Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/pk/katja/katja_exptmod.c @ 1715:3974f087d9c0
Disallow leading lines before the ident for server (#102)
Per RFC4253 4.2 clients must be able to process other lines of data
before the version string, server behavior is not defined neither
with MUST/SHOULD nor with MAY.
If server process up to 50 lines too - it may cause too long hanging
session with invalid/evil client that consume host resources and
potentially may lead to DDoS on poor embedded boxes.
Let's require first line from client to be version string and fail
early if it's not - matches both RFC and real OpenSSH behavior.
author | Vladislav Grishenko <themiron@users.noreply.github.com> |
---|---|
date | Mon, 15 Jun 2020 18:22:18 +0500 |
parents | 6dba84798cd5 |
children |
line wrap: on
line source
/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file katja_exptmod.c Katja PKCS-style exptmod, Tom St Denis */ #ifdef LTC_MKAT /** Compute an RSA modular exponentiation @param in The input data to send into RSA @param inlen The length of the input (octets) @param out [out] The destination @param outlen [in/out] The max size and resulting size of the output @param which Which exponent to use, e.g. PK_PRIVATE or PK_PUBLIC @param key The RSA key to use @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int katja_exptmod(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen, unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen, int which, katja_key *key) { void *tmp, *tmpa, *tmpb; unsigned long x; int err; LTC_ARGCHK(in != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(out != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(outlen != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); /* is the key of the right type for the operation? */ if (which == PK_PRIVATE && (key->type != PK_PRIVATE)) { return CRYPT_PK_NOT_PRIVATE; } /* must be a private or public operation */ if (which != PK_PRIVATE && which != PK_PUBLIC) { return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_TYPE; } /* init and copy into tmp */ if ((err = mp_init_multi(&tmp, &tmpa, &tmpb, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } if ((err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(tmp, (unsigned char *)in, (int)inlen)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* sanity check on the input */ if (mp_cmp(key->N, tmp) == LTC_MP_LT) { err = CRYPT_PK_INVALID_SIZE; goto done; } /* are we using the private exponent and is the key optimized? */ if (which == PK_PRIVATE) { /* tmpa = tmp^dP mod p */ if ((err = mp_exptmod(tmp, key->dP, key->p, tmpa)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* tmpb = tmp^dQ mod q */ if ((err = mp_exptmod(tmp, key->dQ, key->q, tmpb)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* tmp = (tmpa - tmpb) * qInv (mod p) */ if ((err = mp_sub(tmpa, tmpb, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_mulmod(tmp, key->qP, key->p, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* tmp = tmpb + q * tmp */ if ((err = mp_mul(tmp, key->q, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_add(tmp, tmpb, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } else { /* exptmod it */ if ((err = mp_exptmod(tmp, key->N, key->N, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } /* read it back */ x = (unsigned long)mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->N); if (x > *outlen) { *outlen = x; err = CRYPT_BUFFER_OVERFLOW; goto done; } /* this should never happen ... */ if (mp_unsigned_bin_size(tmp) > mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->N)) { err = CRYPT_ERROR; goto done; } *outlen = x; /* convert it */ zeromem(out, x); if ((err = mp_to_unsigned_bin(tmp, out+(x-mp_unsigned_bin_size(tmp)))) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* clean up and return */ err = CRYPT_OK; goto done; error: done: mp_clear_multi(tmp, tmpa, tmpb, NULL); return err; } #endif /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */