Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/encauth/eax/eax_init.c @ 1715:3974f087d9c0
Disallow leading lines before the ident for server (#102)
Per RFC4253 4.2 clients must be able to process other lines of data
before the version string, server behavior is not defined neither
with MUST/SHOULD nor with MAY.
If server process up to 50 lines too - it may cause too long hanging
session with invalid/evil client that consume host resources and
potentially may lead to DDoS on poor embedded boxes.
Let's require first line from client to be version string and fail
early if it's not - matches both RFC and real OpenSSH behavior.
author | Vladislav Grishenko <themiron@users.noreply.github.com> |
---|---|
date | Mon, 15 Jun 2020 18:22:18 +0500 |
parents | 6dba84798cd5 |
children |
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ /** @file eax_init.c EAX implementation, initialized EAX state, by Tom St Denis */ #include "tomcrypt.h" #ifdef LTC_EAX_MODE /** Initialized an EAX state @param eax [out] The EAX state to initialize @param cipher The index of the desired cipher @param key The secret key @param keylen The length of the secret key (octets) @param nonce The use-once nonce for the session @param noncelen The length of the nonce (octets) @param header The header for the EAX state @param headerlen The header length (octets) @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int eax_init(eax_state *eax, int cipher, const unsigned char *key, unsigned long keylen, const unsigned char *nonce, unsigned long noncelen, const unsigned char *header, unsigned long headerlen) { unsigned char *buf; int err, blklen; omac_state *omac; unsigned long len; LTC_ARGCHK(eax != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(nonce != NULL); if (headerlen > 0) { LTC_ARGCHK(header != NULL); } if ((err = cipher_is_valid(cipher)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } blklen = cipher_descriptor[cipher].block_length; /* allocate ram */ buf = XMALLOC(MAXBLOCKSIZE); omac = XMALLOC(sizeof(*omac)); if (buf == NULL || omac == NULL) { if (buf != NULL) { XFREE(buf); } if (omac != NULL) { XFREE(omac); } return CRYPT_MEM; } /* N = LTC_OMAC_0K(nonce) */ zeromem(buf, MAXBLOCKSIZE); if ((err = omac_init(omac, cipher, key, keylen)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } /* omac the [0]_n */ if ((err = omac_process(omac, buf, blklen)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } /* omac the nonce */ if ((err = omac_process(omac, nonce, noncelen)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } /* store result */ len = sizeof(eax->N); if ((err = omac_done(omac, eax->N, &len)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } /* H = LTC_OMAC_1K(header) */ zeromem(buf, MAXBLOCKSIZE); buf[blklen - 1] = 1; if ((err = omac_init(&eax->headeromac, cipher, key, keylen)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } /* omac the [1]_n */ if ((err = omac_process(&eax->headeromac, buf, blklen)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } /* omac the header */ if (headerlen != 0) { if ((err = omac_process(&eax->headeromac, header, headerlen)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } } /* note we don't finish the headeromac, this allows us to add more header later */ /* setup the CTR mode */ if ((err = ctr_start(cipher, eax->N, key, keylen, 0, CTR_COUNTER_BIG_ENDIAN, &eax->ctr)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } /* setup the LTC_OMAC for the ciphertext */ if ((err = omac_init(&eax->ctomac, cipher, key, keylen)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } /* omac [2]_n */ zeromem(buf, MAXBLOCKSIZE); buf[blklen-1] = 2; if ((err = omac_process(&eax->ctomac, buf, blklen)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } err = CRYPT_OK; LBL_ERR: #ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK zeromem(buf, MAXBLOCKSIZE); zeromem(omac, sizeof(*omac)); #endif XFREE(omac); XFREE(buf); return err; } #endif /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */