Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/encauth/ccm/ccm_memory.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d
Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions
To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an
unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection
slot until after the delay.
Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker
can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to
handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel
attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate
is then:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>".
With the delay, this rate becomes:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author | Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com> |
---|---|
date | Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100 |
parents | e9dba7abd939 |
children |
line wrap: on
line source
/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file ccm_memory.c CCM support, process a block of memory, Tom St Denis */ #ifdef LTC_CCM_MODE /** CCM encrypt/decrypt and produce an authentication tag *1 'pt', 'ct' and 'tag' can both be 'in' or 'out', depending on 'direction' @param cipher The index of the cipher desired @param key The secret key to use @param keylen The length of the secret key (octets) @param uskey A previously scheduled key [optional can be NULL] @param nonce The session nonce [use once] @param noncelen The length of the nonce @param header The header for the session @param headerlen The length of the header (octets) @param pt [*1] The plaintext @param ptlen The length of the plaintext (octets) @param ct [*1] The ciphertext @param tag [*1] The destination tag @param taglen The max size and resulting size of the authentication tag @param direction Encrypt or Decrypt direction (0 or 1) @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int ccm_memory(int cipher, const unsigned char *key, unsigned long keylen, symmetric_key *uskey, const unsigned char *nonce, unsigned long noncelen, const unsigned char *header, unsigned long headerlen, unsigned char *pt, unsigned long ptlen, unsigned char *ct, unsigned char *tag, unsigned long *taglen, int direction) { unsigned char PAD[16], ctr[16], CTRPAD[16], ptTag[16], b, *pt_real; unsigned char *pt_work = NULL; symmetric_key *skey; int err; unsigned long len, L, x, y, z, CTRlen; #ifdef LTC_FAST LTC_FAST_TYPE fastMask = ~(LTC_FAST_TYPE)0; /* initialize fastMask at all zeroes */ #endif unsigned char mask = 0xff; /* initialize mask at all zeroes */ if (uskey == NULL) { LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); } LTC_ARGCHK(nonce != NULL); if (headerlen > 0) { LTC_ARGCHK(header != NULL); } LTC_ARGCHK(pt != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(ct != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(tag != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(taglen != NULL); pt_real = pt; #ifdef LTC_FAST if (16 % sizeof(LTC_FAST_TYPE)) { return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG; } #endif /* check cipher input */ if ((err = cipher_is_valid(cipher)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } if (cipher_descriptor[cipher].block_length != 16) { return CRYPT_INVALID_CIPHER; } /* make sure the taglen is even and <= 16 */ *taglen &= ~1; if (*taglen > 16) { *taglen = 16; } /* can't use < 4 */ if (*taglen < 4) { return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG; } /* is there an accelerator? */ if (cipher_descriptor[cipher].accel_ccm_memory != NULL) { return cipher_descriptor[cipher].accel_ccm_memory( key, keylen, uskey, nonce, noncelen, header, headerlen, pt, ptlen, ct, tag, taglen, direction); } /* let's get the L value */ len = ptlen; L = 0; while (len) { ++L; len >>= 8; } if (L <= 1) { L = 2; } /* increase L to match the nonce len */ noncelen = (noncelen > 13) ? 13 : noncelen; if ((15 - noncelen) > L) { L = 15 - noncelen; } /* allocate mem for the symmetric key */ if (uskey == NULL) { skey = XMALLOC(sizeof(*skey)); if (skey == NULL) { return CRYPT_MEM; } /* initialize the cipher */ if ((err = cipher_descriptor[cipher].setup(key, keylen, 0, skey)) != CRYPT_OK) { XFREE(skey); return err; } } else { skey = uskey; } /* initialize buffer for pt */ if (direction == CCM_DECRYPT && ptlen > 0) { pt_work = XMALLOC(ptlen); if (pt_work == NULL) { goto error; } pt = pt_work; } /* form B_0 == flags | Nonce N | l(m) */ x = 0; PAD[x++] = (unsigned char)(((headerlen > 0) ? (1<<6) : 0) | (((*taglen - 2)>>1)<<3) | (L-1)); /* nonce */ for (y = 0; y < (16 - (L + 1)); y++) { PAD[x++] = nonce[y]; } /* store len */ len = ptlen; /* shift len so the upper bytes of len are the contents of the length */ for (y = L; y < 4; y++) { len <<= 8; } /* store l(m) (only store 32-bits) */ for (y = 0; L > 4 && (L-y)>4; y++) { PAD[x++] = 0; } for (; y < L; y++) { PAD[x++] = (unsigned char)((len >> 24) & 255); len <<= 8; } /* encrypt PAD */ if ((err = cipher_descriptor[cipher].ecb_encrypt(PAD, PAD, skey)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* handle header */ if (headerlen > 0) { x = 0; /* store length */ if (headerlen < ((1UL<<16) - (1UL<<8))) { PAD[x++] ^= (headerlen>>8) & 255; PAD[x++] ^= headerlen & 255; } else { PAD[x++] ^= 0xFF; PAD[x++] ^= 0xFE; PAD[x++] ^= (headerlen>>24) & 255; PAD[x++] ^= (headerlen>>16) & 255; PAD[x++] ^= (headerlen>>8) & 255; PAD[x++] ^= headerlen & 255; } /* now add the data */ for (y = 0; y < headerlen; y++) { if (x == 16) { /* full block so let's encrypt it */ if ((err = cipher_descriptor[cipher].ecb_encrypt(PAD, PAD, skey)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } x = 0; } PAD[x++] ^= header[y]; } /* remainder */ if ((err = cipher_descriptor[cipher].ecb_encrypt(PAD, PAD, skey)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } /* setup the ctr counter */ x = 0; /* flags */ ctr[x++] = (unsigned char)L-1; /* nonce */ for (y = 0; y < (16 - (L+1)); ++y) { ctr[x++] = nonce[y]; } /* offset */ while (x < 16) { ctr[x++] = 0; } x = 0; CTRlen = 16; /* now handle the PT */ if (ptlen > 0) { y = 0; #ifdef LTC_FAST if (ptlen & ~15) { if (direction == CCM_ENCRYPT) { for (; y < (ptlen & ~15); y += 16) { /* increment the ctr? */ for (z = 15; z > 15-L; z--) { ctr[z] = (ctr[z] + 1) & 255; if (ctr[z]) break; } if ((err = cipher_descriptor[cipher].ecb_encrypt(ctr, CTRPAD, skey)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* xor the PT against the pad first */ for (z = 0; z < 16; z += sizeof(LTC_FAST_TYPE)) { *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&PAD[z])) ^= *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&pt[y+z])); *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&ct[y+z])) = *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&pt[y+z])) ^ *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&CTRPAD[z])); } if ((err = cipher_descriptor[cipher].ecb_encrypt(PAD, PAD, skey)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } } else { /* direction == CCM_DECRYPT */ for (; y < (ptlen & ~15); y += 16) { /* increment the ctr? */ for (z = 15; z > 15-L; z--) { ctr[z] = (ctr[z] + 1) & 255; if (ctr[z]) break; } if ((err = cipher_descriptor[cipher].ecb_encrypt(ctr, CTRPAD, skey)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* xor the PT against the pad last */ for (z = 0; z < 16; z += sizeof(LTC_FAST_TYPE)) { *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&pt[y+z])) = *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&ct[y+z])) ^ *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&CTRPAD[z])); *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&PAD[z])) ^= *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&pt[y+z])); } if ((err = cipher_descriptor[cipher].ecb_encrypt(PAD, PAD, skey)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } } } #endif for (; y < ptlen; y++) { /* increment the ctr? */ if (CTRlen == 16) { for (z = 15; z > 15-L; z--) { ctr[z] = (ctr[z] + 1) & 255; if (ctr[z]) break; } if ((err = cipher_descriptor[cipher].ecb_encrypt(ctr, CTRPAD, skey)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } CTRlen = 0; } /* if we encrypt we add the bytes to the MAC first */ if (direction == CCM_ENCRYPT) { b = pt[y]; ct[y] = b ^ CTRPAD[CTRlen++]; } else { b = ct[y] ^ CTRPAD[CTRlen++]; pt[y] = b; } if (x == 16) { if ((err = cipher_descriptor[cipher].ecb_encrypt(PAD, PAD, skey)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } x = 0; } PAD[x++] ^= b; } if (x != 0) { if ((err = cipher_descriptor[cipher].ecb_encrypt(PAD, PAD, skey)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } } /* setup CTR for the TAG (zero the count) */ for (y = 15; y > 15 - L; y--) { ctr[y] = 0x00; } if ((err = cipher_descriptor[cipher].ecb_encrypt(ctr, CTRPAD, skey)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if (skey != uskey) { cipher_descriptor[cipher].done(skey); #ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK zeromem(skey, sizeof(*skey)); #endif } if (direction == CCM_ENCRYPT) { /* store the TAG */ for (x = 0; x < 16 && x < *taglen; x++) { tag[x] = PAD[x] ^ CTRPAD[x]; } *taglen = x; } else { /* direction == CCM_DECRYPT */ /* decrypt the tag */ for (x = 0; x < 16 && x < *taglen; x++) { ptTag[x] = tag[x] ^ CTRPAD[x]; } *taglen = x; /* check validity of the decrypted tag against the computed PAD (in constant time) */ /* HACK: the boolean value of XMEM_NEQ becomes either 0 (CRYPT_OK) or 1 (CRYPT_ERR). * there should be a better way of setting the correct error code in constant * time. */ err = XMEM_NEQ(ptTag, PAD, *taglen); /* Zero the plaintext if the tag was invalid (in constant time) */ if (ptlen > 0) { y = 0; mask *= 1 - err; /* mask = ( err ? 0 : 0xff ) */ #ifdef LTC_FAST fastMask *= 1 - err; if (ptlen & ~15) { for (; y < (ptlen & ~15); y += 16) { for (z = 0; z < 16; z += sizeof(LTC_FAST_TYPE)) { *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&pt_real[y+z])) = *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&pt[y+z])) & fastMask; } } } #endif for (; y < ptlen; y++) { pt_real[y] = pt[y] & mask; } } } #ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK #ifdef LTC_FAST fastMask = 0; #endif mask = 0; zeromem(PAD, sizeof(PAD)); zeromem(CTRPAD, sizeof(CTRPAD)); if (pt_work != NULL) { zeromem(pt_work, ptlen); } #endif error: if (pt_work) { XFREE(pt_work); } if (skey != uskey) { XFREE(skey); } return err; } #endif /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */