view fuzz/fuzzer-kexdh.c @ 1855:35d504d59c05

Implement server-side support for sk-ecdsa U2F-backed keys (#142) * Implement server-side support for sk-ecdsa U2F-backed keys * Fix out-of-bounds read on normal ecdsa-sha2-[identifier] keys * Fix one more potential out-of-bounds read * Check if nistp256 curve is used in sk-ecdsa-sha2- key It's the only allowed curve per PROTOCOL.u2f specification * Implement server-side support for sk-ed25519 FIDO2-backed keys * Keys with type sk-* make no sense as host keys, so they should be disabled * fix typo * Make sk-ecdsa call buf_ecdsa_verify This reduces code duplication, the SK code just handles the different message format. * Reduce sk specific code The application id can be stored in signkey, then we don't need to call sk-specific functions from svr-authpubkey * Remove debugging output, which causes compilation errors with DEBUG_TRACE disabled * Proper cleanup of sk_app Co-authored-by: Matt Johnston <[email protected]>
author egor-duda <egor-duda@users.noreply.github.com>
date Sat, 22 Jan 2022 16:53:04 +0300
parents 0cc85b4a4abb
children
line wrap: on
line source

#include "fuzz.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "fuzz-wrapfd.h"
#include "debug.h"
#include "runopts.h"
#include "algo.h"
#include "bignum.h"

static struct key_context* keep_newkeys = NULL;
#define NUM_PARAMS 80
static struct kex_dh_param *dh_params[NUM_PARAMS];

static void setup() __attribute__((constructor));
// Perform initial setup here to avoid hitting timeouts on first run
static void setup() {
	fuzz_common_setup();
	fuzz_svr_setup();

	keep_newkeys = (struct key_context*)m_malloc(sizeof(struct key_context));
	keep_newkeys->algo_kex = fuzz_get_algo(sshkex, "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256");
	keep_newkeys->algo_hostkey = DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_ECDSA_NISTP256;
	ses.newkeys = keep_newkeys;

	/* Pre-generate parameters */
	int i;
	for (i = 0; i < NUM_PARAMS; i++) {
		dh_params[i] = gen_kexdh_param();
	}
}

int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size) {
	if (fuzz_set_input(Data, Size) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
		return 0;
	}

	m_malloc_set_epoch(1);

	if (setjmp(fuzz.jmp) == 0) {
		/* Based on recv_msg_kexdh_init()/send_msg_kexdh_reply() 
		with DROPBEAR_KEX_NORMAL_DH */
		ses.newkeys = keep_newkeys;

		/* Choose from the collection of ecdh params */
		unsigned int e = buf_getint(fuzz.input);
		struct kex_dh_param * dh_param = dh_params[e % NUM_PARAMS];

		DEF_MP_INT(dh_e);
		m_mp_init(&dh_e);
		if (buf_getmpint(fuzz.input, &dh_e) != DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) {
			dropbear_exit("Bad kex value");
		}

		ses.kexhashbuf = buf_new(KEXHASHBUF_MAX_INTS);
		kexdh_comb_key(dh_param, &dh_e, svr_opts.hostkey);

		mp_clear(ses.dh_K);
		m_free(ses.dh_K);
		mp_clear(&dh_e);

		buf_free(ses.hash);
		buf_free(ses.session_id);
		/* kexhashbuf is freed in kexdh_comb_key */

		m_malloc_free_epoch(1, 0);
	} else {
		m_malloc_free_epoch(1, 1);
		TRACE(("dropbear_exit longjmped"))
		/* dropbear_exit jumped here */
	}

	return 0;
}