view libtomcrypt/src/pk/rsa/rsa_export.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d

Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection slot until after the delay. Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate is then: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>". With the delay, this rate becomes: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com>
date Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100
parents e9dba7abd939
children
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis
 *
 * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic
 * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner.
 *
 * The library is free for all purposes without any express
 * guarantee it works.
 */
#include "tomcrypt.h"

/**
  @file rsa_export.c
  Export RSA PKCS keys, Tom St Denis
*/

#ifdef LTC_MRSA

/**
    This will export either an RSAPublicKey or RSAPrivateKey [defined in PKCS #1 v2.1]
    @param out       [out] Destination of the packet
    @param outlen    [in/out] The max size and resulting size of the packet
    @param type      The type of exported key (PK_PRIVATE or PK_PUBLIC)
    @param key       The RSA key to export
    @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int rsa_export(unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen, int type, rsa_key *key)
{
   unsigned long zero=0;
   int err;
   LTC_ARGCHK(out    != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(outlen != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(key    != NULL);

   /* type valid? */
   if (!(key->type == PK_PRIVATE) && (type == PK_PRIVATE)) {
      return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_TYPE;
   }

   if (type == PK_PRIVATE) {
      /* private key */
      /* output is
            Version, n, e, d, p, q, d mod (p-1), d mod (q - 1), 1/q mod p
       */
      return der_encode_sequence_multi(out, outlen,
                          LTC_ASN1_SHORT_INTEGER, 1UL, &zero,
                          LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL,  key->N,
                          LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL,  key->e,
                          LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL,  key->d,
                          LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL,  key->p,
                          LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL,  key->q,
                          LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL,  key->dP,
                          LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL,  key->dQ,
                          LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL,  key->qP,
                          LTC_ASN1_EOL,     0UL, NULL);
   } else {
      /* public key */
      unsigned long tmplen, *ptmplen;
      unsigned char* tmp = NULL;

      if (type & PK_STD) {
          tmplen = (unsigned long)(mp_count_bits(key->N) / 8) * 2 + 8;
          tmp = XMALLOC(tmplen);
          ptmplen = &tmplen;
          if (tmp == NULL) {
              return CRYPT_MEM;
          }
      }
      else {
          tmp = out;
          ptmplen = outlen;
      }

      err = der_encode_sequence_multi(tmp, ptmplen,
                                 LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL,  key->N,
                                 LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL,  key->e,
                                 LTC_ASN1_EOL,     0UL, NULL);

      if ((err != CRYPT_OK) || !(type & PK_STD)) {
          goto finish;
      }

      err = der_encode_subject_public_key_info(out, outlen,
        PKA_RSA, tmp, tmplen, LTC_ASN1_NULL, NULL, 0);

finish:
      if (tmp != out)
        XFREE(tmp);
      return err;

   }
}

#endif /* LTC_MRSA */

/* ref:         $Format:%D$ */
/* git commit:  $Format:%H$ */
/* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */