view libtomcrypt/testprof/pkcs_1_test.c @ 1715:3974f087d9c0

Disallow leading lines before the ident for server (#102) Per RFC4253 4.2 clients must be able to process other lines of data before the version string, server behavior is not defined neither with MUST/SHOULD nor with MAY. If server process up to 50 lines too - it may cause too long hanging session with invalid/evil client that consume host resources and potentially may lead to DDoS on poor embedded boxes. Let's require first line from client to be version string and fail early if it's not - matches both RFC and real OpenSSH behavior.
author Vladislav Grishenko <themiron@users.noreply.github.com>
date Mon, 15 Jun 2020 18:22:18 +0500
parents f849a5ca2efc
children
line wrap: on
line source

#include <tomcrypt_test.h>

#ifdef LTC_PKCS_1

int pkcs_1_test(void)
{
   unsigned char buf[3][128];
   int res1, res2, res3, prng_idx, hash_idx, err;
   unsigned long x, y, l1, l2, l3, i1, i2, lparamlen, saltlen, modlen;
   static const unsigned char lparam[] = { 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16 };

   /* get hash/prng  */
   hash_idx = find_hash("sha1");
   prng_idx = find_prng("yarrow");
   
   if (hash_idx == -1 || prng_idx == -1) {
      fprintf(stderr, "pkcs_1 tests require sha1/yarrow");
      return 1;
   }   

   srand(time(NULL));
   /* do many tests */
   for (x = 0; x < 100; x++) {
      zeromem(buf, sizeof(buf));

      /* make a dummy message (of random length) */
      l3 = (rand() & 31) + 8;
      for (y = 0; y < l3; y++) buf[0][y] = rand() & 255;

      /* pick a random lparam len [0..16] */
      lparamlen = abs(rand()) % 17;

      /* pick a random saltlen 0..16 */
      saltlen   = abs(rand()) % 17;

      /* LTC_PKCS #1 v2.0 supports modlens not multiple of 8 */
      modlen = 800 + (abs(rand()) % 224);

      /* encode it */
      l1 = sizeof(buf[1]);
      DO(pkcs_1_oaep_encode(buf[0], l3, lparam, lparamlen, modlen, &yarrow_prng, prng_idx, hash_idx, buf[1], &l1));

      /* decode it */
      l2 = sizeof(buf[2]);
      DO(pkcs_1_oaep_decode(buf[1], l1, lparam, lparamlen, modlen, hash_idx, buf[2], &l2, &res1));

      if (res1 != 1 || l2 != l3 || memcmp(buf[2], buf[0], l3) != 0) {
         fprintf(stderr, "Outsize == %lu, should have been %lu, res1 = %d, lparamlen = %lu, msg contents follow.\n", l2, l3, res1, lparamlen);
         fprintf(stderr, "ORIGINAL:\n");
         for (x = 0; x < l3; x++) {
             fprintf(stderr, "%02x ", buf[0][x]);
         }
         fprintf(stderr, "\nRESULT:\n");
         for (x = 0; x < l2; x++) {
             fprintf(stderr, "%02x ", buf[2][x]);
         }
         fprintf(stderr, "\n\n");
         return 1;
      }

      /* test PSS */
      l1 = sizeof(buf[1]);
      DO(pkcs_1_pss_encode(buf[0], l3, saltlen, &yarrow_prng, prng_idx, hash_idx, modlen, buf[1], &l1));
      DO(pkcs_1_pss_decode(buf[0], l3, buf[1], l1, saltlen, hash_idx, modlen, &res1));
      
      buf[0][i1 = abs(rand()) % l3] ^= 1;
      DO(pkcs_1_pss_decode(buf[0], l3, buf[1], l1, saltlen, hash_idx, modlen, &res2));

      buf[0][i1] ^= 1;
      buf[1][i2 = abs(rand()) % (l1 - 1)] ^= 1;
      pkcs_1_pss_decode(buf[0], l3, buf[1], l1, saltlen, hash_idx, modlen, &res3);
      if (!(res1 == 1 && res2 == 0 && res3 == 0)) {
         fprintf(stderr, "PSS failed: %d, %d, %d, %lu, %lu\n", res1, res2, res3, l3, saltlen);
         return 1;
      }
   }
   return 0;
}

#else

int pkcs_1_test(void)
{
   fprintf(stderr, "NOP");
   return 0;
}

#endif


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/* $Revision$ */
/* $Date$ */