Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/pk/ecc/ecc_verify_hash.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d
Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions
To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an
unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection
slot until after the delay.
Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker
can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to
handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel
attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate
is then:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>".
With the delay, this rate becomes:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author | Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com> |
---|---|
date | Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100 |
parents | 1ff2a1034c52 |
children |
line wrap: on
line source
/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ #include "tomcrypt.h" #if defined(LTC_MECC) && defined(LTC_DER) /** @file ecc_verify_hash.c ECC Crypto, Tom St Denis */ static int _ecc_verify_hash(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hashlen, int *stat, ecc_key *key, int sigformat) { ecc_point *mG, *mQ; void *r, *s, *v, *w, *u1, *u2, *e, *p, *m; void *mp; int err; unsigned long pbits, pbytes, i, shift_right; unsigned char ch, buf[MAXBLOCKSIZE]; LTC_ARGCHK(sig != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(hash != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); /* default to invalid signature */ *stat = 0; mp = NULL; /* is the IDX valid ? */ if (ltc_ecc_is_valid_idx(key->idx) != 1) { return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_TYPE; } /* allocate ints */ if ((err = mp_init_multi(&r, &s, &v, &w, &u1, &u2, &p, &e, &m, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) { return CRYPT_MEM; } /* allocate points */ mG = ltc_ecc_new_point(); mQ = ltc_ecc_new_point(); if (mQ == NULL || mG == NULL) { err = CRYPT_MEM; goto error; } if (sigformat == 1) { /* RFC7518 format */ if ((siglen % 2) == 1) { err = CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET; goto error; } i = siglen / 2; if ((err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(r, (unsigned char *)sig, i)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(s, (unsigned char *)sig+i, i)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } else { /* ASN.1 format */ if ((err = der_decode_sequence_multi(sig, siglen, LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL, r, LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL, s, LTC_ASN1_EOL, 0UL, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } /* get the order */ if ((err = mp_read_radix(p, (char *)key->dp->order, 16)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* get the modulus */ if ((err = mp_read_radix(m, (char *)key->dp->prime, 16)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* check for zero */ if (mp_iszero(r) || mp_iszero(s) || mp_cmp(r, p) != LTC_MP_LT || mp_cmp(s, p) != LTC_MP_LT) { err = CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET; goto error; } /* read hash - truncate if needed */ pbits = mp_count_bits(p); pbytes = (pbits+7) >> 3; if (pbits > hashlen*8) { if ((err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(e, (unsigned char *)hash, hashlen)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } else if (pbits % 8 == 0) { if ((err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(e, (unsigned char *)hash, pbytes)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } else { shift_right = 8 - pbits % 8; for (i=0, ch=0; i<pbytes; i++) { buf[i] = ch; ch = (hash[i] << (8-shift_right)); buf[i] = buf[i] ^ (hash[i] >> shift_right); } if ((err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(e, (unsigned char *)buf, pbytes)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } /* w = s^-1 mod n */ if ((err = mp_invmod(s, p, w)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* u1 = ew */ if ((err = mp_mulmod(e, w, p, u1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* u2 = rw */ if ((err = mp_mulmod(r, w, p, u2)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* find mG and mQ */ if ((err = mp_read_radix(mG->x, (char *)key->dp->Gx, 16)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_read_radix(mG->y, (char *)key->dp->Gy, 16)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_set(mG->z, 1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_copy(key->pubkey.x, mQ->x)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_copy(key->pubkey.y, mQ->y)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_copy(key->pubkey.z, mQ->z)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* compute u1*mG + u2*mQ = mG */ if (ltc_mp.ecc_mul2add == NULL) { if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_ptmul(u1, mG, mG, m, 0)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_ptmul(u2, mQ, mQ, m, 0)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* find the montgomery mp */ if ((err = mp_montgomery_setup(m, &mp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* add them */ if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_ptadd(mQ, mG, mG, m, mp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* reduce */ if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_map(mG, m, mp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } else { /* use Shamir's trick to compute u1*mG + u2*mQ using half of the doubles */ if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_mul2add(mG, u1, mQ, u2, mG, m)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } /* v = X_x1 mod n */ if ((err = mp_mod(mG->x, p, v)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* does v == r */ if (mp_cmp(v, r) == LTC_MP_EQ) { *stat = 1; } /* clear up and return */ err = CRYPT_OK; error: ltc_ecc_del_point(mG); ltc_ecc_del_point(mQ); mp_clear_multi(r, s, v, w, u1, u2, p, e, m, NULL); if (mp != NULL) { mp_montgomery_free(mp); } return err; } /** Verify an ECC signature @param sig The signature to verify @param siglen The length of the signature (octets) @param hash The hash (message digest) that was signed @param hashlen The length of the hash (octets) @param stat Result of signature, 1==valid, 0==invalid @param key The corresponding public ECC key @return CRYPT_OK if successful (even if the signature is not valid) */ int ecc_verify_hash(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hashlen, int *stat, ecc_key *key) { return _ecc_verify_hash(sig, siglen, hash, hashlen, stat, key, 0); } /** Verify an ECC signature in RFC7518 format @param sig The signature to verify @param siglen The length of the signature (octets) @param hash The hash (message digest) that was signed @param hashlen The length of the hash (octets) @param stat Result of signature, 1==valid, 0==invalid @param key The corresponding public ECC key @return CRYPT_OK if successful (even if the signature is not valid) */ int ecc_verify_hash_rfc7518(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hashlen, int *stat, ecc_key *key) { return _ecc_verify_hash(sig, siglen, hash, hashlen, stat, key, 1); } #endif /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */