Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/pk/dsa/dsa_verify_hash.c @ 1715:3974f087d9c0
Disallow leading lines before the ident for server (#102)
Per RFC4253 4.2 clients must be able to process other lines of data
before the version string, server behavior is not defined neither
with MUST/SHOULD nor with MAY.
If server process up to 50 lines too - it may cause too long hanging
session with invalid/evil client that consume host resources and
potentially may lead to DDoS on poor embedded boxes.
Let's require first line from client to be version string and fail
early if it's not - matches both RFC and real OpenSSH behavior.
author | Vladislav Grishenko <themiron@users.noreply.github.com> |
---|---|
date | Mon, 15 Jun 2020 18:22:18 +0500 |
parents | 6dba84798cd5 |
children |
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file dsa_verify_hash.c DSA implementation, verify a signature, Tom St Denis */ #ifdef LTC_MDSA /** Verify a DSA signature @param r DSA "r" parameter @param s DSA "s" parameter @param hash The hash that was signed @param hashlen The length of the hash that was signed @param stat [out] The result of the signature verification, 1==valid, 0==invalid @param key The corresponding public DSA key @return CRYPT_OK if successful (even if the signature is invalid) */ int dsa_verify_hash_raw( void *r, void *s, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hashlen, int *stat, dsa_key *key) { void *w, *v, *u1, *u2; int err; LTC_ARGCHK(r != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(s != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); /* default to invalid signature */ *stat = 0; /* init our variables */ if ((err = mp_init_multi(&w, &v, &u1, &u2, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } /* neither r or s can be null or >q*/ if (mp_cmp_d(r, 0) != LTC_MP_GT || mp_cmp_d(s, 0) != LTC_MP_GT || mp_cmp(r, key->q) != LTC_MP_LT || mp_cmp(s, key->q) != LTC_MP_LT) { err = CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET; goto error; } /* FIPS 186-4 4.7: use leftmost min(bitlen(q), bitlen(hash)) bits of 'hash' */ hashlen = MIN(hashlen, (unsigned long)(key->qord)); /* w = 1/s mod q */ if ((err = mp_invmod(s, key->q, w)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* u1 = m * w mod q */ if ((err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(u1, (unsigned char *)hash, hashlen)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_mulmod(u1, w, key->q, u1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* u2 = r*w mod q */ if ((err = mp_mulmod(r, w, key->q, u2)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* v = g^u1 * y^u2 mod p mod q */ if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->g, u1, key->p, u1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->y, u2, key->p, u2)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_mulmod(u1, u2, key->p, v)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_mod(v, key->q, v)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* if r = v then we're set */ if (mp_cmp(r, v) == LTC_MP_EQ) { *stat = 1; } err = CRYPT_OK; error: mp_clear_multi(w, v, u1, u2, NULL); return err; } /** Verify a DSA signature @param sig The signature @param siglen The length of the signature (octets) @param hash The hash that was signed @param hashlen The length of the hash that was signed @param stat [out] The result of the signature verification, 1==valid, 0==invalid @param key The corresponding public DSA key @return CRYPT_OK if successful (even if the signature is invalid) */ int dsa_verify_hash(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hashlen, int *stat, dsa_key *key) { int err; void *r, *s; ltc_asn1_list sig_seq[2]; unsigned long reallen = 0; LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL); *stat = 0; /* must be set before the first return */ if ((err = mp_init_multi(&r, &s, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } LTC_SET_ASN1(sig_seq, 0, LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, r, 1UL); LTC_SET_ASN1(sig_seq, 1, LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, s, 1UL); err = der_decode_sequence(sig, siglen, sig_seq, 2); if (err != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } err = der_length_sequence(sig_seq, 2, &reallen); if (err != CRYPT_OK || reallen != siglen) { goto LBL_ERR; } /* do the op */ err = dsa_verify_hash_raw(r, s, hash, hashlen, stat, key); LBL_ERR: mp_clear_multi(r, s, NULL); return err; } #endif /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */