Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/pk/pkcs1/pkcs_1_pss_decode.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d
Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions
To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an
unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection
slot until after the delay.
Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker
can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to
handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel
attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate
is then:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>".
With the delay, this rate becomes:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author | Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com> |
---|---|
date | Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100 |
parents | 6dba84798cd5 |
children |
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file pkcs_1_pss_decode.c PKCS #1 PSS Signature Padding, Tom St Denis */ #ifdef LTC_PKCS_1 /** PKCS #1 v2.00 PSS decode @param msghash The hash to verify @param msghashlen The length of the hash (octets) @param sig The signature data (encoded data) @param siglen The length of the signature data (octets) @param saltlen The length of the salt used (octets) @param hash_idx The index of the hash desired @param modulus_bitlen The bit length of the RSA modulus @param res [out] The result of the comparison, 1==valid, 0==invalid @return CRYPT_OK if successful (even if the comparison failed) */ int pkcs_1_pss_decode(const unsigned char *msghash, unsigned long msghashlen, const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen, unsigned long saltlen, int hash_idx, unsigned long modulus_bitlen, int *res) { unsigned char *DB, *mask, *salt, *hash; unsigned long x, y, hLen, modulus_len; int err; hash_state md; LTC_ARGCHK(msghash != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(res != NULL); /* default to invalid */ *res = 0; /* ensure hash is valid */ if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } hLen = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].hashsize; modulus_bitlen--; modulus_len = (modulus_bitlen>>3) + (modulus_bitlen & 7 ? 1 : 0); /* check sizes */ if ((saltlen > modulus_len) || (modulus_len < hLen + saltlen + 2)) { return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_SIZE; } /* allocate ram for DB/mask/salt/hash of size modulus_len */ DB = XMALLOC(modulus_len); mask = XMALLOC(modulus_len); salt = XMALLOC(modulus_len); hash = XMALLOC(modulus_len); if (DB == NULL || mask == NULL || salt == NULL || hash == NULL) { if (DB != NULL) { XFREE(DB); } if (mask != NULL) { XFREE(mask); } if (salt != NULL) { XFREE(salt); } if (hash != NULL) { XFREE(hash); } return CRYPT_MEM; } /* ensure the 0xBC byte */ if (sig[siglen-1] != 0xBC) { err = CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET; goto LBL_ERR; } /* copy out the DB */ x = 0; XMEMCPY(DB, sig + x, modulus_len - hLen - 1); x += modulus_len - hLen - 1; /* copy out the hash */ XMEMCPY(hash, sig + x, hLen); /* x += hLen; */ /* check the MSB */ if ((sig[0] & ~(0xFF >> ((modulus_len<<3) - (modulus_bitlen)))) != 0) { err = CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET; goto LBL_ERR; } /* generate mask of length modulus_len - hLen - 1 from hash */ if ((err = pkcs_1_mgf1(hash_idx, hash, hLen, mask, modulus_len - hLen - 1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } /* xor against DB */ for (y = 0; y < (modulus_len - hLen - 1); y++) { DB[y] ^= mask[y]; } /* now clear the first byte [make sure smaller than modulus] */ DB[0] &= 0xFF >> ((modulus_len<<3) - (modulus_bitlen)); /* DB = PS || 0x01 || salt, PS == modulus_len - saltlen - hLen - 2 zero bytes */ /* check for zeroes and 0x01 */ for (x = 0; x < modulus_len - saltlen - hLen - 2; x++) { if (DB[x] != 0x00) { err = CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET; goto LBL_ERR; } } /* check for the 0x01 */ if (DB[x++] != 0x01) { err = CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET; goto LBL_ERR; } /* M = (eight) 0x00 || msghash || salt, mask = H(M) */ if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].init(&md)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } zeromem(mask, 8); if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].process(&md, mask, 8)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].process(&md, msghash, msghashlen)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].process(&md, DB+x, saltlen)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].done(&md, mask)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } /* mask == hash means valid signature */ if (XMEM_NEQ(mask, hash, hLen) == 0) { *res = 1; } err = CRYPT_OK; LBL_ERR: #ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK zeromem(DB, modulus_len); zeromem(mask, modulus_len); zeromem(salt, modulus_len); zeromem(hash, modulus_len); #endif XFREE(hash); XFREE(salt); XFREE(mask); XFREE(DB); return err; } #endif /* LTC_PKCS_1 */ /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */