Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/pk/dsa/dsa_encrypt_key.c @ 1715:3974f087d9c0
Disallow leading lines before the ident for server (#102)
Per RFC4253 4.2 clients must be able to process other lines of data
before the version string, server behavior is not defined neither
with MUST/SHOULD nor with MAY.
If server process up to 50 lines too - it may cause too long hanging
session with invalid/evil client that consume host resources and
potentially may lead to DDoS on poor embedded boxes.
Let's require first line from client to be version string and fail
early if it's not - matches both RFC and real OpenSSH behavior.
author | Vladislav Grishenko <themiron@users.noreply.github.com> |
---|---|
date | Mon, 15 Jun 2020 18:22:18 +0500 |
parents | 6dba84798cd5 |
children |
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file dsa_encrypt_key.c DSA Crypto, Tom St Denis */ #ifdef LTC_MDSA /** Encrypt a symmetric key with DSA @param in The symmetric key you want to encrypt @param inlen The length of the key to encrypt (octets) @param out [out] The destination for the ciphertext @param outlen [in/out] The max size and resulting size of the ciphertext @param prng An active PRNG state @param wprng The index of the PRNG you wish to use @param hash The index of the hash you want to use @param key The DSA key you want to encrypt to @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int dsa_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen, unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen, prng_state *prng, int wprng, int hash, dsa_key *key) { unsigned char *expt, *skey; void *g_pub, *g_priv; unsigned long x, y; int err; LTC_ARGCHK(in != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(out != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(outlen != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); /* check that wprng/cipher/hash are not invalid */ if ((err = prng_is_valid(wprng)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } if (inlen > hash_descriptor[hash].hashsize) { return CRYPT_INVALID_HASH; } /* make a random key and export the public copy */ if ((err = mp_init_multi(&g_pub, &g_priv, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } expt = XMALLOC(mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->p) + 1); skey = XMALLOC(MAXBLOCKSIZE); if (expt == NULL || skey == NULL) { if (expt != NULL) { XFREE(expt); } if (skey != NULL) { XFREE(skey); } mp_clear_multi(g_pub, g_priv, NULL); return CRYPT_MEM; } /* make a random g_priv, g_pub = g^x pair private key x should be in range: 1 <= x <= q-1 (see FIPS 186-4 B.1.2) */ if ((err = rand_bn_upto(g_priv, key->q, prng, wprng)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } /* compute y */ if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->g, g_priv, key->p, g_pub)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } /* make random key */ x = mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->p) + 1; if ((err = dsa_shared_secret(g_priv, key->y, key, expt, &x)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } y = MAXBLOCKSIZE; if ((err = hash_memory(hash, expt, x, skey, &y)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } /* Encrypt key */ for (x = 0; x < inlen; x++) { skey[x] ^= in[x]; } err = der_encode_sequence_multi(out, outlen, LTC_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER, hash_descriptor[hash].OIDlen, hash_descriptor[hash].OID, LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL, g_pub, LTC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, inlen, skey, LTC_ASN1_EOL, 0UL, NULL); LBL_ERR: #ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK /* clean up */ zeromem(expt, mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->p) + 1); zeromem(skey, MAXBLOCKSIZE); #endif XFREE(skey); XFREE(expt); mp_clear_multi(g_pub, g_priv, NULL); return err; } #endif /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */