Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/modes/lrw/lrw_setiv.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d
Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions
To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an
unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection
slot until after the delay.
Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker
can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to
handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel
attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate
is then:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>".
With the delay, this rate becomes:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author | Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com> |
---|---|
date | Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100 |
parents | 6dba84798cd5 |
children |
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file lrw_setiv.c LRW_MODE implementation, Set the current IV, Tom St Denis */ #ifdef LTC_LRW_MODE /** Set the IV for LRW @param IV The IV, must be 16 octets @param len Length ... must be 16 :-) @param lrw The LRW state to update @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int lrw_setiv(const unsigned char *IV, unsigned long len, symmetric_LRW *lrw) { int err; #ifdef LTC_LRW_TABLES unsigned char T[16]; int x, y; #endif LTC_ARGCHK(IV != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(lrw != NULL); if (len != 16) { return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG; } if ((err = cipher_is_valid(lrw->cipher)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } /* copy the IV */ XMEMCPY(lrw->IV, IV, 16); /* check if we have to actually do work */ if (cipher_descriptor[lrw->cipher].accel_lrw_encrypt != NULL && cipher_descriptor[lrw->cipher].accel_lrw_decrypt != NULL) { /* we have accelerators, let's bail since they don't use lrw->pad anyways */ return CRYPT_OK; } #ifdef LTC_LRW_TABLES XMEMCPY(T, &lrw->PC[0][IV[0]][0], 16); for (x = 1; x < 16; x++) { #ifdef LTC_FAST for (y = 0; y < 16; y += sizeof(LTC_FAST_TYPE)) { *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(T + y)) ^= *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&lrw->PC[x][IV[x]][y])); } #else for (y = 0; y < 16; y++) { T[y] ^= lrw->PC[x][IV[x]][y]; } #endif } XMEMCPY(lrw->pad, T, 16); #else gcm_gf_mult(lrw->tweak, IV, lrw->pad); #endif return CRYPT_OK; } #endif /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */