view libtomcrypt/src/mac/xcbc/xcbc_done.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d

Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection slot until after the delay. Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate is then: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>". With the delay, this rate becomes: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com>
date Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100
parents 6dba84798cd5
children
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis
 *
 * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic
 * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner.
 *
 * The library is free for all purposes without any express
 * guarantee it works.
 */
#include "tomcrypt.h"

/**
  @file xcbc_done.c
  XCBC Support, terminate the state
*/

#ifdef LTC_XCBC

/** Terminate the XCBC-MAC state
  @param xcbc     XCBC state to terminate
  @param out      [out] Destination for the MAC tag
  @param outlen   [in/out] Destination size and final tag size
  Return CRYPT_OK on success
*/
int xcbc_done(xcbc_state *xcbc, unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen)
{
   int err, x;
   LTC_ARGCHK(xcbc != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(out  != NULL);

   /* check structure */
   if ((err = cipher_is_valid(xcbc->cipher)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
   }

   if ((xcbc->blocksize > cipher_descriptor[xcbc->cipher].block_length) || (xcbc->blocksize < 0) ||
       (xcbc->buflen > xcbc->blocksize) || (xcbc->buflen < 0)) {
      return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
   }

   /* which key do we use? */
   if (xcbc->buflen == xcbc->blocksize) {
      /* k2 */
      for (x = 0; x < xcbc->blocksize; x++) {
         xcbc->IV[x] ^= xcbc->K[1][x];
      }
   } else {
      xcbc->IV[xcbc->buflen] ^= 0x80;
      /* k3 */
      for (x = 0; x < xcbc->blocksize; x++) {
         xcbc->IV[x] ^= xcbc->K[2][x];
      }
   }

   /* encrypt */
   cipher_descriptor[xcbc->cipher].ecb_encrypt(xcbc->IV, xcbc->IV, &xcbc->key);
   cipher_descriptor[xcbc->cipher].done(&xcbc->key);

   /* extract tag */
   for (x = 0; x < xcbc->blocksize && (unsigned long)x < *outlen; x++) {
      out[x] = xcbc->IV[x];
   }
   *outlen = x;

#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
   zeromem(xcbc, sizeof(*xcbc));
#endif
   return CRYPT_OK;
}

#endif

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