view libtomcrypt/src/modes/lrw/lrw_setiv.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d

Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection slot until after the delay. Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate is then: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>". With the delay, this rate becomes: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com>
date Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100
parents 6dba84798cd5
children
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis
 *
 * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic
 * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner.
 *
 * The library is free for all purposes without any express
 * guarantee it works.
 */
#include "tomcrypt.h"

/**
   @file lrw_setiv.c
   LRW_MODE implementation, Set the current IV, Tom St Denis
*/

#ifdef LTC_LRW_MODE

/**
  Set the IV for LRW
  @param IV      The IV, must be 16 octets
  @param len     Length ... must be 16 :-)
  @param lrw     The LRW state to update
  @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int lrw_setiv(const unsigned char *IV, unsigned long len, symmetric_LRW *lrw)
{
   int           err;
#ifdef LTC_LRW_TABLES
   unsigned char T[16];
   int           x, y;
#endif
   LTC_ARGCHK(IV != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(lrw != NULL);

   if (len != 16) {
      return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
   }

   if ((err = cipher_is_valid(lrw->cipher)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
   }

   /* copy the IV */
   XMEMCPY(lrw->IV, IV, 16);

   /* check if we have to actually do work */
   if (cipher_descriptor[lrw->cipher].accel_lrw_encrypt != NULL && cipher_descriptor[lrw->cipher].accel_lrw_decrypt != NULL) {
       /* we have accelerators, let's bail since they don't use lrw->pad anyways */
       return CRYPT_OK;
   }

#ifdef LTC_LRW_TABLES
   XMEMCPY(T, &lrw->PC[0][IV[0]][0], 16);
   for (x = 1; x < 16; x++) {
#ifdef LTC_FAST
       for (y = 0; y < 16; y += sizeof(LTC_FAST_TYPE)) {
           *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(T + y)) ^= *(LTC_FAST_TYPE_PTR_CAST(&lrw->PC[x][IV[x]][y]));
       }
#else
       for (y = 0; y < 16; y++) {
           T[y] ^= lrw->PC[x][IV[x]][y];
       }
#endif
   }
   XMEMCPY(lrw->pad, T, 16);
#else
   gcm_gf_mult(lrw->tweak, IV, lrw->pad);
#endif

   return CRYPT_OK;
}


#endif
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