Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/pk/dsa/dsa_verify_key.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d
Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions
To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an
unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection
slot until after the delay.
Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker
can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to
handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel
attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate
is then:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>".
With the delay, this rate becomes:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author | Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com> |
---|---|
date | Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100 |
parents | 6dba84798cd5 |
children |
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line source
/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file dsa_verify_key.c DSA implementation, verify a key, Tom St Denis */ #ifdef LTC_MDSA /** Validate a DSA key Yeah, this function should've been called dsa_validate_key() in the first place and for compat-reasons we keep it as it was (for now). @param key The key to validate @param stat [out] Result of test, 1==valid, 0==invalid @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int dsa_verify_key(dsa_key *key, int *stat) { int err; err = dsa_int_validate_primes(key, stat); if (err != CRYPT_OK || *stat == 0) return err; err = dsa_int_validate_pqg(key, stat); if (err != CRYPT_OK || *stat == 0) return err; return dsa_int_validate_xy(key, stat); } /** Non-complex part (no primality testing) of the validation of DSA params (p, q, g) @param key The key to validate @param stat [out] Result of test, 1==valid, 0==invalid @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int dsa_int_validate_pqg(dsa_key *key, int *stat) { void *tmp1, *tmp2; int err; LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL); *stat = 0; /* check q-order */ if ( key->qord >= LTC_MDSA_MAX_GROUP || key->qord <= 15 || (unsigned long)key->qord >= mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->p) || (mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->p) - key->qord) >= LTC_MDSA_DELTA ) { return CRYPT_OK; } /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: 1 < g < p */ if (mp_cmp_d(key->g, 1) != LTC_MP_GT || mp_cmp(key->g, key->p) != LTC_MP_LT) { return CRYPT_OK; } if ((err = mp_init_multi(&tmp1, &tmp2, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: q is a divisor of (p - 1) */ if ((err = mp_sub_d(key->p, 1, tmp1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_div(tmp1, key->q, tmp1, tmp2)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if (mp_iszero(tmp2) != LTC_MP_YES) { err = CRYPT_OK; goto error; } /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: g is a generator of a subgroup of order q in * the multiplicative group of GF(p) - so we make sure that g^q mod p = 1 */ if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->g, key->q, key->p, tmp1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if (mp_cmp_d(tmp1, 1) != LTC_MP_EQ) { err = CRYPT_OK; goto error; } err = CRYPT_OK; *stat = 1; error: mp_clear_multi(tmp2, tmp1, NULL); return err; } /** Primality testing of DSA params p and q @param key The key to validate @param stat [out] Result of test, 1==valid, 0==invalid @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int dsa_int_validate_primes(dsa_key *key, int *stat) { int err, res; *stat = 0; LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL); /* key->q prime? */ if ((err = mp_prime_is_prime(key->q, LTC_MILLER_RABIN_REPS, &res)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } if (res == LTC_MP_NO) { return CRYPT_OK; } /* key->p prime? */ if ((err = mp_prime_is_prime(key->p, LTC_MILLER_RABIN_REPS, &res)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } if (res == LTC_MP_NO) { return CRYPT_OK; } *stat = 1; return CRYPT_OK; } /** Validation of a DSA key (x and y values) @param key The key to validate @param stat [out] Result of test, 1==valid, 0==invalid @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int dsa_int_validate_xy(dsa_key *key, int *stat) { void *tmp; int err; *stat = 0; LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL); /* 1 < y < p-1 */ if ((err = mp_init(&tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } if ((err = mp_sub_d(key->p, 1, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if (mp_cmp_d(key->y, 1) != LTC_MP_GT || mp_cmp(key->y, tmp) != LTC_MP_LT) { err = CRYPT_OK; goto error; } if (key->type == PK_PRIVATE) { /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: 0 < x < q */ if (mp_cmp_d(key->x, 0) != LTC_MP_GT || mp_cmp(key->x, key->q) != LTC_MP_LT) { err = CRYPT_OK; goto error; } /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: y = g^x mod p */ if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->g, key->x, key->p, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if (mp_cmp(tmp, key->y) != LTC_MP_EQ) { err = CRYPT_OK; goto error; } } else { /* with just a public key we cannot test y = g^x mod p therefore we * only test that y^q mod p = 1, which makes sure y is in g^x mod p */ if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->y, key->q, key->p, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if (mp_cmp_d(tmp, 1) != LTC_MP_EQ) { err = CRYPT_OK; goto error; } } err = CRYPT_OK; *stat = 1; error: mp_clear(tmp); return err; } #endif /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */