Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/pk/pkcs1/pkcs_1_v1_5_encode.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d
Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions
To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an
unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection
slot until after the delay.
Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker
can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to
handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel
attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate
is then:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>".
With the delay, this rate becomes:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author | Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com> |
---|---|
date | Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100 |
parents | 6dba84798cd5 |
children |
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /*! \file pkcs_1_v1_5_encode.c * * PKCS #1 v1.5 Padding (Andreas Lange) */ #ifdef LTC_PKCS_1 /*! \brief PKCS #1 v1.5 encode. * * \param msg The data to encode * \param msglen The length of the data to encode (octets) * \param block_type Block type to use in padding (\sa ltc_pkcs_1_v1_5_blocks) * \param modulus_bitlen The bit length of the RSA modulus * \param prng An active PRNG state (only for LTC_PKCS_1_EME) * \param prng_idx The index of the PRNG desired (only for LTC_PKCS_1_EME) * \param out [out] The destination for the encoded data * \param outlen [in/out] The max size and resulting size of the encoded data * * \return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int pkcs_1_v1_5_encode(const unsigned char *msg, unsigned long msglen, int block_type, unsigned long modulus_bitlen, prng_state *prng, int prng_idx, unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen) { unsigned long modulus_len, ps_len, i; unsigned char *ps; int result; /* valid block_type? */ if ((block_type != LTC_PKCS_1_EMSA) && (block_type != LTC_PKCS_1_EME)) { return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_PADDING; } if (block_type == LTC_PKCS_1_EME) { /* encryption padding, we need a valid PRNG */ if ((result = prng_is_valid(prng_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) { return result; } } modulus_len = (modulus_bitlen >> 3) + (modulus_bitlen & 7 ? 1 : 0); /* test message size */ if ((msglen + 11) > modulus_len) { return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_SIZE; } if (*outlen < modulus_len) { *outlen = modulus_len; result = CRYPT_BUFFER_OVERFLOW; goto bail; } /* generate an octets string PS */ ps = &out[2]; ps_len = modulus_len - msglen - 3; if (block_type == LTC_PKCS_1_EME) { /* now choose a random ps */ if (prng_descriptor[prng_idx].read(ps, ps_len, prng) != ps_len) { result = CRYPT_ERROR_READPRNG; goto bail; } /* transform zero bytes (if any) to non-zero random bytes */ for (i = 0; i < ps_len; i++) { while (ps[i] == 0) { if (prng_descriptor[prng_idx].read(&ps[i], 1, prng) != 1) { result = CRYPT_ERROR_READPRNG; goto bail; } } } } else { XMEMSET(ps, 0xFF, ps_len); } /* create string of length modulus_len */ out[0] = 0x00; out[1] = (unsigned char)block_type; /* block_type 1 or 2 */ out[2 + ps_len] = 0x00; XMEMCPY(&out[2 + ps_len + 1], msg, msglen); *outlen = modulus_len; result = CRYPT_OK; bail: return result; } /* pkcs_1_v1_5_encode */ #endif /* #ifdef LTC_PKCS_1 */ /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */