view libtomcrypt/src/pk/pkcs1/pkcs_1_mgf1.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d

Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection slot until after the delay. Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate is then: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>". With the delay, this rate becomes: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com>
date Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100
parents 6dba84798cd5
children
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis
 *
 * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic
 * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner.
 *
 * The library is free for all purposes without any express
 * guarantee it works.
 */
#include "tomcrypt.h"

/**
  @file pkcs_1_mgf1.c
  The Mask Generation Function (MGF1) for PKCS #1, Tom St Denis
*/

#ifdef LTC_PKCS_1

/**
   Perform PKCS #1 MGF1 (internal)
   @param hash_idx    The index of the hash desired
   @param seed        The seed for MGF1
   @param seedlen     The length of the seed
   @param mask        [out] The destination
   @param masklen     The length of the mask desired
   @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int pkcs_1_mgf1(int                  hash_idx,
                const unsigned char *seed, unsigned long seedlen,
                      unsigned char *mask, unsigned long masklen)
{
   unsigned long hLen, x;
   ulong32       counter;
   int           err;
   hash_state    *md;
   unsigned char *buf;

   LTC_ARGCHK(seed != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(mask != NULL);

   /* ensure valid hash */
   if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
   }

   /* get hash output size */
   hLen = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].hashsize;

   /* allocate memory */
   md  = XMALLOC(sizeof(hash_state));
   buf = XMALLOC(hLen);
   if (md == NULL || buf == NULL) {
      if (md != NULL) {
         XFREE(md);
      }
      if (buf != NULL) {
         XFREE(buf);
      }
      return CRYPT_MEM;
   }

   /* start counter */
   counter = 0;

   while (masklen > 0) {
       /* handle counter */
       STORE32H(counter, buf);
       ++counter;

       /* get hash of seed || counter */
       if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].init(md)) != CRYPT_OK) {
          goto LBL_ERR;
       }
       if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].process(md, seed, seedlen)) != CRYPT_OK) {
          goto LBL_ERR;
       }
       if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].process(md, buf, 4)) != CRYPT_OK) {
          goto LBL_ERR;
       }
       if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].done(md, buf)) != CRYPT_OK) {
          goto LBL_ERR;
       }

       /* store it */
       for (x = 0; x < hLen && masklen > 0; x++, masklen--) {
          *mask++ = buf[x];
       }
   }

   err = CRYPT_OK;
LBL_ERR:
#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
   zeromem(buf, hLen);
   zeromem(md,  sizeof(hash_state));
#endif

   XFREE(buf);
   XFREE(md);

   return err;
}

#endif /* LTC_PKCS_1 */

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