Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/pk/pkcs1/pkcs_1_pss_encode.c @ 1930:299f4f19ba19
Add /usr/sbin and /sbin to default root PATH
When dropbear is used in a very restricted environment (such as in a
initrd), the default user shell is often also very restricted
and doesn't take care of setting the PATH so the user ends up
with the PATH set by dropbear. Unfortunately, dropbear always
sets "/usr/bin:/bin" as default PATH even for the root user
which should have /usr/sbin and /sbin too.
For a concrete instance of this problem, see the "Remote Unlocking"
section in this tutorial: https://paxswill.com/blog/2013/11/04/encrypted-raspberry-pi/
It speaks of a bug in the initramfs script because it's written "blkid"
instead of "/sbin/blkid"... this is just because the scripts from the
initramfs do not expect to have a PATH without the sbin directories and
because dropbear is not setting the PATH appropriately for the root user.
I'm thus suggesting to use the attached patch to fix this misbehaviour (I
did not test it, but it's easy enough). It might seem anecdotic but
multiple Kali users have been bitten by this.
From https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=903403
author | Raphael Hertzog <hertzog@debian.org> |
---|---|
date | Mon, 09 Jul 2018 16:27:53 +0200 |
parents | 6dba84798cd5 |
children |
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file pkcs_1_pss_encode.c PKCS #1 PSS Signature Padding, Tom St Denis */ #ifdef LTC_PKCS_1 /** PKCS #1 v2.00 Signature Encoding @param msghash The hash to encode @param msghashlen The length of the hash (octets) @param saltlen The length of the salt desired (octets) @param prng An active PRNG context @param prng_idx The index of the PRNG desired @param hash_idx The index of the hash desired @param modulus_bitlen The bit length of the RSA modulus @param out [out] The destination of the encoding @param outlen [in/out] The max size and resulting size of the encoded data @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int pkcs_1_pss_encode(const unsigned char *msghash, unsigned long msghashlen, unsigned long saltlen, prng_state *prng, int prng_idx, int hash_idx, unsigned long modulus_bitlen, unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen) { unsigned char *DB, *mask, *salt, *hash; unsigned long x, y, hLen, modulus_len; int err; hash_state md; LTC_ARGCHK(msghash != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(out != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(outlen != NULL); /* ensure hash and PRNG are valid */ if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } if ((err = prng_is_valid(prng_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } hLen = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].hashsize; modulus_bitlen--; modulus_len = (modulus_bitlen>>3) + (modulus_bitlen & 7 ? 1 : 0); /* check sizes */ if ((saltlen > modulus_len) || (modulus_len < hLen + saltlen + 2)) { return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_SIZE; } /* allocate ram for DB/mask/salt/hash of size modulus_len */ DB = XMALLOC(modulus_len); mask = XMALLOC(modulus_len); salt = XMALLOC(modulus_len); hash = XMALLOC(modulus_len); if (DB == NULL || mask == NULL || salt == NULL || hash == NULL) { if (DB != NULL) { XFREE(DB); } if (mask != NULL) { XFREE(mask); } if (salt != NULL) { XFREE(salt); } if (hash != NULL) { XFREE(hash); } return CRYPT_MEM; } /* generate random salt */ if (saltlen > 0) { if (prng_descriptor[prng_idx].read(salt, saltlen, prng) != saltlen) { err = CRYPT_ERROR_READPRNG; goto LBL_ERR; } } /* M = (eight) 0x00 || msghash || salt, hash = H(M) */ if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].init(&md)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } zeromem(DB, 8); if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].process(&md, DB, 8)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].process(&md, msghash, msghashlen)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].process(&md, salt, saltlen)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].done(&md, hash)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } /* generate DB = PS || 0x01 || salt, PS == modulus_len - saltlen - hLen - 2 zero bytes */ x = 0; XMEMSET(DB + x, 0, modulus_len - saltlen - hLen - 2); x += modulus_len - saltlen - hLen - 2; DB[x++] = 0x01; XMEMCPY(DB + x, salt, saltlen); /* x += saltlen; */ /* generate mask of length modulus_len - hLen - 1 from hash */ if ((err = pkcs_1_mgf1(hash_idx, hash, hLen, mask, modulus_len - hLen - 1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } /* xor against DB */ for (y = 0; y < (modulus_len - hLen - 1); y++) { DB[y] ^= mask[y]; } /* output is DB || hash || 0xBC */ if (*outlen < modulus_len) { *outlen = modulus_len; err = CRYPT_BUFFER_OVERFLOW; goto LBL_ERR; } /* DB len = modulus_len - hLen - 1 */ y = 0; XMEMCPY(out + y, DB, modulus_len - hLen - 1); y += modulus_len - hLen - 1; /* hash */ XMEMCPY(out + y, hash, hLen); y += hLen; /* 0xBC */ out[y] = 0xBC; /* now clear the 8*modulus_len - modulus_bitlen most significant bits */ out[0] &= 0xFF >> ((modulus_len<<3) - modulus_bitlen); /* store output size */ *outlen = modulus_len; err = CRYPT_OK; LBL_ERR: #ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK zeromem(DB, modulus_len); zeromem(mask, modulus_len); zeromem(salt, modulus_len); zeromem(hash, modulus_len); #endif XFREE(hash); XFREE(salt); XFREE(mask); XFREE(DB); return err; } #endif /* LTC_PKCS_1 */ /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */