Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/ciphers/kasumi.c @ 1715:3974f087d9c0
Disallow leading lines before the ident for server (#102)
Per RFC4253 4.2 clients must be able to process other lines of data
before the version string, server behavior is not defined neither
with MUST/SHOULD nor with MAY.
If server process up to 50 lines too - it may cause too long hanging
session with invalid/evil client that consume host resources and
potentially may lead to DDoS on poor embedded boxes.
Let's require first line from client to be version string and fail
early if it's not - matches both RFC and real OpenSSH behavior.
author | Vladislav Grishenko <themiron@users.noreply.github.com> |
---|---|
date | Mon, 15 Jun 2020 18:22:18 +0500 |
parents | 6dba84798cd5 |
children |
line wrap: on
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ /** @file kasumi.c Implementation of the 3GPP Kasumi block cipher Derived from the 3GPP standard source code */ #include "tomcrypt.h" #ifdef LTC_KASUMI typedef unsigned u16; #define ROL16(x, y) ((((x)<<(y)) | ((x)>>(16-(y)))) & 0xFFFF) const struct ltc_cipher_descriptor kasumi_desc = { "kasumi", 21, 16, 16, 8, 8, &kasumi_setup, &kasumi_ecb_encrypt, &kasumi_ecb_decrypt, &kasumi_test, &kasumi_done, &kasumi_keysize, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; static u16 FI( u16 in, u16 subkey ) { u16 nine, seven; static const u16 S7[128] = { 54, 50, 62, 56, 22, 34, 94, 96, 38, 6, 63, 93, 2, 18,123, 33, 55,113, 39,114, 21, 67, 65, 12, 47, 73, 46, 27, 25,111,124, 81, 53, 9,121, 79, 52, 60, 58, 48,101,127, 40,120,104, 70, 71, 43, 20,122, 72, 61, 23,109, 13,100, 77, 1, 16, 7, 82, 10,105, 98, 117,116, 76, 11, 89,106, 0,125,118, 99, 86, 69, 30, 57,126, 87, 112, 51, 17, 5, 95, 14, 90, 84, 91, 8, 35,103, 32, 97, 28, 66, 102, 31, 26, 45, 75, 4, 85, 92, 37, 74, 80, 49, 68, 29,115, 44, 64,107,108, 24,110, 83, 36, 78, 42, 19, 15, 41, 88,119, 59, 3 }; static const u16 S9[512] = { 167,239,161,379,391,334, 9,338, 38,226, 48,358,452,385, 90,397, 183,253,147,331,415,340, 51,362,306,500,262, 82,216,159,356,177, 175,241,489, 37,206, 17, 0,333, 44,254,378, 58,143,220, 81,400, 95, 3,315,245, 54,235,218,405,472,264,172,494,371,290,399, 76, 165,197,395,121,257,480,423,212,240, 28,462,176,406,507,288,223, 501,407,249,265, 89,186,221,428,164, 74,440,196,458,421,350,163, 232,158,134,354, 13,250,491,142,191, 69,193,425,152,227,366,135, 344,300,276,242,437,320,113,278, 11,243, 87,317, 36, 93,496, 27, 487,446,482, 41, 68,156,457,131,326,403,339, 20, 39,115,442,124, 475,384,508, 53,112,170,479,151,126,169, 73,268,279,321,168,364, 363,292, 46,499,393,327,324, 24,456,267,157,460,488,426,309,229, 439,506,208,271,349,401,434,236, 16,209,359, 52, 56,120,199,277, 465,416,252,287,246, 6, 83,305,420,345,153,502, 65, 61,244,282, 173,222,418, 67,386,368,261,101,476,291,195,430, 49, 79,166,330, 280,383,373,128,382,408,155,495,367,388,274,107,459,417, 62,454, 132,225,203,316,234, 14,301, 91,503,286,424,211,347,307,140,374, 35,103,125,427, 19,214,453,146,498,314,444,230,256,329,198,285, 50,116, 78,410, 10,205,510,171,231, 45,139,467, 29, 86,505, 32, 72, 26,342,150,313,490,431,238,411,325,149,473, 40,119,174,355, 185,233,389, 71,448,273,372, 55,110,178,322, 12,469,392,369,190, 1,109,375,137,181, 88, 75,308,260,484, 98,272,370,275,412,111, 336,318, 4,504,492,259,304, 77,337,435, 21,357,303,332,483, 18, 47, 85, 25,497,474,289,100,269,296,478,270,106, 31,104,433, 84, 414,486,394, 96, 99,154,511,148,413,361,409,255,162,215,302,201, 266,351,343,144,441,365,108,298,251, 34,182,509,138,210,335,133, 311,352,328,141,396,346,123,319,450,281,429,228,443,481, 92,404, 485,422,248,297, 23,213,130,466, 22,217,283, 70,294,360,419,127, 312,377, 7,468,194, 2,117,295,463,258,224,447,247,187, 80,398, 284,353,105,390,299,471,470,184, 57,200,348, 63,204,188, 33,451, 97, 30,310,219, 94,160,129,493, 64,179,263,102,189,207,114,402, 438,477,387,122,192, 42,381, 5,145,118,180,449,293,323,136,380, 43, 66, 60,455,341,445,202,432, 8,237, 15,376,436,464, 59,461}; /* The sixteen bit input is split into two unequal halves, * * nine bits and seven bits - as is the subkey */ nine = (u16)(in>>7)&0x1FF; seven = (u16)(in&0x7F); /* Now run the various operations */ nine = (u16)(S9[nine] ^ seven); seven = (u16)(S7[seven] ^ (nine & 0x7F)); seven ^= (subkey>>9); nine ^= (subkey&0x1FF); nine = (u16)(S9[nine] ^ seven); seven = (u16)(S7[seven] ^ (nine & 0x7F)); return (u16)(seven<<9) + nine; } static ulong32 FO( ulong32 in, int round_no, symmetric_key *key) { u16 left, right; /* Split the input into two 16-bit words */ left = (u16)(in>>16); right = (u16) in&0xFFFF; /* Now apply the same basic transformation three times */ left ^= key->kasumi.KOi1[round_no]; left = FI( left, key->kasumi.KIi1[round_no] ); left ^= right; right ^= key->kasumi.KOi2[round_no]; right = FI( right, key->kasumi.KIi2[round_no] ); right ^= left; left ^= key->kasumi.KOi3[round_no]; left = FI( left, key->kasumi.KIi3[round_no] ); left ^= right; return (((ulong32)right)<<16)+left; } static ulong32 FL( ulong32 in, int round_no, symmetric_key *key ) { u16 l, r, a, b; /* split out the left and right halves */ l = (u16)(in>>16); r = (u16)(in)&0xFFFF; /* do the FL() operations */ a = (u16) (l & key->kasumi.KLi1[round_no]); r ^= ROL16(a,1); b = (u16)(r | key->kasumi.KLi2[round_no]); l ^= ROL16(b,1); /* put the two halves back together */ return (((ulong32)l)<<16) + r; } int kasumi_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *pt, unsigned char *ct, symmetric_key *skey) { ulong32 left, right, temp; int n; LTC_ARGCHK(pt != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(ct != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(skey != NULL); LOAD32H(left, pt); LOAD32H(right, pt+4); for (n = 0; n <= 7; ) { temp = FL(left, n, skey); temp = FO(temp, n++, skey); right ^= temp; temp = FO(right, n, skey); temp = FL(temp, n++, skey); left ^= temp; } STORE32H(left, ct); STORE32H(right, ct+4); return CRYPT_OK; } int kasumi_ecb_decrypt(const unsigned char *ct, unsigned char *pt, symmetric_key *skey) { ulong32 left, right, temp; int n; LTC_ARGCHK(pt != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(ct != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(skey != NULL); LOAD32H(left, ct); LOAD32H(right, ct+4); for (n = 7; n >= 0; ) { temp = FO(right, n, skey); temp = FL(temp, n--, skey); left ^= temp; temp = FL(left, n, skey); temp = FO(temp, n--, skey); right ^= temp; } STORE32H(left, pt); STORE32H(right, pt+4); return CRYPT_OK; } int kasumi_setup(const unsigned char *key, int keylen, int num_rounds, symmetric_key *skey) { static const u16 C[8] = { 0x0123,0x4567,0x89AB,0xCDEF, 0xFEDC,0xBA98,0x7654,0x3210 }; u16 ukey[8], Kprime[8]; int n; LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(skey != NULL); if (keylen != 16) { return CRYPT_INVALID_KEYSIZE; } if (num_rounds != 0 && num_rounds != 8) { return CRYPT_INVALID_ROUNDS; } /* Start by ensuring the subkeys are endian correct on a 16-bit basis */ for (n = 0; n < 8; n++ ) { ukey[n] = (((u16)key[2*n]) << 8) | key[2*n+1]; } /* Now build the K'[] keys */ for (n = 0; n < 8; n++) { Kprime[n] = ukey[n] ^ C[n]; } /* Finally construct the various sub keys */ for(n = 0; n < 8; n++) { skey->kasumi.KLi1[n] = ROL16(ukey[n],1); skey->kasumi.KLi2[n] = Kprime[(n+2)&0x7]; skey->kasumi.KOi1[n] = ROL16(ukey[(n+1)&0x7],5); skey->kasumi.KOi2[n] = ROL16(ukey[(n+5)&0x7],8); skey->kasumi.KOi3[n] = ROL16(ukey[(n+6)&0x7],13); skey->kasumi.KIi1[n] = Kprime[(n+4)&0x7]; skey->kasumi.KIi2[n] = Kprime[(n+3)&0x7]; skey->kasumi.KIi3[n] = Kprime[(n+7)&0x7]; } return CRYPT_OK; } void kasumi_done(symmetric_key *skey) { LTC_UNUSED_PARAM(skey); } int kasumi_keysize(int *keysize) { LTC_ARGCHK(keysize != NULL); if (*keysize >= 16) { *keysize = 16; return CRYPT_OK; } else { return CRYPT_INVALID_KEYSIZE; } } int kasumi_test(void) { #ifndef LTC_TEST return CRYPT_NOP; #else static const struct { unsigned char key[16], pt[8], ct[8]; } tests[] = { { { 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, { 0x4B, 0x58, 0xA7, 0x71, 0xAF, 0xC7, 0xE5, 0xE8 } }, { { 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, { 0x7E, 0xEF, 0x11, 0x3C, 0x95, 0xBB, 0x5A, 0x77 } }, { { 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, { 0x5F, 0x14, 0x06, 0x86, 0xD7, 0xAD, 0x5A, 0x39 }, }, { { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 }, { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, { 0x2E, 0x14, 0x91, 0xCF, 0x70, 0xAA, 0x46, 0x5D } }, { { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00 }, { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, { 0xB5, 0x45, 0x86, 0xF4, 0xAB, 0x9A, 0xE5, 0x46 } }, }; unsigned char buf[2][8]; symmetric_key key; int err, x; for (x = 0; x < (int)(sizeof(tests)/sizeof(tests[0])); x++) { if ((err = kasumi_setup(tests[x].key, 16, 0, &key)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } if ((err = kasumi_ecb_encrypt(tests[x].pt, buf[0], &key)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } if ((err = kasumi_ecb_decrypt(tests[x].ct, buf[1], &key)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } if (compare_testvector(buf[1], 8, tests[x].pt, 8, "Kasumi Decrypt", x) || compare_testvector(buf[0], 8, tests[x].ct, 8, "Kasumi Encrypt", x)) { return CRYPT_FAIL_TESTVECTOR; } } return CRYPT_OK; #endif } #endif /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */