view libtomcrypt/src/encauth/gcm/gcm_process.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d

Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection slot until after the delay. Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate is then: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>". With the delay, this rate becomes: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com>
date Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100
parents 6dba84798cd5
children
line wrap: on
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis
 *
 * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic
 * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner.
 *
 * The library is free for all purposes without any express
 * guarantee it works.
 */

/**
   @file gcm_process.c
   GCM implementation, process message data, by Tom St Denis
*/
#include "tomcrypt.h"

#ifdef LTC_GCM_MODE

/**
  Process plaintext/ciphertext through GCM
  @param gcm       The GCM state
  @param pt        The plaintext
  @param ptlen     The plaintext length (ciphertext length is the same)
  @param ct        The ciphertext
  @param direction Encrypt or Decrypt mode (GCM_ENCRYPT or GCM_DECRYPT)
  @return CRYPT_OK on success
 */
int gcm_process(gcm_state *gcm,
                     unsigned char *pt,     unsigned long ptlen,
                     unsigned char *ct,
                     int direction)
{
   unsigned long x;
   int           y, err;
   unsigned char b;

   LTC_ARGCHK(gcm != NULL);
   if (ptlen > 0) {
      LTC_ARGCHK(pt  != NULL);
      LTC_ARGCHK(ct  != NULL);
   }

   if (gcm->buflen > 16 || gcm->buflen < 0) {
      return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
   }

   if ((err = cipher_is_valid(gcm->cipher)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
   }

   /* 0xFFFFFFFE0 = ((2^39)-256)/8 */
   if (gcm->pttotlen / 8 + (ulong64)gcm->buflen + (ulong64)ptlen >= CONST64(0xFFFFFFFE0)) {
      return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
   }

   if (gcm->mode == LTC_GCM_MODE_IV) {
      /* let's process the IV */
      if ((err = gcm_add_aad(gcm, NULL, 0)) != CRYPT_OK) return err;
   }

   /* in AAD mode? */
   if (gcm->mode == LTC_GCM_MODE_AAD) {
      /* let's process the AAD */
      if (gcm->buflen) {
         gcm->totlen += gcm->buflen * CONST64(8);
         gcm_mult_h(gcm, gcm->X);
      }

      /* increment counter */
      for (y = 15; y >= 12; y--) {
          if (++gcm->Y[y] & 255) { break; }
      }
      /* encrypt the counter */
      if ((err = cipher_descriptor[gcm->cipher].ecb_encrypt(gcm->Y, gcm->buf, &gcm->K)) != CRYPT_OK) {
         return err;
      }

      gcm->buflen = 0;
      gcm->mode   = LTC_GCM_MODE_TEXT;
   }

   if (gcm->mode != LTC_GCM_MODE_TEXT) {
      return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
   }

   x = 0;
#ifdef LTC_FAST
   if (gcm->buflen == 0) {
      if (direction == GCM_ENCRYPT) {
         for (x = 0; x < (ptlen & ~15); x += 16) {
             /* ctr encrypt */
             for (y = 0; y < 16; y += sizeof(LTC_FAST_TYPE)) {
                 *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&ct[x + y])) = *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&pt[x+y])) ^ *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&gcm->buf[y]));
                 *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&gcm->X[y])) ^= *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&ct[x+y]));
             }
             /* GMAC it */
             gcm->pttotlen += 128;
             gcm_mult_h(gcm, gcm->X);
             /* increment counter */
             for (y = 15; y >= 12; y--) {
                 if (++gcm->Y[y] & 255) { break; }
             }
             if ((err = cipher_descriptor[gcm->cipher].ecb_encrypt(gcm->Y, gcm->buf, &gcm->K)) != CRYPT_OK) {
                return err;
             }
         }
      } else {
         for (x = 0; x < (ptlen & ~15); x += 16) {
             /* ctr encrypt */
             for (y = 0; y < 16; y += sizeof(LTC_FAST_TYPE)) {
                 *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&gcm->X[y])) ^= *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&ct[x+y]));
                 *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&pt[x + y])) = *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&ct[x+y])) ^ *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&gcm->buf[y]));
             }
             /* GMAC it */
             gcm->pttotlen += 128;
             gcm_mult_h(gcm, gcm->X);
             /* increment counter */
             for (y = 15; y >= 12; y--) {
                 if (++gcm->Y[y] & 255) { break; }
             }
             if ((err = cipher_descriptor[gcm->cipher].ecb_encrypt(gcm->Y, gcm->buf, &gcm->K)) != CRYPT_OK) {
                return err;
             }
         }
      }
   }
#endif

   /* process text */
   for (; x < ptlen; x++) {
       if (gcm->buflen == 16) {
          gcm->pttotlen += 128;
          gcm_mult_h(gcm, gcm->X);

          /* increment counter */
          for (y = 15; y >= 12; y--) {
              if (++gcm->Y[y] & 255) { break; }
          }
          if ((err = cipher_descriptor[gcm->cipher].ecb_encrypt(gcm->Y, gcm->buf, &gcm->K)) != CRYPT_OK) {
             return err;
          }
          gcm->buflen = 0;
       }

       if (direction == GCM_ENCRYPT) {
          b = ct[x] = pt[x] ^ gcm->buf[gcm->buflen];
       } else {
          b = ct[x];
          pt[x] = ct[x] ^ gcm->buf[gcm->buflen];
       }
       gcm->X[gcm->buflen++] ^= b;
   }

   return CRYPT_OK;
}

#endif

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