view dss.c @ 447:278805938dcf

Patch from Nicolai Ehemann to try binding before going to the background, so that if it exits early (because something's already listening etc) then it will return an exitcode of 1.
author Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
date Thu, 19 Jul 2007 15:54:18 +0000
parents a124aff0cbf1
children b50f0107e505 76097ec1a29a
line wrap: on
line source

/*
 * Dropbear - a SSH2 server
 * 
 * Copyright (c) 2002,2003 Matt Johnston
 * All rights reserved.
 * 
 * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
 * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
 * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
 * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
 * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
 * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
 * 
 * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
 * all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
 * 
 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
 * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
 * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
 * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
 * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
 * SOFTWARE. */

#include "includes.h"
#include "dbutil.h"
#include "bignum.h"
#include "dss.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "random.h"

/* Handle DSS (Digital Signature Standard), aka DSA (D.S. Algorithm),
 * operations, such as key reading, signing, verification. Key generation
 * is in gendss.c, since it isn't required in the server itself.
 *
 * See FIPS186 or the Handbook of Applied Cryptography for details of the
 * algorithm */

#ifdef DROPBEAR_DSS 

/* Load a dss key from a buffer, initialising the values.
 * The key will have the same format as buf_put_dss_key.
 * These should be freed with dss_key_free.
 * Returns DROPBEAR_SUCCESS or DROPBEAR_FAILURE */
int buf_get_dss_pub_key(buffer* buf, dss_key *key) {

	TRACE(("enter buf_get_dss_pub_key"))
	dropbear_assert(key != NULL);
	key->p = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int));
	key->q = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int));
	key->g = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int));
	key->y = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int));
	m_mp_init_multi(key->p, key->q, key->g, key->y, NULL);
	key->x = NULL;

	buf_incrpos(buf, 4+SSH_SIGNKEY_DSS_LEN); /* int + "ssh-dss" */
	if (buf_getmpint(buf, key->p) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE
	 || buf_getmpint(buf, key->q) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE
	 || buf_getmpint(buf, key->g) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE
	 || buf_getmpint(buf, key->y) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
		TRACE(("leave buf_get_dss_pub_key: failed reading mpints"))
		return DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
	}

	if (mp_count_bits(key->p) < MIN_DSS_KEYLEN) {
		dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "DSS key too short");
		TRACE(("leave buf_get_dss_pub_key: short key"))
		return DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
	}

	TRACE(("leave buf_get_dss_pub_key: success"))
	return DROPBEAR_SUCCESS;
}

/* Same as buf_get_dss_pub_key, but reads a private "x" key at the end.
 * Loads a private dss key from a buffer
 * Returns DROPBEAR_SUCCESS or DROPBEAR_FAILURE */
int buf_get_dss_priv_key(buffer* buf, dss_key *key) {

	int ret = DROPBEAR_FAILURE;

	dropbear_assert(key != NULL);

	ret = buf_get_dss_pub_key(buf, key);
	if (ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
		return DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
	}

	key->x = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int));
	m_mp_init(key->x);
	ret = buf_getmpint(buf, key->x);
	if (ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
		m_free(key->x);
	}

	return ret;
}
	

/* Clear and free the memory used by a public or private key */
void dss_key_free(dss_key *key) {

	TRACE(("enter dsa_key_free"))
	if (key == NULL) {
		TRACE(("enter dsa_key_free: key == NULL"))
		return;
	}
	if (key->p) {
		mp_clear(key->p);
		m_free(key->p);
	}
	if (key->q) {
		mp_clear(key->q);
		m_free(key->q);
	}
	if (key->g) {
		mp_clear(key->g);
		m_free(key->g);
	}
	if (key->y) {
		mp_clear(key->y);
		m_free(key->y);
	}
	if (key->x) {
		mp_clear(key->x);
		m_free(key->x);
	}
	m_free(key);
	TRACE(("leave dsa_key_free"))
}

/* put the dss public key into the buffer in the required format:
 *
 * string	"ssh-dss"
 * mpint	p
 * mpint	q
 * mpint	g
 * mpint	y
 */
void buf_put_dss_pub_key(buffer* buf, dss_key *key) {

	dropbear_assert(key != NULL);
	buf_putstring(buf, SSH_SIGNKEY_DSS, SSH_SIGNKEY_DSS_LEN);
	buf_putmpint(buf, key->p);
	buf_putmpint(buf, key->q);
	buf_putmpint(buf, key->g);
	buf_putmpint(buf, key->y);

}

/* Same as buf_put_dss_pub_key, but with the private "x" key appended */
void buf_put_dss_priv_key(buffer* buf, dss_key *key) {

	dropbear_assert(key != NULL);
	buf_put_dss_pub_key(buf, key);
	buf_putmpint(buf, key->x);

}

#ifdef DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_VERIFY
/* Verify a DSS signature (in buf) made on data by the key given. 
 * returns DROPBEAR_SUCCESS or DROPBEAR_FAILURE */
int buf_dss_verify(buffer* buf, dss_key *key, const unsigned char* data,
		unsigned int len) {

	unsigned char msghash[SHA1_HASH_SIZE];
	hash_state hs;
	int ret = DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
	DEF_MP_INT(val1);
	DEF_MP_INT(val2);
	DEF_MP_INT(val3);
	DEF_MP_INT(val4);
	char * string = NULL;
	int stringlen;

	TRACE(("enter buf_dss_verify"))
	dropbear_assert(key != NULL);

	m_mp_init_multi(&val1, &val2, &val3, &val4, NULL);

	/* get blob, check length */
	string = buf_getstring(buf, &stringlen);
	if (stringlen != 2*SHA1_HASH_SIZE) {
		goto out;
	}

	/* hash the data */
	sha1_init(&hs);
	sha1_process(&hs, data, len);
	sha1_done(&hs, msghash);

	/* create the signature - s' and r' are the received signatures in buf */
	/* w = (s')-1 mod q */
	/* let val1 = s' */
	bytes_to_mp(&val1, &string[SHA1_HASH_SIZE], SHA1_HASH_SIZE);

	if (mp_cmp(&val1, key->q) != MP_LT) {
		TRACE(("verify failed, s' >= q"))
		goto out;
	}
	/* let val2 = w = (s')^-1 mod q*/
	if (mp_invmod(&val1, key->q, &val2) != MP_OKAY) {
		goto out;
	}

	/* u1 = ((SHA(M')w) mod q */
	/* let val1 = SHA(M') = msghash */
	bytes_to_mp(&val1, msghash, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);

	/* let val3 = u1 = ((SHA(M')w) mod q */
	if (mp_mulmod(&val1, &val2, key->q, &val3) != MP_OKAY) {
		goto out;
	}

	/* u2 = ((r')w) mod q */
	/* let val1 = r' */
	bytes_to_mp(&val1, &string[0], SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
	if (mp_cmp(&val1, key->q) != MP_LT) {
		TRACE(("verify failed, r' >= q"))
		goto out;
	}
	/* let val4 = u2 = ((r')w) mod q */
	if (mp_mulmod(&val1, &val2, key->q, &val4) != MP_OKAY) {
		goto out;
	}

	/* v = (((g)^u1 (y)^u2) mod p) mod q */
	/* val2 = g^u1 mod p */
	if (mp_exptmod(key->g, &val3, key->p, &val2) != MP_OKAY) {
		goto out;
	}
	/* val3 = y^u2 mod p */
	if (mp_exptmod(key->y, &val4, key->p, &val3) != MP_OKAY) {
		goto out;
	}
	/* val4 = ((g)^u1 (y)^u2) mod p */
	if (mp_mulmod(&val2, &val3, key->p, &val4) != MP_OKAY) {
		goto out;
	}
	/* val2 = v = (((g)^u1 (y)^u2) mod p) mod q */
	if (mp_mod(&val4, key->q, &val2) != MP_OKAY) {
		goto out;
	}
	
	/* check whether signatures verify */
	if (mp_cmp(&val2, &val1) == MP_EQ) {
		/* good sig */
		ret = DROPBEAR_SUCCESS;
	}

out:
	mp_clear_multi(&val1, &val2, &val3, &val4, NULL);
	m_free(string);

	return ret;

}
#endif /* DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_VERIFY */

#ifdef DSS_PROTOK	
/* convert an unsigned mp into an array of bytes, malloced.
 * This array must be freed after use, len contains the length of the array,
 * if len != NULL */
static unsigned char* mptobytes(mp_int *mp, int *len) {
	
	unsigned char* ret;
	int size;

	size = mp_unsigned_bin_size(mp);
	ret = m_malloc(size);
	if (mp_to_unsigned_bin(mp, ret) != MP_OKAY) {
		dropbear_exit("mem alloc error");
	}
	if (len != NULL) {
		*len = size;
	}
	return ret;
}
#endif

/* Sign the data presented with key, writing the signature contents
 * to the buffer
 *
 * When DSS_PROTOK is #defined:
 * The alternate k generation method is based on the method used in PuTTY. 
 * In particular to avoid being vulnerable to attacks using flaws in random
 * generation of k, we use the following:
 *
 * proto_k = SHA512 ( SHA512(x) || SHA160(message) )
 * k = proto_k mod q
 *
 * Now we aren't relying on the random number generation to protect the private
 * key x, which is a long term secret */
void buf_put_dss_sign(buffer* buf, dss_key *key, const unsigned char* data,
		unsigned int len) {

	unsigned char msghash[SHA1_HASH_SIZE];
	unsigned int writelen;
	unsigned int i;
#ifdef DSS_PROTOK
	unsigned char privkeyhash[SHA512_HASH_SIZE];
	unsigned char *privkeytmp;
	unsigned char proto_k[SHA512_HASH_SIZE];
	DEF_MP_INT(dss_protok);
#endif
	DEF_MP_INT(dss_k);
	DEF_MP_INT(dss_m);
	DEF_MP_INT(dss_temp1);
	DEF_MP_INT(dss_temp2);
	DEF_MP_INT(dss_r);
	DEF_MP_INT(dss_s);
	hash_state hs;
	
	TRACE(("enter buf_put_dss_sign"))
	dropbear_assert(key != NULL);
	
	/* hash the data */
	sha1_init(&hs);
	sha1_process(&hs, data, len);
	sha1_done(&hs, msghash);

	m_mp_init_multi(&dss_k, &dss_temp1, &dss_temp2, &dss_r, &dss_s,
			&dss_m, NULL);
#ifdef DSS_PROTOK	
	/* hash the privkey */
	privkeytmp = mptobytes(key->x, &i);
	sha512_init(&hs);
	sha512_process(&hs, "the quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog", 44);
	sha512_process(&hs, privkeytmp, i);
	sha512_done(&hs, privkeyhash);
	m_burn(privkeytmp, i);
	m_free(privkeytmp);

	/* calculate proto_k */
	sha512_init(&hs);
	sha512_process(&hs, privkeyhash, SHA512_HASH_SIZE);
	sha512_process(&hs, msghash, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
	sha512_done(&hs, proto_k);

	/* generate k */
	m_mp_init(&dss_protok);
	bytes_to_mp(&dss_protok, proto_k, SHA512_HASH_SIZE);
	if (mp_mod(&dss_protok, key->q, &dss_k) != MP_OKAY) {
		dropbear_exit("dss error");
	}
	mp_clear(&dss_protok);
	m_burn(proto_k, SHA512_HASH_SIZE);
#else /* DSS_PROTOK not defined*/
	gen_random_mpint(key->q, &dss_k);
#endif

	/* now generate the actual signature */
	bytes_to_mp(&dss_m, msghash, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);

	/* g^k mod p */
	if (mp_exptmod(key->g, &dss_k, key->p, &dss_temp1) !=  MP_OKAY) {
		dropbear_exit("dss error");
	}
	/* r = (g^k mod p) mod q */
	if (mp_mod(&dss_temp1, key->q, &dss_r) != MP_OKAY) {
		dropbear_exit("dss error");
	}

	/* x*r mod q */
	if (mp_mulmod(&dss_r, key->x, key->q, &dss_temp1) != MP_OKAY) {
		dropbear_exit("dss error");
	}
	/* (SHA1(M) + xr) mod q) */
	if (mp_addmod(&dss_m, &dss_temp1, key->q, &dss_temp2) != MP_OKAY) {
		dropbear_exit("dss error");
	}
	
	/* (k^-1) mod q */
	if (mp_invmod(&dss_k, key->q, &dss_temp1) != MP_OKAY) {
		dropbear_exit("dss error");
	}

	/* s = (k^-1(SHA1(M) + xr)) mod q */
	if (mp_mulmod(&dss_temp1, &dss_temp2, key->q, &dss_s) != MP_OKAY) {
		dropbear_exit("dss error");
	}

	buf_putstring(buf, SSH_SIGNKEY_DSS, SSH_SIGNKEY_DSS_LEN);
	buf_putint(buf, 2*SHA1_HASH_SIZE);

	writelen = mp_unsigned_bin_size(&dss_r);
	dropbear_assert(writelen <= SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
	/* need to pad to 160 bits with leading zeros */
	for (i = 0; i < SHA1_HASH_SIZE - writelen; i++) {
		buf_putbyte(buf, 0);
	}
	if (mp_to_unsigned_bin(&dss_r, buf_getwriteptr(buf, writelen)) 
			!= MP_OKAY) {
		dropbear_exit("dss error");
	}
	mp_clear(&dss_r);
	buf_incrwritepos(buf, writelen);

	writelen = mp_unsigned_bin_size(&dss_s);
	dropbear_assert(writelen <= SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
	/* need to pad to 160 bits with leading zeros */
	for (i = 0; i < SHA1_HASH_SIZE - writelen; i++) {
		buf_putbyte(buf, 0);
	}
	if (mp_to_unsigned_bin(&dss_s, buf_getwriteptr(buf, writelen)) 
			!= MP_OKAY) {
		dropbear_exit("dss error");
	}
	mp_clear(&dss_s);
	buf_incrwritepos(buf, writelen);

	mp_clear_multi(&dss_k, &dss_temp1, &dss_temp2, &dss_r, &dss_s,
			&dss_m, NULL);
	
	/* create the signature to return */

	TRACE(("leave buf_put_dss_sign"))
}

#endif /* DROPBEAR_DSS */