Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/pk/katja/katja_encrypt_key.c @ 958:1bf92da7a2a0
Try without identifying current user
Small change that warns the user if the current user cannot be identified rather than aborting. This came in handy when I put dropbear on a dlink that did not have a true user environment. Falling back on the "-l" option and user@ options works just fine as a client. The only implication I found is that the -J option will fail ungracefully without a known own_user.
author | iquaba <cooka2011@gmail.com> |
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date | Wed, 06 Aug 2014 08:48:43 -0500 |
parents | 0cbe8f6dbf9e |
children | f849a5ca2efc |
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. * * Tom St Denis, [email protected], http://libtomcrypt.com */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file katja_encrypt_key.c Katja PKCS-style OAEP encryption, Tom St Denis */ #ifdef MKAT /** (PKCS #1 v2.0) OAEP pad then encrypt @param in The plaintext @param inlen The length of the plaintext (octets) @param out [out] The ciphertext @param outlen [in/out] The max size and resulting size of the ciphertext @param lparam The system "lparam" for the encryption @param lparamlen The length of lparam (octets) @param prng An active PRNG @param prng_idx The index of the desired prng @param hash_idx The index of the desired hash @param key The Katja key to encrypt to @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int katja_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen, unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen, const unsigned char *lparam, unsigned long lparamlen, prng_state *prng, int prng_idx, int hash_idx, katja_key *key) { unsigned long modulus_bitlen, modulus_bytelen, x; int err; LTC_ARGCHK(in != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(out != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(outlen != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); /* valid prng and hash ? */ if ((err = prng_is_valid(prng_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } /* get modulus len in bits */ modulus_bitlen = mp_count_bits((key->N)); /* payload is upto pq, so we know q is 1/3rd the size of N and therefore pq is 2/3th the size */ modulus_bitlen = ((modulus_bitlen << 1) / 3); /* round down to next byte */ modulus_bitlen -= (modulus_bitlen & 7) + 8; /* outlen must be at least the size of the modulus */ modulus_bytelen = mp_unsigned_bin_size((key->N)); if (modulus_bytelen > *outlen) { *outlen = modulus_bytelen; return CRYPT_BUFFER_OVERFLOW; } /* OAEP pad the key */ x = *outlen; if ((err = pkcs_1_oaep_encode(in, inlen, lparam, lparamlen, modulus_bitlen, prng, prng_idx, hash_idx, out, &x)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } /* Katja exptmod the OAEP pad */ return katja_exptmod(out, x, out, outlen, PK_PUBLIC, key); } #endif /* MRSA */ /* $Source: /cvs/libtom/libtomcrypt/src/pk/katja/katja_encrypt_key.c,v $ */ /* $Revision: 1.5 $ */ /* $Date: 2006/06/16 21:53:41 $ */