Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/pk/rsa/rsa_decrypt_key.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d
Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions
To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an
unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection
slot until after the delay.
Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker
can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to
handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel
attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate
is then:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>".
With the delay, this rate becomes:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author | Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com> |
---|---|
date | Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100 |
parents | 6dba84798cd5 |
children |
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line source
/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file rsa_decrypt_key.c RSA PKCS #1 Decryption, Tom St Denis and Andreas Lange */ #ifdef LTC_MRSA /** PKCS #1 decrypt then v1.5 or OAEP depad @param in The ciphertext @param inlen The length of the ciphertext (octets) @param out [out] The plaintext @param outlen [in/out] The max size and resulting size of the plaintext (octets) @param lparam The system "lparam" value @param lparamlen The length of the lparam value (octets) @param hash_idx The index of the hash desired @param padding Type of padding (LTC_PKCS_1_OAEP or LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) @param stat [out] Result of the decryption, 1==valid, 0==invalid @param key The corresponding private RSA key @return CRYPT_OK if succcessul (even if invalid) */ int rsa_decrypt_key_ex(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen, unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen, const unsigned char *lparam, unsigned long lparamlen, int hash_idx, int padding, int *stat, rsa_key *key) { unsigned long modulus_bitlen, modulus_bytelen, x; int err; unsigned char *tmp; LTC_ARGCHK(out != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(outlen != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL); /* default to invalid */ *stat = 0; /* valid padding? */ if ((padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) && (padding != LTC_PKCS_1_OAEP)) { return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_PADDING; } if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_OAEP) { /* valid hash ? */ if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } } /* get modulus len in bits */ modulus_bitlen = mp_count_bits( (key->N)); /* outlen must be at least the size of the modulus */ modulus_bytelen = mp_unsigned_bin_size( (key->N)); if (modulus_bytelen != inlen) { return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET; } /* allocate ram */ tmp = XMALLOC(inlen); if (tmp == NULL) { return CRYPT_MEM; } /* rsa decode the packet */ x = inlen; if ((err = ltc_mp.rsa_me(in, inlen, tmp, &x, PK_PRIVATE, key)) != CRYPT_OK) { XFREE(tmp); return err; } if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_OAEP) { /* now OAEP decode the packet */ err = pkcs_1_oaep_decode(tmp, x, lparam, lparamlen, modulus_bitlen, hash_idx, out, outlen, stat); } else { /* now PKCS #1 v1.5 depad the packet */ err = pkcs_1_v1_5_decode(tmp, x, LTC_PKCS_1_EME, modulus_bitlen, out, outlen, stat); } XFREE(tmp); return err; } #endif /* LTC_MRSA */ /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */