Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/pk/ecc/ltc_ecc_mul2add.c @ 1629:258b57b208ae
Fix for issue successfull login of disabled user (#78)
This commit introduces fix for scenario:
1. Root login disabled on dropbear
2. PAM authentication model enabled
While login as root user, after prompt for password
user is being notified about login failrue, but
after second attempt of prompt for password within
same session, login becames succesfull.
Signed-off-by: Pawel Rapkiewicz <[email protected]>
author | vincentto13 <33652988+vincentto13@users.noreply.github.com> |
---|---|
date | Wed, 20 Mar 2019 15:03:40 +0100 |
parents | 6dba84798cd5 |
children |
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ /* Implements ECC over Z/pZ for curve y^2 = x^3 - 3x + b * * All curves taken from NIST recommendation paper of July 1999 * Available at http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/dss.htm */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file ltc_ecc_mul2add.c ECC Crypto, Shamir's Trick, Tom St Denis */ #ifdef LTC_MECC #ifdef LTC_ECC_SHAMIR /** Computes kA*A + kB*B = C using Shamir's Trick @param A First point to multiply @param kA What to multiple A by @param B Second point to multiply @param kB What to multiple B by @param C [out] Destination point (can overlap with A or B @param modulus Modulus for curve @return CRYPT_OK on success */ int ltc_ecc_mul2add(ecc_point *A, void *kA, ecc_point *B, void *kB, ecc_point *C, void *modulus) { ecc_point *precomp[16]; unsigned bitbufA, bitbufB, lenA, lenB, len, x, y, nA, nB, nibble; unsigned char *tA, *tB; int err, first; void *mp, *mu; /* argchks */ LTC_ARGCHK(A != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(B != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(C != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(kA != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(kB != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(modulus != NULL); /* allocate memory */ tA = XCALLOC(1, ECC_BUF_SIZE); if (tA == NULL) { return CRYPT_MEM; } tB = XCALLOC(1, ECC_BUF_SIZE); if (tB == NULL) { XFREE(tA); return CRYPT_MEM; } /* get sizes */ lenA = mp_unsigned_bin_size(kA); lenB = mp_unsigned_bin_size(kB); len = MAX(lenA, lenB); /* sanity check */ if ((lenA > ECC_BUF_SIZE) || (lenB > ECC_BUF_SIZE)) { err = CRYPT_INVALID_ARG; goto ERR_T; } /* extract and justify kA */ mp_to_unsigned_bin(kA, (len - lenA) + tA); /* extract and justify kB */ mp_to_unsigned_bin(kB, (len - lenB) + tB); /* allocate the table */ for (x = 0; x < 16; x++) { precomp[x] = ltc_ecc_new_point(); if (precomp[x] == NULL) { for (y = 0; y < x; ++y) { ltc_ecc_del_point(precomp[y]); } err = CRYPT_MEM; goto ERR_T; } } /* init montgomery reduction */ if ((err = mp_montgomery_setup(modulus, &mp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto ERR_P; } if ((err = mp_init(&mu)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto ERR_MP; } if ((err = mp_montgomery_normalization(mu, modulus)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto ERR_MU; } /* copy ones ... */ if ((err = mp_mulmod(A->x, mu, modulus, precomp[1]->x)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto ERR_MU; } if ((err = mp_mulmod(A->y, mu, modulus, precomp[1]->y)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto ERR_MU; } if ((err = mp_mulmod(A->z, mu, modulus, precomp[1]->z)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto ERR_MU; } if ((err = mp_mulmod(B->x, mu, modulus, precomp[1<<2]->x)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto ERR_MU; } if ((err = mp_mulmod(B->y, mu, modulus, precomp[1<<2]->y)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto ERR_MU; } if ((err = mp_mulmod(B->z, mu, modulus, precomp[1<<2]->z)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto ERR_MU; } /* precomp [i,0](A + B) table */ if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_ptdbl(precomp[1], precomp[2], modulus, mp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto ERR_MU; } if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_ptadd(precomp[1], precomp[2], precomp[3], modulus, mp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto ERR_MU; } /* precomp [0,i](A + B) table */ if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_ptdbl(precomp[1<<2], precomp[2<<2], modulus, mp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto ERR_MU; } if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_ptadd(precomp[1<<2], precomp[2<<2], precomp[3<<2], modulus, mp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto ERR_MU; } /* precomp [i,j](A + B) table (i != 0, j != 0) */ for (x = 1; x < 4; x++) { for (y = 1; y < 4; y++) { if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_ptadd(precomp[x], precomp[(y<<2)], precomp[x+(y<<2)], modulus, mp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto ERR_MU; } } } nibble = 3; first = 1; bitbufA = tA[0]; bitbufB = tB[0]; /* for every byte of the multiplicands */ for (x = 0;; ) { /* grab a nibble */ if (++nibble == 4) { if (x == len) break; bitbufA = tA[x]; bitbufB = tB[x]; nibble = 0; ++x; } /* extract two bits from both, shift/update */ nA = (bitbufA >> 6) & 0x03; nB = (bitbufB >> 6) & 0x03; bitbufA = (bitbufA << 2) & 0xFF; bitbufB = (bitbufB << 2) & 0xFF; /* if both zero, if first, continue */ if ((nA == 0) && (nB == 0) && (first == 1)) { continue; } /* double twice, only if this isn't the first */ if (first == 0) { /* double twice */ if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_ptdbl(C, C, modulus, mp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto ERR_MU; } if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_ptdbl(C, C, modulus, mp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto ERR_MU; } } /* if not both zero */ if ((nA != 0) || (nB != 0)) { if (first == 1) { /* if first, copy from table */ first = 0; if ((err = mp_copy(precomp[nA + (nB<<2)]->x, C->x)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto ERR_MU; } if ((err = mp_copy(precomp[nA + (nB<<2)]->y, C->y)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto ERR_MU; } if ((err = mp_copy(precomp[nA + (nB<<2)]->z, C->z)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto ERR_MU; } } else { /* if not first, add from table */ if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_ptadd(C, precomp[nA + (nB<<2)], C, modulus, mp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto ERR_MU; } } } } /* reduce to affine */ err = ltc_ecc_map(C, modulus, mp); /* clean up */ ERR_MU: mp_clear(mu); ERR_MP: mp_montgomery_free(mp); ERR_P: for (x = 0; x < 16; x++) { ltc_ecc_del_point(precomp[x]); } ERR_T: #ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK zeromem(tA, ECC_BUF_SIZE); zeromem(tB, ECC_BUF_SIZE); #endif XFREE(tA); XFREE(tB); return err; } #endif #endif /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */