view libtomcrypt/src/pk/ecc/ecc_decrypt_key.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d

Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection slot until after the delay. Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate is then: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>". With the delay, this rate becomes: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com>
date Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100
parents 6dba84798cd5
children
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis
 *
 * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic
 * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner.
 *
 * The library is free for all purposes without any express
 * guarantee it works.
 */

/* Implements ECC over Z/pZ for curve y^2 = x^3 - 3x + b
 *
 * All curves taken from NIST recommendation paper of July 1999
 * Available at http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/dss.htm
 */
#include "tomcrypt.h"

/**
  @file ecc_decrypt_key.c
  ECC Crypto, Tom St Denis
*/

#if defined(LTC_MECC) && defined(LTC_DER)

/**
  Decrypt an ECC encrypted key
  @param in       The ciphertext
  @param inlen    The length of the ciphertext (octets)
  @param out      [out] The plaintext
  @param outlen   [in/out] The max size and resulting size of the plaintext
  @param key      The corresponding private ECC key
  @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int ecc_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *in,  unsigned long  inlen,
                          unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen,
                          ecc_key *key)
{
   unsigned char *ecc_shared, *skey, *pub_expt;
   unsigned long  x, y;
   unsigned long  hashOID[32] = { 0 };
   int            hash, err;
   ecc_key        pubkey;
   ltc_asn1_list  decode[3];

   LTC_ARGCHK(in     != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(out    != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(outlen != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(key    != NULL);

   /* right key type? */
   if (key->type != PK_PRIVATE) {
      return CRYPT_PK_NOT_PRIVATE;
   }

   /* decode to find out hash */
   LTC_SET_ASN1(decode, 0, LTC_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER, hashOID, sizeof(hashOID)/sizeof(hashOID[0]));
   err = der_decode_sequence(in, inlen, decode, 1);
   if (err != CRYPT_OK && err != CRYPT_INPUT_TOO_LONG) {
      return err;
   }

   hash = find_hash_oid(hashOID, decode[0].size);
   if (hash_is_valid(hash) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
   }

   /* we now have the hash! */

   /* allocate memory */
   pub_expt   = XMALLOC(ECC_BUF_SIZE);
   ecc_shared = XMALLOC(ECC_BUF_SIZE);
   skey       = XMALLOC(MAXBLOCKSIZE);
   if (pub_expt == NULL || ecc_shared == NULL || skey == NULL) {
      if (pub_expt != NULL) {
         XFREE(pub_expt);
      }
      if (ecc_shared != NULL) {
         XFREE(ecc_shared);
      }
      if (skey != NULL) {
         XFREE(skey);
      }
      return CRYPT_MEM;
   }
   LTC_SET_ASN1(decode, 1, LTC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,      pub_expt,  ECC_BUF_SIZE);
   LTC_SET_ASN1(decode, 2, LTC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,      skey,      MAXBLOCKSIZE);

   /* read the structure in now */
   if ((err = der_decode_sequence(in, inlen, decode, 3)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      goto LBL_ERR;
   }

   /* import ECC key from packet */
   if ((err = ecc_import(decode[1].data, decode[1].size, &pubkey)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      goto LBL_ERR;
   }

   /* make shared key */
   x = ECC_BUF_SIZE;
   if ((err = ecc_shared_secret(key, &pubkey, ecc_shared, &x)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      ecc_free(&pubkey);
      goto LBL_ERR;
   }
   ecc_free(&pubkey);

   y = MIN(ECC_BUF_SIZE, MAXBLOCKSIZE);
   if ((err = hash_memory(hash, ecc_shared, x, ecc_shared, &y)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      goto LBL_ERR;
   }

   /* ensure the hash of the shared secret is at least as big as the encrypt itself */
   if (decode[2].size > y) {
      err = CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
      goto LBL_ERR;
   }

   /* avoid buffer overflow */
   if (*outlen < decode[2].size) {
      *outlen = decode[2].size;
      err = CRYPT_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;
      goto LBL_ERR;
   }

   /* Decrypt the key */
   for (x = 0; x < decode[2].size; x++) {
     out[x] = skey[x] ^ ecc_shared[x];
   }
   *outlen = x;

   err = CRYPT_OK;
LBL_ERR:
#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
   zeromem(pub_expt,   ECC_BUF_SIZE);
   zeromem(ecc_shared, ECC_BUF_SIZE);
   zeromem(skey,       MAXBLOCKSIZE);
#endif

   XFREE(pub_expt);
   XFREE(ecc_shared);
   XFREE(skey);

   return err;
}

#endif

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