view libtomcrypt/src/pk/ecc/ecc_ansi_x963_import.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d

Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection slot until after the delay. Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate is then: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>". With the delay, this rate becomes: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com>
date Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100
parents 6dba84798cd5
children
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis
 *
 * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic
 * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner.
 *
 * The library is free for all purposes without any express
 * guarantee it works.
 */

/* Implements ECC over Z/pZ for curve y^2 = x^3 - 3x + b
 *
 * All curves taken from NIST recommendation paper of July 1999
 * Available at http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/dss.htm
 */
#include "tomcrypt.h"

/**
  @file ecc_ansi_x963_import.c
  ECC Crypto, Tom St Denis
*/

#ifdef LTC_MECC

/** Import an ANSI X9.63 format public key
  @param in      The input data to read
  @param inlen   The length of the input data
  @param key     [out] destination to store imported key \
*/
int ecc_ansi_x963_import(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen, ecc_key *key)
{
   return ecc_ansi_x963_import_ex(in, inlen, key, NULL);
}

int ecc_ansi_x963_import_ex(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen, ecc_key *key, ltc_ecc_set_type *dp)
{
   int x, err;

   LTC_ARGCHK(in  != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL);

   /* must be odd */
   if ((inlen & 1) == 0) {
      return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
   }

   /* init key */
   if (mp_init_multi(&key->pubkey.x, &key->pubkey.y, &key->pubkey.z, &key->k, NULL) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return CRYPT_MEM;
   }

   /* check for 4, 6 or 7 */
   if (in[0] != 4 && in[0] != 6 && in[0] != 7) {
      err = CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
      goto error;
   }

   /* read data */
   if ((err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(key->pubkey.x, (unsigned char *)in+1, (inlen-1)>>1)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      goto error;
   }

   if ((err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(key->pubkey.y, (unsigned char *)in+1+((inlen-1)>>1), (inlen-1)>>1)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      goto error;
   }
   if ((err = mp_set(key->pubkey.z, 1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; }

   if (dp == NULL) {
     /* determine the idx */
      for (x = 0; ltc_ecc_sets[x].size != 0; x++) {
         if ((unsigned)ltc_ecc_sets[x].size >= ((inlen-1)>>1)) {
            break;
         }
      }
      if (ltc_ecc_sets[x].size == 0) {
         err = CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
         goto error;
      }
      /* set the idx */
      key->idx  = x;
      key->dp = &ltc_ecc_sets[x];
   } else {
      if (((inlen-1)>>1) != (unsigned long) dp->size) {
         err = CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
         goto error;
      }
      key->idx = -1;
      key->dp  = dp;
   }
   key->type = PK_PUBLIC;

   /* we're done */
   return CRYPT_OK;
error:
   mp_clear_multi(key->pubkey.x, key->pubkey.y, key->pubkey.z, key->k, NULL);
   return err;
}

#endif

/* ref:         $Format:%D$ */
/* git commit:  $Format:%H$ */
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