Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/notes/tech0001.txt @ 1672:3a97f14c0235
Add Chacha20-Poly1305, AES128-GCM and AES256-GCM support (#93)
* Add Chacha20-Poly1305 authenticated encryption
* Add general AEAD approach.
* Add [email protected] algo using LibTomCrypt chacha and
poly1305 routines.
Chacha20-Poly1305 is generally faster than AES256 on CPU w/o dedicated
AES instructions, having the same key size.
Compiling in will add ~5,5kB to binary size on x86-64.
function old new delta
chacha_crypt - 1397 +1397
_poly1305_block - 608 +608
poly1305_done - 595 +595
dropbear_chachapoly_crypt - 457 +457
.rodata 26976 27392 +416
poly1305_process - 290 +290
poly1305_init - 221 +221
chacha_setup - 218 +218
encrypt_packet 1068 1270 +202
dropbear_chachapoly_getlength - 147 +147
decrypt_packet 756 897 +141
chacha_ivctr64 - 137 +137
read_packet 543 637 +94
dropbear_chachapoly_start - 94 +94
read_kex_algos 792 880 +88
chacha_keystream - 69 +69
dropbear_mode_chachapoly - 48 +48
sshciphers 280 320 +40
dropbear_mode_none 24 48 +24
dropbear_mode_ctr 24 48 +24
dropbear_mode_cbc 24 48 +24
dropbear_chachapoly_mac - 24 +24
dropbear_chachapoly - 24 +24
gen_new_keys 848 854 +6
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(add/remove: 14/0 grow/shrink: 10/0 up/down: 5388/0) Total: 5388 bytes
* Add AES128-GCM and AES256-GCM authenticated encryption
* Add general AES-GCM mode.
* Add [email protected] and [email protected] algo using
LibTomCrypt gcm routines.
AES-GCM is combination of AES CTR mode and GHASH, slower than AES-CTR on
CPU w/o dedicated AES/GHASH instructions therefore disabled by default.
Compiling in will add ~6kB to binary size on x86-64.
function old new delta
gcm_process - 1060 +1060
.rodata 26976 27808 +832
gcm_gf_mult - 820 +820
gcm_add_aad - 660 +660
gcm_shift_table - 512 +512
gcm_done - 471 +471
gcm_add_iv - 384 +384
gcm_init - 347 +347
dropbear_gcm_crypt - 309 +309
encrypt_packet 1068 1270 +202
decrypt_packet 756 897 +141
gcm_reset - 118 +118
read_packet 543 637 +94
read_kex_algos 792 880 +88
sshciphers 280 360 +80
gcm_mult_h - 80 +80
dropbear_gcm_start - 62 +62
dropbear_mode_gcm - 48 +48
dropbear_mode_none 24 48 +24
dropbear_mode_ctr 24 48 +24
dropbear_mode_cbc 24 48 +24
dropbear_ghash - 24 +24
dropbear_gcm_getlength - 24 +24
gen_new_keys 848 854 +6
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(add/remove: 14/0 grow/shrink: 10/0 up/down: 6434/0) Total: 6434 bytes
author | Vladislav Grishenko <themiron@users.noreply.github.com> |
---|---|
date | Mon, 25 May 2020 20:50:25 +0500 |
parents | 1b9e69c058d2 |
children |
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Tech Note 0001 How to Gather Entropy on Embedded Systems Tom St Denis Introduction ------------ This tech note explains a relatively simple way to gather entropy for a PRNG (Yarrow in this case) in embedded systems where there are few sources of entropy or physical sources. When trying to setup a secure random number generator a fresh source of random data (entropy) is required to ensure the deterministic state of the PRNG is not known or predetermined with respect to an attacker. At the very least the system requires one timer and one source of un-timed interrupts. by "un-timed" I mean interrupts that do not occur at regular intervals [e.g. joypad/keypad input, network packets, etc...]. First we shall begin by taking an overview of how the Yarrow PRNG works within libtomcrypt. At the heart of all PRNGs is the "prng_state" data type. This is a union of structures that hold the PRNG state for the various prngs. The first thing we require is a state... prng_state myPrng; Next we must initialize the state once to get the ball rolling if (yarrow_start(&myPrng) != CRYPT_OK) { // error should never happen! } At this point the PRNG is ready to accept fresh entropy which is added with int yarrow_add_entropy(const unsigned char *buf, unsigned long len, prng_state *prng) This function is **NOT** thread safe which will come under consideration later. To add entropy to our PRNG we must call this function with fresh data as its sampled. Lets say we have a timer counter called "uTimer" which is a 32-bit long and say a 32-bit joyPad state called "uPad". An example interrupt handler would look like void joypad_interrupt(...) { unsigned char buf[8]; STORE32L(uTimer, buf); STORE32L(uPad, buf+4) if (yarrow_add_entropy(buf, 8, &myPrng) != CRYPT_OK) { // this should never occur either unless you didn't call yarrow_start } // handle interrupt } In this snippet the timer count and state of the joypad are added together into the entropy pool. The timer is important because with respect to the joypad it is a good source of entropy (on its own its not). For example, the probability of the user pushing the up arrow is fairly high, but at a specific time is not. This method doesn't gather alot of entropy and has to be used to for quite a while. One way to speed it up is to tap multiple sources. If you have a network adapter and other sources of events (keyboard, mouse, etc...) trapping their data is ideal as well. Its important to gather the timer along with the event data. As mentioned the "yarrow_add_entropy()" function is not thread safe. If your system allows interrupt handlers to be interrupted themselves then you could have trouble. One simple way is to detect when an interrupt is in progress and simply not add entropy during the call (jump over the yarrow_add_entropy() call) Once you feel that there has been enough entropy added to the pool then within a single thread you can call int yarrow_ready(prng_state *prng) Now the PRNG is ready to read via the unsigned long yarrow_read(unsigned char *buf, unsigned long len, prng_state *prng) It is a very good idea that once you call the yarrow_ready() function that you stop harvesting entropy in your interrupt functions. This will free up alot of CPU time. Also one more final note. The yarrow_read() function is not thread safe either. This means if you have multiple threads or processes that read from it you will have to add your own semaphores around calls to it.