Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/modes/lrw/lrw_process.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d
Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions
To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an
unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection
slot until after the delay.
Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker
can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to
handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel
attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate
is then:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>".
With the delay, this rate becomes:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author | Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com> |
---|---|
date | Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100 |
parents | 6dba84798cd5 |
children |
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file lrw_process.c LRW_MODE implementation, Encrypt/decrypt blocks, Tom St Denis */ #ifdef LTC_LRW_MODE /** Process blocks with LRW, since decrypt/encrypt are largely the same they share this code. @param pt The "input" data @param ct [out] The "output" data @param len The length of the input, must be a multiple of 128-bits (16 octets) @param mode LRW_ENCRYPT or LRW_DECRYPT @param lrw The LRW state @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int lrw_process(const unsigned char *pt, unsigned char *ct, unsigned long len, int mode, symmetric_LRW *lrw) { unsigned char prod[16]; int x, err; #ifdef LTC_LRW_TABLES int y; #endif LTC_ARGCHK(pt != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(ct != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(lrw != NULL); if (len & 15) { return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG; } while (len) { /* copy pad */ XMEMCPY(prod, lrw->pad, 16); /* increment IV */ for (x = 15; x >= 0; x--) { lrw->IV[x] = (lrw->IV[x] + 1) & 255; if (lrw->IV[x]) { break; } } /* update pad */ #ifdef LTC_LRW_TABLES /* for each byte changed we undo it's affect on the pad then add the new product */ for (; x < 16; x++) { #ifdef LTC_FAST for (y = 0; y < 16; y += sizeof(LTC_FAST_TYPE)) { *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(lrw->pad + y)) ^= *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&lrw->PC[x][lrw->IV[x]][y])) ^ *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&lrw->PC[x][(lrw->IV[x]-1)&255][y])); } #else for (y = 0; y < 16; y++) { lrw->pad[y] ^= lrw->PC[x][lrw->IV[x]][y] ^ lrw->PC[x][(lrw->IV[x]-1)&255][y]; } #endif } #else gcm_gf_mult(lrw->tweak, lrw->IV, lrw->pad); #endif /* xor prod */ #ifdef LTC_FAST for (x = 0; x < 16; x += sizeof(LTC_FAST_TYPE)) { *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(ct + x)) = *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(pt + x)) ^ *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(prod + x)); } #else for (x = 0; x < 16; x++) { ct[x] = pt[x] ^ prod[x]; } #endif /* send through cipher */ if (mode == LRW_ENCRYPT) { if ((err = cipher_descriptor[lrw->cipher].ecb_encrypt(ct, ct, &lrw->key)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } } else { if ((err = cipher_descriptor[lrw->cipher].ecb_decrypt(ct, ct, &lrw->key)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } } /* xor prod */ #ifdef LTC_FAST for (x = 0; x < 16; x += sizeof(LTC_FAST_TYPE)) { *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(ct + x)) = *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(ct + x)) ^ *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(prod + x)); } #else for (x = 0; x < 16; x++) { ct[x] = ct[x] ^ prod[x]; } #endif /* move to next */ pt += 16; ct += 16; len -= 16; } return CRYPT_OK; } #endif /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */