Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/encauth/ocb/ocb_init.c @ 1715:3974f087d9c0
Disallow leading lines before the ident for server (#102)
Per RFC4253 4.2 clients must be able to process other lines of data
before the version string, server behavior is not defined neither
with MUST/SHOULD nor with MAY.
If server process up to 50 lines too - it may cause too long hanging
session with invalid/evil client that consume host resources and
potentially may lead to DDoS on poor embedded boxes.
Let's require first line from client to be version string and fail
early if it's not - matches both RFC and real OpenSSH behavior.
author | Vladislav Grishenko <themiron@users.noreply.github.com> |
---|---|
date | Mon, 15 Jun 2020 18:22:18 +0500 |
parents | 6dba84798cd5 |
children |
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ /** @file ocb_init.c OCB implementation, initialize state, by Tom St Denis */ #include "tomcrypt.h" #ifdef LTC_OCB_MODE static const struct { int len; unsigned char poly_div[MAXBLOCKSIZE], poly_mul[MAXBLOCKSIZE]; } polys[] = { { 8, { 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0D }, { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1B } }, { 16, { 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x43 }, { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x87 } } }; /** Initialize an OCB context. @param ocb [out] The destination of the OCB state @param cipher The index of the desired cipher @param key The secret key @param keylen The length of the secret key (octets) @param nonce The session nonce (length of the block size of the cipher) @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int ocb_init(ocb_state *ocb, int cipher, const unsigned char *key, unsigned long keylen, const unsigned char *nonce) { int poly, x, y, m, err; LTC_ARGCHK(ocb != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(nonce != NULL); /* valid cipher? */ if ((err = cipher_is_valid(cipher)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } /* determine which polys to use */ ocb->block_len = cipher_descriptor[cipher].block_length; x = (int)(sizeof(polys)/sizeof(polys[0])); for (poly = 0; poly < x; poly++) { if (polys[poly].len == ocb->block_len) { break; } } if (poly == x) { return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG; /* block_len not found in polys */ } if (polys[poly].len != ocb->block_len) { return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG; } /* schedule the key */ if ((err = cipher_descriptor[cipher].setup(key, keylen, 0, &ocb->key)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } /* find L = E[0] */ zeromem(ocb->L, ocb->block_len); if ((err = cipher_descriptor[cipher].ecb_encrypt(ocb->L, ocb->L, &ocb->key)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } /* find R = E[N xor L] */ for (x = 0; x < ocb->block_len; x++) { ocb->R[x] = ocb->L[x] ^ nonce[x]; } if ((err = cipher_descriptor[cipher].ecb_encrypt(ocb->R, ocb->R, &ocb->key)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } /* find Ls[i] = L << i for i == 0..31 */ XMEMCPY(ocb->Ls[0], ocb->L, ocb->block_len); for (x = 1; x < 32; x++) { m = ocb->Ls[x-1][0] >> 7; for (y = 0; y < ocb->block_len-1; y++) { ocb->Ls[x][y] = ((ocb->Ls[x-1][y] << 1) | (ocb->Ls[x-1][y+1] >> 7)) & 255; } ocb->Ls[x][ocb->block_len-1] = (ocb->Ls[x-1][ocb->block_len-1] << 1) & 255; if (m == 1) { for (y = 0; y < ocb->block_len; y++) { ocb->Ls[x][y] ^= polys[poly].poly_mul[y]; } } } /* find Lr = L / x */ m = ocb->L[ocb->block_len-1] & 1; /* shift right */ for (x = ocb->block_len - 1; x > 0; x--) { ocb->Lr[x] = ((ocb->L[x] >> 1) | (ocb->L[x-1] << 7)) & 255; } ocb->Lr[0] = ocb->L[0] >> 1; if (m == 1) { for (x = 0; x < ocb->block_len; x++) { ocb->Lr[x] ^= polys[poly].poly_div[x]; } } /* set Li, checksum */ zeromem(ocb->Li, ocb->block_len); zeromem(ocb->checksum, ocb->block_len); /* set other params */ ocb->block_index = 1; ocb->cipher = cipher; return CRYPT_OK; } #endif /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */