view libtomcrypt/src/hashes/md2.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d

Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection slot until after the delay. Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate is then: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>". With the delay, this rate becomes: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com>
date Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100
parents 6dba84798cd5
children
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis
 *
 * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic
 * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner.
 *
 * The library is free for all purposes without any express
 * guarantee it works.
 */
#include "tomcrypt.h"

/**
   @param md2.c
   LTC_MD2 (RFC 1319) hash function implementation by Tom St Denis
*/

#ifdef LTC_MD2

const struct ltc_hash_descriptor md2_desc =
{
    "md2",
    7,
    16,
    16,

    /* OID */
   { 1, 2, 840, 113549, 2, 2,  },
   6,

    &md2_init,
    &md2_process,
    &md2_done,
    &md2_test,
    NULL
};

static const unsigned char PI_SUBST[256] = {
  41, 46, 67, 201, 162, 216, 124, 1, 61, 54, 84, 161, 236, 240, 6,
  19, 98, 167, 5, 243, 192, 199, 115, 140, 152, 147, 43, 217, 188,
  76, 130, 202, 30, 155, 87, 60, 253, 212, 224, 22, 103, 66, 111, 24,
  138, 23, 229, 18, 190, 78, 196, 214, 218, 158, 222, 73, 160, 251,
  245, 142, 187, 47, 238, 122, 169, 104, 121, 145, 21, 178, 7, 63,
  148, 194, 16, 137, 11, 34, 95, 33, 128, 127, 93, 154, 90, 144, 50,
  39, 53, 62, 204, 231, 191, 247, 151, 3, 255, 25, 48, 179, 72, 165,
  181, 209, 215, 94, 146, 42, 172, 86, 170, 198, 79, 184, 56, 210,
  150, 164, 125, 182, 118, 252, 107, 226, 156, 116, 4, 241, 69, 157,
  112, 89, 100, 113, 135, 32, 134, 91, 207, 101, 230, 45, 168, 2, 27,
  96, 37, 173, 174, 176, 185, 246, 28, 70, 97, 105, 52, 64, 126, 15,
  85, 71, 163, 35, 221, 81, 175, 58, 195, 92, 249, 206, 186, 197,
  234, 38, 44, 83, 13, 110, 133, 40, 132, 9, 211, 223, 205, 244, 65,
  129, 77, 82, 106, 220, 55, 200, 108, 193, 171, 250, 36, 225, 123,
  8, 12, 189, 177, 74, 120, 136, 149, 139, 227, 99, 232, 109, 233,
  203, 213, 254, 59, 0, 29, 57, 242, 239, 183, 14, 102, 88, 208, 228,
  166, 119, 114, 248, 235, 117, 75, 10, 49, 68, 80, 180, 143, 237,
  31, 26, 219, 153, 141, 51, 159, 17, 131, 20
};

/* adds 16 bytes to the checksum */
static void md2_update_chksum(hash_state *md)
{
   int j;
   unsigned char L;
   L = md->md2.chksum[15];
   for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) {

/* caution, the RFC says its "C[j] = S[M[i*16+j] xor L]" but the reference source code [and test vectors] say
   otherwise.
*/
       L = (md->md2.chksum[j] ^= PI_SUBST[(int)(md->md2.buf[j] ^ L)] & 255);
   }
}

static void md2_compress(hash_state *md)
{
   int j, k;
   unsigned char t;

   /* copy block */
   for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
       md->md2.X[16+j] = md->md2.buf[j];
       md->md2.X[32+j] = md->md2.X[j] ^ md->md2.X[16+j];
   }

   t = (unsigned char)0;

   /* do 18 rounds */
   for (j = 0; j < 18; j++) {
       for (k = 0; k < 48; k++) {
           t = (md->md2.X[k] ^= PI_SUBST[(int)(t & 255)]);
       }
       t = (t + (unsigned char)j) & 255;
   }
}

/**
   Initialize the hash state
   @param md   The hash state you wish to initialize
   @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int md2_init(hash_state *md)
{
   LTC_ARGCHK(md != NULL);

   /* LTC_MD2 uses a zero'ed state... */
   zeromem(md->md2.X, sizeof(md->md2.X));
   zeromem(md->md2.chksum, sizeof(md->md2.chksum));
   zeromem(md->md2.buf, sizeof(md->md2.buf));
   md->md2.curlen = 0;
   return CRYPT_OK;
}

/**
   Process a block of memory though the hash
   @param md     The hash state
   @param in     The data to hash
   @param inlen  The length of the data (octets)
   @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int md2_process(hash_state *md, const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen)
{
    unsigned long n;
    LTC_ARGCHK(md != NULL);
    LTC_ARGCHK(in != NULL);
    if (md-> md2 .curlen > sizeof(md-> md2 .buf)) {
       return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
    }
    while (inlen > 0) {
        n = MIN(inlen, (16 - md->md2.curlen));
        XMEMCPY(md->md2.buf + md->md2.curlen, in, (size_t)n);
        md->md2.curlen += n;
        in             += n;
        inlen          -= n;

        /* is 16 bytes full? */
        if (md->md2.curlen == 16) {
            md2_compress(md);
            md2_update_chksum(md);
            md->md2.curlen = 0;
        }
    }
    return CRYPT_OK;
}

/**
   Terminate the hash to get the digest
   @param md  The hash state
   @param out [out] The destination of the hash (16 bytes)
   @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int md2_done(hash_state * md, unsigned char *out)
{
    unsigned long i, k;

    LTC_ARGCHK(md  != NULL);
    LTC_ARGCHK(out != NULL);

    if (md->md2.curlen >= sizeof(md->md2.buf)) {
       return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
    }


    /* pad the message */
    k = 16 - md->md2.curlen;
    for (i = md->md2.curlen; i < 16; i++) {
        md->md2.buf[i] = (unsigned char)k;
    }

    /* hash and update */
    md2_compress(md);
    md2_update_chksum(md);

    /* hash checksum */
    XMEMCPY(md->md2.buf, md->md2.chksum, 16);
    md2_compress(md);

    /* output is lower 16 bytes of X */
    XMEMCPY(out, md->md2.X, 16);

#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
    zeromem(md, sizeof(hash_state));
#endif
    return CRYPT_OK;
}

/**
  Self-test the hash
  @return CRYPT_OK if successful, CRYPT_NOP if self-tests have been disabled
*/
int md2_test(void)
{
 #ifndef LTC_TEST
    return CRYPT_NOP;
 #else
   static const struct {
        const char *msg;
        unsigned char hash[16];
   } tests[] = {
      { "",
        {0x83,0x50,0xe5,0xa3,0xe2,0x4c,0x15,0x3d,
         0xf2,0x27,0x5c,0x9f,0x80,0x69,0x27,0x73
        }
      },
      { "a",
        {0x32,0xec,0x01,0xec,0x4a,0x6d,0xac,0x72,
         0xc0,0xab,0x96,0xfb,0x34,0xc0,0xb5,0xd1
        }
      },
      { "message digest",
        {0xab,0x4f,0x49,0x6b,0xfb,0x2a,0x53,0x0b,
         0x21,0x9f,0xf3,0x30,0x31,0xfe,0x06,0xb0
        }
      },
      { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz",
        {0x4e,0x8d,0xdf,0xf3,0x65,0x02,0x92,0xab,
         0x5a,0x41,0x08,0xc3,0xaa,0x47,0x94,0x0b
        }
      },
      { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789",
        {0xda,0x33,0xde,0xf2,0xa4,0x2d,0xf1,0x39,
         0x75,0x35,0x28,0x46,0xc3,0x03,0x38,0xcd
        }
      },
      { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890",
        {0xd5,0x97,0x6f,0x79,0xd8,0x3d,0x3a,0x0d,
         0xc9,0x80,0x6c,0x3c,0x66,0xf3,0xef,0xd8
        }
      }
   };

   int i;
   unsigned char tmp[16];
   hash_state md;

   for (i = 0; i < (int)(sizeof(tests) / sizeof(tests[0])); i++) {
       md2_init(&md);
       md2_process(&md, (unsigned char*)tests[i].msg, (unsigned long)strlen(tests[i].msg));
       md2_done(&md, tmp);
       if (compare_testvector(tmp, sizeof(tmp), tests[i].hash, sizeof(tests[i].hash), "MD2", i)) {
          return CRYPT_FAIL_TESTVECTOR;
       }
   }
   return CRYPT_OK;
  #endif
}

#endif


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