((err = der_decode_sequence(out, outlen, siginfo, 2)) != CRYPT_OK) { /* fallback to Legacy:missing NULL */ LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE, digestinfo, 1); if ((err = der_decode_sequence(out, outlen, siginfo, 2)) != CRYPT_OK) { XFREE(out); goto bail_2; } } if ((err = der_length_sequence(siginfo, 2, &reallen)) != CRYPT_OK) { XFREE(out); goto bail_2; } /* test OID */ if ((reallen == outlen) && (digestinfo[0].size == hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen) && (XMEMCMP(digestinfo[0].data, hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OID, sizeof(unsigned long) * hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen) == 0) && (siginfo[1].size == hashlen) && (XMEMCMP(siginfo[1].data, hash, hashlen) == 0)) { *stat = 1; } } else { /* only check if the hash is equal */ if ((hashlen == outlen) && (XMEMCMP(out, hash, hashlen) == 0)) { *stat = 1; } } #ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK zeromem(out, outlen); #endif XFREE(out); } bail_2: #ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK zeromem(tmpbuf, siglen); #endif XFREE(tmpbuf); return err; } #endif /* LTC_MRSA */ /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */