Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/pk/ecc/ecc_verify_hash.c @ 652:17962b2a6b8f
- Make sure we don't use channel-specific data after it has been freed
with a ChanType->closehandler()
author | Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au> |
---|---|
date | Sun, 04 Dec 2011 05:27:29 +0800 |
parents | 0cbe8f6dbf9e |
children | ac2158e3e403 |
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. * * Tom St Denis, [email protected], http://libtomcrypt.com */ /* Implements ECC over Z/pZ for curve y^2 = x^3 - 3x + b * * All curves taken from NIST recommendation paper of July 1999 * Available at http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/dss.htm */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file ecc_verify_hash.c ECC Crypto, Tom St Denis */ #ifdef MECC /* verify * * w = s^-1 mod n * u1 = xw * u2 = rw * X = u1*G + u2*Q * v = X_x1 mod n * accept if v == r */ /** Verify an ECC signature @param sig The signature to verify @param siglen The length of the signature (octets) @param hash The hash (message digest) that was signed @param hashlen The length of the hash (octets) @param stat Result of signature, 1==valid, 0==invalid @param key The corresponding public ECC key @return CRYPT_OK if successful (even if the signature is not valid) */ int ecc_verify_hash(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hashlen, int *stat, ecc_key *key) { ecc_point *mG, *mQ; void *r, *s, *v, *w, *u1, *u2, *e, *p, *m; void *mp; int err; LTC_ARGCHK(sig != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(hash != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); /* default to invalid signature */ *stat = 0; mp = NULL; /* is the IDX valid ? */ if (ltc_ecc_is_valid_idx(key->idx) != 1) { return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_TYPE; } /* allocate ints */ if ((err = mp_init_multi(&r, &s, &v, &w, &u1, &u2, &p, &e, &m, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) { return CRYPT_MEM; } /* allocate points */ mG = ltc_ecc_new_point(); mQ = ltc_ecc_new_point(); if (mQ == NULL || mG == NULL) { err = CRYPT_MEM; goto error; } /* parse header */ if ((err = der_decode_sequence_multi(sig, siglen, LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL, r, LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL, s, LTC_ASN1_EOL, 0UL, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* get the order */ if ((err = mp_read_radix(p, (char *)key->dp->order, 16)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* get the modulus */ if ((err = mp_read_radix(m, (char *)key->dp->prime, 16)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* check for zero */ if (mp_iszero(r) || mp_iszero(s) || mp_cmp(r, p) != LTC_MP_LT || mp_cmp(s, p) != LTC_MP_LT) { err = CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET; goto error; } /* read hash */ if ((err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(e, (unsigned char *)hash, (int)hashlen)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* w = s^-1 mod n */ if ((err = mp_invmod(s, p, w)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* u1 = ew */ if ((err = mp_mulmod(e, w, p, u1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* u2 = rw */ if ((err = mp_mulmod(r, w, p, u2)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* find mG and mQ */ if ((err = mp_read_radix(mG->x, (char *)key->dp->Gx, 16)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_read_radix(mG->y, (char *)key->dp->Gy, 16)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_set(mG->z, 1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_copy(key->pubkey.x, mQ->x)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_copy(key->pubkey.y, mQ->y)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_copy(key->pubkey.z, mQ->z)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* compute u1*mG + u2*mQ = mG */ if (ltc_mp.ecc_mul2add == NULL) { if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_ptmul(u1, mG, mG, m, 0)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_ptmul(u2, mQ, mQ, m, 0)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* find the montgomery mp */ if ((err = mp_montgomery_setup(m, &mp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* add them */ if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_ptadd(mQ, mG, mG, m, mp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* reduce */ if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_map(mG, m, mp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } else { /* use Shamir's trick to compute u1*mG + u2*mQ using half of the doubles */ if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_mul2add(mG, u1, mQ, u2, mG, m)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } /* v = X_x1 mod n */ if ((err = mp_mod(mG->x, p, v)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* does v == r */ if (mp_cmp(v, r) == LTC_MP_EQ) { *stat = 1; } /* clear up and return */ err = CRYPT_OK; error: ltc_ecc_del_point(mG); ltc_ecc_del_point(mQ); mp_clear_multi(r, s, v, w, u1, u2, p, e, m, NULL); if (mp != NULL) { mp_montgomery_free(mp); } return err; } #endif /* $Source: /cvs/libtom/libtomcrypt/src/pk/ecc/ecc_verify_hash.c,v $ */ /* $Revision: 1.12 $ */ /* $Date: 2006/12/04 05:07:59 $ */