Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/pk/pkcs1/pkcs_1_pss_encode.c @ 1715:3974f087d9c0
Disallow leading lines before the ident for server (#102)
Per RFC4253 4.2 clients must be able to process other lines of data
before the version string, server behavior is not defined neither
with MUST/SHOULD nor with MAY.
If server process up to 50 lines too - it may cause too long hanging
session with invalid/evil client that consume host resources and
potentially may lead to DDoS on poor embedded boxes.
Let's require first line from client to be version string and fail
early if it's not - matches both RFC and real OpenSSH behavior.
author | Vladislav Grishenko <themiron@users.noreply.github.com> |
---|---|
date | Mon, 15 Jun 2020 18:22:18 +0500 |
parents | 6dba84798cd5 |
children |
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file pkcs_1_pss_encode.c PKCS #1 PSS Signature Padding, Tom St Denis */ #ifdef LTC_PKCS_1 /** PKCS #1 v2.00 Signature Encoding @param msghash The hash to encode @param msghashlen The length of the hash (octets) @param saltlen The length of the salt desired (octets) @param prng An active PRNG context @param prng_idx The index of the PRNG desired @param hash_idx The index of the hash desired @param modulus_bitlen The bit length of the RSA modulus @param out [out] The destination of the encoding @param outlen [in/out] The max size and resulting size of the encoded data @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int pkcs_1_pss_encode(const unsigned char *msghash, unsigned long msghashlen, unsigned long saltlen, prng_state *prng, int prng_idx, int hash_idx, unsigned long modulus_bitlen, unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen) { unsigned char *DB, *mask, *salt, *hash; unsigned long x, y, hLen, modulus_len; int err; hash_state md; LTC_ARGCHK(msghash != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(out != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(outlen != NULL); /* ensure hash and PRNG are valid */ if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } if ((err = prng_is_valid(prng_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } hLen = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].hashsize; modulus_bitlen--; modulus_len = (modulus_bitlen>>3) + (modulus_bitlen & 7 ? 1 : 0); /* check sizes */ if ((saltlen > modulus_len) || (modulus_len < hLen + saltlen + 2)) { return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_SIZE; } /* allocate ram for DB/mask/salt/hash of size modulus_len */ DB = XMALLOC(modulus_len); mask = XMALLOC(modulus_len); salt = XMALLOC(modulus_len); hash = XMALLOC(modulus_len); if (DB == NULL || mask == NULL || salt == NULL || hash == NULL) { if (DB != NULL) { XFREE(DB); } if (mask != NULL) { XFREE(mask); } if (salt != NULL) { XFREE(salt); } if (hash != NULL) { XFREE(hash); } return CRYPT_MEM; } /* generate random salt */ if (saltlen > 0) { if (prng_descriptor[prng_idx].read(salt, saltlen, prng) != saltlen) { err = CRYPT_ERROR_READPRNG; goto LBL_ERR; } } /* M = (eight) 0x00 || msghash || salt, hash = H(M) */ if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].init(&md)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } zeromem(DB, 8); if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].process(&md, DB, 8)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].process(&md, msghash, msghashlen)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].process(&md, salt, saltlen)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].done(&md, hash)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } /* generate DB = PS || 0x01 || salt, PS == modulus_len - saltlen - hLen - 2 zero bytes */ x = 0; XMEMSET(DB + x, 0, modulus_len - saltlen - hLen - 2); x += modulus_len - saltlen - hLen - 2; DB[x++] = 0x01; XMEMCPY(DB + x, salt, saltlen); /* x += saltlen; */ /* generate mask of length modulus_len - hLen - 1 from hash */ if ((err = pkcs_1_mgf1(hash_idx, hash, hLen, mask, modulus_len - hLen - 1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } /* xor against DB */ for (y = 0; y < (modulus_len - hLen - 1); y++) { DB[y] ^= mask[y]; } /* output is DB || hash || 0xBC */ if (*outlen < modulus_len) { *outlen = modulus_len; err = CRYPT_BUFFER_OVERFLOW; goto LBL_ERR; } /* DB len = modulus_len - hLen - 1 */ y = 0; XMEMCPY(out + y, DB, modulus_len - hLen - 1); y += modulus_len - hLen - 1; /* hash */ XMEMCPY(out + y, hash, hLen); y += hLen; /* 0xBC */ out[y] = 0xBC; /* now clear the 8*modulus_len - modulus_bitlen most significant bits */ out[0] &= 0xFF >> ((modulus_len<<3) - modulus_bitlen); /* store output size */ *outlen = modulus_len; err = CRYPT_OK; LBL_ERR: #ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK zeromem(DB, modulus_len); zeromem(mask, modulus_len); zeromem(salt, modulus_len); zeromem(hash, modulus_len); #endif XFREE(hash); XFREE(salt); XFREE(mask); XFREE(DB); return err; } #endif /* LTC_PKCS_1 */ /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */