Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/pk/rsa/rsa_import_x509.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d
Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions
To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an
unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection
slot until after the delay.
Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker
can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to
handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel
attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate
is then:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>".
With the delay, this rate becomes:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author | Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com> |
---|---|
date | Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100 |
parents | 6dba84798cd5 |
children |
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file rsa_import.c Import an RSA key from a X.509 certificate, Steffen Jaeckel */ #ifdef LTC_MRSA /** Import an RSA key from a X.509 certificate @param in The packet to import from @param inlen It's length (octets) @param key [out] Destination for newly imported key @return CRYPT_OK if successful, upon error allocated memory is freed */ int rsa_import_x509(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen, rsa_key *key) { int err; unsigned char *tmpbuf; unsigned long tmpbuf_len, tmp_inlen; ltc_asn1_list *decoded_list = NULL, *l; LTC_ARGCHK(in != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(ltc_mp.name != NULL); /* init key */ if ((err = mp_init_multi(&key->e, &key->d, &key->N, &key->dQ, &key->dP, &key->qP, &key->p, &key->q, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } tmpbuf_len = inlen; tmpbuf = XCALLOC(1, tmpbuf_len); if (tmpbuf == NULL) { err = CRYPT_MEM; goto LBL_ERR; } tmp_inlen = inlen; if ((err = der_decode_sequence_flexi(in, &tmp_inlen, &decoded_list)) == CRYPT_OK) { l = decoded_list; /* Move 2 levels up in the tree SEQUENCE SEQUENCE ... */ if (l->type == LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE && l->child) { l = l->child; if (l->type == LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE && l->child) { l = l->child; err = CRYPT_ERROR; /* Move forward in the tree until we find this combination ... SEQUENCE SEQUENCE OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 NULL BIT STRING */ do { /* The additional check for l->data is there to make sure * we won't try to decode a list that has been 'shrunk' */ if (l->type == LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE && l->data && l->child && l->child->type == LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE && l->child->child && l->child->child->type == LTC_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER && l->child->next && l->child->next->type == LTC_ASN1_BIT_STRING) { err = der_decode_subject_public_key_info(l->data, l->size, PKA_RSA, tmpbuf, &tmpbuf_len, LTC_ASN1_NULL, NULL, 0); if (err == CRYPT_OK) { /* now it should be SEQUENCE { INTEGER, INTEGER } */ if ((err = der_decode_sequence_multi(tmpbuf, tmpbuf_len, LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL, key->N, LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL, key->e, LTC_ASN1_EOL, 0UL, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto LBL_ERR; } key->type = PK_PUBLIC; err = CRYPT_OK; goto LBL_FREE; } } l = l->next; } while(l); } } } LBL_ERR: rsa_free(key); LBL_FREE: if (decoded_list) der_free_sequence_flexi(decoded_list); if (tmpbuf != NULL) XFREE(tmpbuf); return err; } #endif /* LTC_MRSA */ /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */