view libtomcrypt/src/mac/pmac/pmac_process.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d

Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection slot until after the delay. Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate is then: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>". With the delay, this rate becomes: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com>
date Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100
parents 6dba84798cd5
children
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis
 *
 * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic
 * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner.
 *
 * The library is free for all purposes without any express
 * guarantee it works.
 */
#include "tomcrypt.h"

/**
   @file pmac_process.c
   PMAC implementation, process data, by Tom St Denis
*/


#ifdef LTC_PMAC

/**
  Process data in a PMAC stream
  @param pmac     The PMAC state
  @param in       The data to send through PMAC
  @param inlen    The length of the data to send through PMAC
  @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int pmac_process(pmac_state *pmac, const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen)
{
   int err, n;
   unsigned long x;
   unsigned char Z[MAXBLOCKSIZE];

   LTC_ARGCHK(pmac != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(in   != NULL);
   if ((err = cipher_is_valid(pmac->cipher_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
   }

   if ((pmac->buflen > (int)sizeof(pmac->block)) || (pmac->buflen < 0) ||
       (pmac->block_len > (int)sizeof(pmac->block)) || (pmac->buflen > pmac->block_len)) {
      return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
   }

#ifdef LTC_FAST
   if (pmac->buflen == 0 && inlen > 16) {
      unsigned long y;
      for (x = 0; x < (inlen - 16); x += 16) {
          pmac_shift_xor(pmac);
          for (y = 0; y < 16; y += sizeof(LTC_FAST_TYPE)) {
              *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&Z[y])) = *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&in[y])) ^ *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&pmac->Li[y]));
          }
          if ((err = cipher_descriptor[pmac->cipher_idx].ecb_encrypt(Z, Z, &pmac->key)) != CRYPT_OK) {
             return err;
          }
          for (y = 0; y < 16; y += sizeof(LTC_FAST_TYPE)) {
              *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&pmac->checksum[y])) ^= *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&Z[y]));
          }
          in += 16;
      }
      inlen -= x;
   }
#endif

   while (inlen != 0) {
       /* ok if the block is full we xor in prev, encrypt and replace prev */
       if (pmac->buflen == pmac->block_len) {
          pmac_shift_xor(pmac);
          for (x = 0; x < (unsigned long)pmac->block_len; x++) {
               Z[x] = pmac->Li[x] ^ pmac->block[x];
          }
          if ((err = cipher_descriptor[pmac->cipher_idx].ecb_encrypt(Z, Z, &pmac->key)) != CRYPT_OK) {
             return err;
           }
          for (x = 0; x < (unsigned long)pmac->block_len; x++) {
              pmac->checksum[x] ^= Z[x];
          }
          pmac->buflen = 0;
       }

       /* add bytes */
       n = MIN(inlen, (unsigned long)(pmac->block_len - pmac->buflen));
       XMEMCPY(pmac->block + pmac->buflen, in, n);
       pmac->buflen  += n;
       inlen         -= n;
       in            += n;
   }

#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
   zeromem(Z, sizeof(Z));
#endif

   return CRYPT_OK;
}

#endif

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