Mercurial > dropbear
view fuzzer-verify.c @ 1715:3974f087d9c0
Disallow leading lines before the ident for server (#102)
Per RFC4253 4.2 clients must be able to process other lines of data
before the version string, server behavior is not defined neither
with MUST/SHOULD nor with MAY.
If server process up to 50 lines too - it may cause too long hanging
session with invalid/evil client that consume host resources and
potentially may lead to DDoS on poor embedded boxes.
Let's require first line from client to be version string and fail
early if it's not - matches both RFC and real OpenSSH behavior.
author | Vladislav Grishenko <themiron@users.noreply.github.com> |
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date | Mon, 15 Jun 2020 18:22:18 +0500 |
parents | e01f9ec6d177 |
children |
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#include "fuzz.h" #include "session.h" #include "fuzz-wrapfd.h" #include "debug.h" #include "dss.h" static void setup_fuzzer(void) { fuzz_common_setup(); } static buffer *verifydata; /* Tests reading a public key and verifying a signature */ int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size) { static int once = 0; if (!once) { setup_fuzzer(); verifydata = buf_new(30); buf_putstring(verifydata, "x", 1); once = 1; } if (fuzz_set_input(Data, Size) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) { return 0; } m_malloc_set_epoch(1); if (setjmp(fuzz.jmp) == 0) { sign_key *key = new_sign_key(); enum signkey_type keytype = DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_ANY; if (buf_get_pub_key(fuzz.input, key, &keytype) == DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) { enum signature_type sigtype; if (keytype == DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_RSA) { /* Flip a coin to decide rsa signature type */ int flag = buf_getbyte(fuzz.input); if (flag & 0x01) { sigtype = DROPBEAR_SIGNATURE_RSA_SHA256; } else { sigtype = DROPBEAR_SIGNATURE_RSA_SHA1; } } else { sigtype = signature_type_from_signkey(keytype); } if (buf_verify(fuzz.input, key, sigtype, verifydata) == DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) { /* The fuzzer is capable of generating keys with a signature to match. We don't want false positives if the key is bogus, since a client/server wouldn't be trusting a bogus key anyway */ int boguskey = 0; if (keytype == DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_DSS) { /* So far have seen dss keys with bad p/q/g domain parameters */ int pprime, qprime, trials; trials = mp_prime_rabin_miller_trials(mp_count_bits(key->dsskey->p)); assert(mp_prime_is_prime(key->dsskey->p, trials, &pprime) == MP_OKAY); trials = mp_prime_rabin_miller_trials(mp_count_bits(key->dsskey->q)); assert(mp_prime_is_prime(key->dsskey->q, trials, &qprime) == MP_OKAY); boguskey = !(pprime && qprime); /* Could also check g**q mod p == 1 */ } if (!boguskey) { printf("Random key/signature managed to verify!\n"); abort(); } } } sign_key_free(key); m_malloc_free_epoch(1, 0); } else { m_malloc_free_epoch(1, 1); TRACE(("dropbear_exit longjmped")) /* dropbear_exit jumped here */ } return 0; }