view libtomcrypt/src/encauth/ocb/ocb_encrypt_authenticate_memory.c @ 1715:3974f087d9c0

Disallow leading lines before the ident for server (#102) Per RFC4253 4.2 clients must be able to process other lines of data before the version string, server behavior is not defined neither with MUST/SHOULD nor with MAY. If server process up to 50 lines too - it may cause too long hanging session with invalid/evil client that consume host resources and potentially may lead to DDoS on poor embedded boxes. Let's require first line from client to be version string and fail early if it's not - matches both RFC and real OpenSSH behavior.
author Vladislav Grishenko <themiron@users.noreply.github.com>
date Mon, 15 Jun 2020 18:22:18 +0500
parents 6dba84798cd5
children
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis
 *
 * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic
 * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner.
 *
 * The library is free for all purposes without any express
 * guarantee it works.
 */

/**
  @file ocb_encrypt_authenticate_memory.c
  OCB implementation, encrypt block of memory, by Tom St Denis
*/
#include "tomcrypt.h"

#ifdef LTC_OCB_MODE

/**
   Encrypt and generate an authentication code for a buffer of memory
   @param cipher     The index of the cipher desired
   @param key        The secret key
   @param keylen     The length of the secret key (octets)
   @param nonce      The session nonce (length of the block ciphers block size)
   @param pt         The plaintext
   @param ptlen      The length of the plaintext (octets)
   @param ct         [out] The ciphertext
   @param tag        [out] The authentication tag
   @param taglen     [in/out] The max size and resulting size of the authentication tag
   @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int ocb_encrypt_authenticate_memory(int cipher,
    const unsigned char *key,    unsigned long keylen,
    const unsigned char *nonce,
    const unsigned char *pt,     unsigned long ptlen,
          unsigned char *ct,
          unsigned char *tag,    unsigned long *taglen)
{
   int err;
   ocb_state *ocb;

   LTC_ARGCHK(key    != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(nonce  != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(pt     != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(ct     != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(tag    != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(taglen != NULL);

   /* allocate ram */
   ocb = XMALLOC(sizeof(ocb_state));
   if (ocb == NULL) {
      return CRYPT_MEM;
   }

   if ((err = ocb_init(ocb, cipher, key, keylen, nonce)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      goto LBL_ERR;
   }

   while (ptlen > (unsigned long)ocb->block_len) {
        if ((err = ocb_encrypt(ocb, pt, ct)) != CRYPT_OK) {
           goto LBL_ERR;
        }
        ptlen   -= ocb->block_len;
        pt      += ocb->block_len;
        ct      += ocb->block_len;
   }

   err = ocb_done_encrypt(ocb, pt, ptlen, ct, tag, taglen);
LBL_ERR:
#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
   zeromem(ocb, sizeof(ocb_state));
#endif

   XFREE(ocb);

   return err;
}

#endif

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/* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */