view libtomcrypt/src/pk/pkcs1/pkcs_1_pss_encode.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d

Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection slot until after the delay. Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate is then: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>". With the delay, this rate becomes: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com>
date Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100
parents 6dba84798cd5
children
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis
 *
 * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic
 * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner.
 *
 * The library is free for all purposes without any express
 * guarantee it works.
 */
#include "tomcrypt.h"

/**
  @file pkcs_1_pss_encode.c
  PKCS #1 PSS Signature Padding, Tom St Denis
*/

#ifdef LTC_PKCS_1

/**
   PKCS #1 v2.00 Signature Encoding
   @param msghash          The hash to encode
   @param msghashlen       The length of the hash (octets)
   @param saltlen          The length of the salt desired (octets)
   @param prng             An active PRNG context
   @param prng_idx         The index of the PRNG desired
   @param hash_idx         The index of the hash desired
   @param modulus_bitlen   The bit length of the RSA modulus
   @param out              [out] The destination of the encoding
   @param outlen           [in/out] The max size and resulting size of the encoded data
   @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int pkcs_1_pss_encode(const unsigned char *msghash, unsigned long msghashlen,
                            unsigned long saltlen,  prng_state   *prng,
                            int           prng_idx, int           hash_idx,
                            unsigned long modulus_bitlen,
                            unsigned char *out,     unsigned long *outlen)
{
   unsigned char *DB, *mask, *salt, *hash;
   unsigned long x, y, hLen, modulus_len;
   int           err;
   hash_state    md;

   LTC_ARGCHK(msghash != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(out     != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(outlen  != NULL);

   /* ensure hash and PRNG are valid */
   if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
   }
   if ((err = prng_is_valid(prng_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
   }

   hLen        = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].hashsize;
   modulus_bitlen--;
   modulus_len = (modulus_bitlen>>3) + (modulus_bitlen & 7 ? 1 : 0);

   /* check sizes */
   if ((saltlen > modulus_len) || (modulus_len < hLen + saltlen + 2)) {
      return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_SIZE;
   }

   /* allocate ram for DB/mask/salt/hash of size modulus_len */
   DB   = XMALLOC(modulus_len);
   mask = XMALLOC(modulus_len);
   salt = XMALLOC(modulus_len);
   hash = XMALLOC(modulus_len);
   if (DB == NULL || mask == NULL || salt == NULL || hash == NULL) {
      if (DB != NULL) {
         XFREE(DB);
      }
      if (mask != NULL) {
         XFREE(mask);
      }
      if (salt != NULL) {
         XFREE(salt);
      }
      if (hash != NULL) {
         XFREE(hash);
      }
      return CRYPT_MEM;
   }


   /* generate random salt */
   if (saltlen > 0) {
      if (prng_descriptor[prng_idx].read(salt, saltlen, prng) != saltlen) {
         err = CRYPT_ERROR_READPRNG;
         goto LBL_ERR;
      }
   }

   /* M = (eight) 0x00 || msghash || salt, hash = H(M) */
   if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].init(&md)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      goto LBL_ERR;
   }
   zeromem(DB, 8);
   if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].process(&md, DB, 8)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      goto LBL_ERR;
   }
   if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].process(&md, msghash, msghashlen)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      goto LBL_ERR;
   }
   if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].process(&md, salt, saltlen)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      goto LBL_ERR;
   }
   if ((err = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].done(&md, hash)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      goto LBL_ERR;
   }

   /* generate DB = PS || 0x01 || salt, PS == modulus_len - saltlen - hLen - 2 zero bytes */
   x = 0;
   XMEMSET(DB + x, 0, modulus_len - saltlen - hLen - 2);
   x += modulus_len - saltlen - hLen - 2;
   DB[x++] = 0x01;
   XMEMCPY(DB + x, salt, saltlen);
   /* x += saltlen; */

   /* generate mask of length modulus_len - hLen - 1 from hash */
   if ((err = pkcs_1_mgf1(hash_idx, hash, hLen, mask, modulus_len - hLen - 1)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      goto LBL_ERR;
   }

   /* xor against DB */
   for (y = 0; y < (modulus_len - hLen - 1); y++) {
      DB[y] ^= mask[y];
   }

   /* output is DB || hash || 0xBC */
   if (*outlen < modulus_len) {
      *outlen = modulus_len;
      err = CRYPT_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;
      goto LBL_ERR;
   }

   /* DB len = modulus_len - hLen - 1 */
   y = 0;
   XMEMCPY(out + y, DB, modulus_len - hLen - 1);
   y += modulus_len - hLen - 1;

   /* hash */
   XMEMCPY(out + y, hash, hLen);
   y += hLen;

   /* 0xBC */
   out[y] = 0xBC;

   /* now clear the 8*modulus_len - modulus_bitlen most significant bits */
   out[0] &= 0xFF >> ((modulus_len<<3) - modulus_bitlen);

   /* store output size */
   *outlen = modulus_len;
   err = CRYPT_OK;
LBL_ERR:
#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
   zeromem(DB,   modulus_len);
   zeromem(mask, modulus_len);
   zeromem(salt, modulus_len);
   zeromem(hash, modulus_len);
#endif

   XFREE(hash);
   XFREE(salt);
   XFREE(mask);
   XFREE(DB);

   return err;
}

#endif /* LTC_PKCS_1 */

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