view libtomcrypt/src/encauth/ocb3/ocb3_encrypt.c @ 1715:3974f087d9c0

Disallow leading lines before the ident for server (#102) Per RFC4253 4.2 clients must be able to process other lines of data before the version string, server behavior is not defined neither with MUST/SHOULD nor with MAY. If server process up to 50 lines too - it may cause too long hanging session with invalid/evil client that consume host resources and potentially may lead to DDoS on poor embedded boxes. Let's require first line from client to be version string and fail early if it's not - matches both RFC and real OpenSSH behavior.
author Vladislav Grishenko <themiron@users.noreply.github.com>
date Mon, 15 Jun 2020 18:22:18 +0500
parents 6dba84798cd5
children
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis
 *
 * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic
 * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner.
 *
 * The library is free for all purposes without any express
 * guarantee it works.
 */

/**
   @file ocb3_encrypt.c
   OCB implementation, encrypt data, by Tom St Denis
*/
#include "tomcrypt.h"

#ifdef LTC_OCB3_MODE

/**
   Encrypt blocks of data with OCB
   @param ocb     The OCB state
   @param pt      The plaintext (length multiple of the block size of the block cipher)
   @param ptlen   The length of the input (octets)
   @param ct      [out] The ciphertext (same size as the pt)
   @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int ocb3_encrypt(ocb3_state *ocb, const unsigned char *pt, unsigned long ptlen, unsigned char *ct)
{
   unsigned char tmp[MAXBLOCKSIZE];
   int err, i, full_blocks;
   unsigned char *pt_b, *ct_b;

   LTC_ARGCHK(ocb != NULL);
   if (ptlen == 0) return CRYPT_OK; /* no data, nothing to do */
   LTC_ARGCHK(pt != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(ct != NULL);

   if ((err = cipher_is_valid(ocb->cipher)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
   }
   if (ocb->block_len != cipher_descriptor[ocb->cipher].block_length) {
      return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
   }

   if (ptlen % ocb->block_len) { /* ptlen has to bu multiple of block_len */
      return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
   }

   full_blocks = ptlen/ocb->block_len;
   for(i=0; i<full_blocks; i++) {
     pt_b = (unsigned char *)pt+i*ocb->block_len;
     ct_b = (unsigned char *)ct+i*ocb->block_len;

     /* ocb->Offset_current[] = ocb->Offset_current[] ^ Offset_{ntz(block_index)} */
     ocb3_int_xor_blocks(ocb->Offset_current, ocb->Offset_current, ocb->L_[ocb3_int_ntz(ocb->block_index)], ocb->block_len);

     /* tmp[] = pt[] XOR ocb->Offset_current[] */
     ocb3_int_xor_blocks(tmp, pt_b, ocb->Offset_current, ocb->block_len);

     /* encrypt */
     if ((err = cipher_descriptor[ocb->cipher].ecb_encrypt(tmp, tmp, &ocb->key)) != CRYPT_OK) {
        goto LBL_ERR;
     }

     /* ct[] = tmp[] XOR ocb->Offset_current[] */
     ocb3_int_xor_blocks(ct_b, tmp, ocb->Offset_current, ocb->block_len);

     /* ocb->checksum[] = ocb->checksum[] XOR pt[] */
     ocb3_int_xor_blocks(ocb->checksum, ocb->checksum, pt_b, ocb->block_len);

     ocb->block_index++;
   }

   err = CRYPT_OK;

LBL_ERR:
#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
   zeromem(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
#endif
   return err;
}

#endif

/* ref:         $Format:%D$ */
/* git commit:  $Format:%H$ */
/* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */