view libtomcrypt/src/pk/dsa/dsa_sign_hash.c @ 1861:2b3a8026a6ce

Add re-exec for server This allows ASLR to re-randomize the address space for every connection, preventing some vulnerabilities from being exploitable by repeated probing. Overhead (memory and time) is yet to be confirmed. At present this is only enabled on Linux. Other BSD platforms with fexecve() would probably also work though have not been tested.
author Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
date Sun, 30 Jan 2022 10:14:56 +0800
parents 6dba84798cd5
children
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis
 *
 * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic
 * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner.
 *
 * The library is free for all purposes without any express
 * guarantee it works.
 */
#include "tomcrypt.h"

/**
   @file dsa_sign_hash.c
   DSA implementation, sign a hash, Tom St Denis
*/

#ifdef LTC_MDSA

/**
  Sign a hash with DSA
  @param in       The hash to sign
  @param inlen    The length of the hash to sign
  @param r        The "r" integer of the signature (caller must initialize with mp_init() first)
  @param s        The "s" integer of the signature (caller must initialize with mp_init() first)
  @param prng     An active PRNG state
  @param wprng    The index of the PRNG desired
  @param key      A private DSA key
  @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int dsa_sign_hash_raw(const unsigned char *in,  unsigned long inlen,
                                   void   *r,   void *s,
                               prng_state *prng, int wprng, dsa_key *key)
{
   void         *k, *kinv, *tmp;
   unsigned char *buf;
   int            err, qbits;

   LTC_ARGCHK(in  != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(r   != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(s   != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL);

   if ((err = prng_is_valid(wprng)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
   }
   if (key->type != PK_PRIVATE) {
      return CRYPT_PK_NOT_PRIVATE;
   }

   /* check group order size  */
   if (key->qord >= LTC_MDSA_MAX_GROUP) {
      return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
   }

   buf = XMALLOC(LTC_MDSA_MAX_GROUP);
   if (buf == NULL) {
      return CRYPT_MEM;
   }

   /* Init our temps */
   if ((err = mp_init_multi(&k, &kinv, &tmp, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK)                       { goto ERRBUF; }

   qbits = mp_count_bits(key->q);
retry:

   do {
      /* gen random k */
      if ((err = rand_bn_bits(k, qbits, prng, wprng)) != CRYPT_OK)                     { goto error; }

      /* k should be from range: 1 <= k <= q-1 (see FIPS 186-4 B.2.2) */
      if (mp_cmp_d(k, 0) != LTC_MP_GT || mp_cmp(k, key->q) != LTC_MP_LT)               { goto retry; }

      /* test gcd */
      if ((err = mp_gcd(k, key->q, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK)                                  { goto error; }
   } while (mp_cmp_d(tmp, 1) != LTC_MP_EQ);

   /* now find 1/k mod q */
   if ((err = mp_invmod(k, key->q, kinv)) != CRYPT_OK)                                 { goto error; }

   /* now find r = g^k mod p mod q */
   if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->g, k, key->p, r)) != CRYPT_OK)                           { goto error; }
   if ((err = mp_mod(r, key->q, r)) != CRYPT_OK)                                       { goto error; }

   if (mp_iszero(r) == LTC_MP_YES)                                                     { goto retry; }

   /* FIPS 186-4 4.6: use leftmost min(bitlen(q), bitlen(hash)) bits of 'hash'*/
   inlen = MIN(inlen, (unsigned long)(key->qord));

   /* now find s = (in + xr)/k mod q */
   if ((err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(tmp, (unsigned char *)in, inlen)) != CRYPT_OK)      { goto error; }
   if ((err = mp_mul(key->x, r, s)) != CRYPT_OK)                                       { goto error; }
   if ((err = mp_add(s, tmp, s)) != CRYPT_OK)                                          { goto error; }
   if ((err = mp_mulmod(s, kinv, key->q, s)) != CRYPT_OK)                              { goto error; }

   if (mp_iszero(s) == LTC_MP_YES)                                                     { goto retry; }

   err = CRYPT_OK;
error:
   mp_clear_multi(k, kinv, tmp, NULL);
ERRBUF:
#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
   zeromem(buf, LTC_MDSA_MAX_GROUP);
#endif
   XFREE(buf);
   return err;
}

/**
  Sign a hash with DSA
  @param in       The hash to sign
  @param inlen    The length of the hash to sign
  @param out      [out] Where to store the signature
  @param outlen   [in/out] The max size and resulting size of the signature
  @param prng     An active PRNG state
  @param wprng    The index of the PRNG desired
  @param key      A private DSA key
  @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int dsa_sign_hash(const unsigned char *in,  unsigned long inlen,
                        unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen,
                        prng_state *prng, int wprng, dsa_key *key)
{
   void         *r, *s;
   int           err;

   LTC_ARGCHK(in      != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(out     != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(outlen  != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(key     != NULL);

   if (mp_init_multi(&r, &s, NULL) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return CRYPT_MEM;
   }

   if ((err = dsa_sign_hash_raw(in, inlen, r, s, prng, wprng, key)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      goto error;
   }

   err = der_encode_sequence_multi(out, outlen,
                             LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL, r,
                             LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL, s,
                             LTC_ASN1_EOL,     0UL, NULL);

error:
   mp_clear_multi(r, s, NULL);
   return err;
}

#endif

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