Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/mac/pmac/pmac_process.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d
Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions
To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an
unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection
slot until after the delay.
Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker
can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to
handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel
attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate
is then:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>".
With the delay, this rate becomes:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author | Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com> |
---|---|
date | Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100 |
parents | 6dba84798cd5 |
children |
line wrap: on
line source
/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file pmac_process.c PMAC implementation, process data, by Tom St Denis */ #ifdef LTC_PMAC /** Process data in a PMAC stream @param pmac The PMAC state @param in The data to send through PMAC @param inlen The length of the data to send through PMAC @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int pmac_process(pmac_state *pmac, const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen) { int err, n; unsigned long x; unsigned char Z[MAXBLOCKSIZE]; LTC_ARGCHK(pmac != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(in != NULL); if ((err = cipher_is_valid(pmac->cipher_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } if ((pmac->buflen > (int)sizeof(pmac->block)) || (pmac->buflen < 0) || (pmac->block_len > (int)sizeof(pmac->block)) || (pmac->buflen > pmac->block_len)) { return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG; } #ifdef LTC_FAST if (pmac->buflen == 0 && inlen > 16) { unsigned long y; for (x = 0; x < (inlen - 16); x += 16) { pmac_shift_xor(pmac); for (y = 0; y < 16; y += sizeof(LTC_FAST_TYPE)) { *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&Z[y])) = *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&in[y])) ^ *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&pmac->Li[y])); } if ((err = cipher_descriptor[pmac->cipher_idx].ecb_encrypt(Z, Z, &pmac->key)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } for (y = 0; y < 16; y += sizeof(LTC_FAST_TYPE)) { *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&pmac->checksum[y])) ^= *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&Z[y])); } in += 16; } inlen -= x; } #endif while (inlen != 0) { /* ok if the block is full we xor in prev, encrypt and replace prev */ if (pmac->buflen == pmac->block_len) { pmac_shift_xor(pmac); for (x = 0; x < (unsigned long)pmac->block_len; x++) { Z[x] = pmac->Li[x] ^ pmac->block[x]; } if ((err = cipher_descriptor[pmac->cipher_idx].ecb_encrypt(Z, Z, &pmac->key)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } for (x = 0; x < (unsigned long)pmac->block_len; x++) { pmac->checksum[x] ^= Z[x]; } pmac->buflen = 0; } /* add bytes */ n = MIN(inlen, (unsigned long)(pmac->block_len - pmac->buflen)); XMEMCPY(pmac->block + pmac->buflen, in, n); pmac->buflen += n; inlen -= n; in += n; } #ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK zeromem(Z, sizeof(Z)); #endif return CRYPT_OK; } #endif /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */