view libtomcrypt/src/pk/rsa/rsa_make_key.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d

Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection slot until after the delay. Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate is then: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>". With the delay, this rate becomes: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com>
date Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100
parents 6dba84798cd5
children
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis
 *
 * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic
 * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner.
 *
 * The library is free for all purposes without any express
 * guarantee it works.
 */
#include "tomcrypt.h"

/**
  @file rsa_make_key.c
  RSA key generation, Tom St Denis
*/

#ifdef LTC_MRSA

/**
   Create an RSA key
   @param prng     An active PRNG state
   @param wprng    The index of the PRNG desired
   @param size     The size of the modulus (key size) desired (octets)
   @param e        The "e" value (public key).  e==65537 is a good choice
   @param key      [out] Destination of a newly created private key pair
   @return CRYPT_OK if successful, upon error all allocated ram is freed
*/
int rsa_make_key(prng_state *prng, int wprng, int size, long e, rsa_key *key)
{
   void *p, *q, *tmp1, *tmp2, *tmp3;
   int    err;

   LTC_ARGCHK(ltc_mp.name != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(key         != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(size        > 0);

   if ((e < 3) || ((e & 1) == 0)) {
      return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
   }

   if ((err = prng_is_valid(wprng)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
   }

   if ((err = mp_init_multi(&p, &q, &tmp1, &tmp2, &tmp3, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
   }

   /* make primes p and q (optimization provided by Wayne Scott) */
   if ((err = mp_set_int(tmp3, e)) != CRYPT_OK)                      { goto cleanup; }  /* tmp3 = e */

   /* make prime "p" */
   do {
       if ((err = rand_prime( p, size/2, prng, wprng)) != CRYPT_OK)  { goto cleanup; }
       if ((err = mp_sub_d( p, 1,  tmp1)) != CRYPT_OK)               { goto cleanup; }  /* tmp1 = p-1 */
       if ((err = mp_gcd( tmp1,  tmp3,  tmp2)) != CRYPT_OK)          { goto cleanup; }  /* tmp2 = gcd(p-1, e) */
   } while (mp_cmp_d( tmp2, 1) != 0);                                                  /* while e divides p-1 */

   /* make prime "q" */
   do {
       if ((err = rand_prime( q, size/2, prng, wprng)) != CRYPT_OK)  { goto cleanup; }
       if ((err = mp_sub_d( q, 1,  tmp1)) != CRYPT_OK)               { goto cleanup; } /* tmp1 = q-1 */
       if ((err = mp_gcd( tmp1,  tmp3,  tmp2)) != CRYPT_OK)          { goto cleanup; } /* tmp2 = gcd(q-1, e) */
   } while (mp_cmp_d( tmp2, 1) != 0);                                                 /* while e divides q-1 */

   /* tmp1 = lcm(p-1, q-1) */
   if ((err = mp_sub_d( p, 1,  tmp2)) != CRYPT_OK)                   { goto cleanup; } /* tmp2 = p-1 */
                                                                                      /* tmp1 = q-1 (previous do/while loop) */
   if ((err = mp_lcm( tmp1,  tmp2,  tmp1)) != CRYPT_OK)              { goto cleanup; } /* tmp1 = lcm(p-1, q-1) */

   /* make key */
   if ((err = mp_init_multi(&key->e, &key->d, &key->N, &key->dQ, &key->dP, &key->qP, &key->p, &key->q, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      goto errkey;
   }

   if ((err = mp_set_int( key->e, e)) != CRYPT_OK)                     { goto errkey; } /* key->e =  e */
   if ((err = mp_invmod( key->e,  tmp1,  key->d)) != CRYPT_OK)         { goto errkey; } /* key->d = 1/e mod lcm(p-1,q-1) */
   if ((err = mp_mul( p,  q,  key->N)) != CRYPT_OK)                    { goto errkey; } /* key->N = pq */

   /* optimize for CRT now */
   /* find d mod q-1 and d mod p-1 */
   if ((err = mp_sub_d( p, 1,  tmp1)) != CRYPT_OK)                     { goto errkey; } /* tmp1 = q-1 */
   if ((err = mp_sub_d( q, 1,  tmp2)) != CRYPT_OK)                     { goto errkey; } /* tmp2 = p-1 */
   if ((err = mp_mod( key->d,  tmp1,  key->dP)) != CRYPT_OK)           { goto errkey; } /* dP = d mod p-1 */
   if ((err = mp_mod( key->d,  tmp2,  key->dQ)) != CRYPT_OK)           { goto errkey; } /* dQ = d mod q-1 */
   if ((err = mp_invmod( q,  p,  key->qP)) != CRYPT_OK)                { goto errkey; } /* qP = 1/q mod p */

   if ((err = mp_copy( p,  key->p)) != CRYPT_OK)                       { goto errkey; }
   if ((err = mp_copy( q,  key->q)) != CRYPT_OK)                       { goto errkey; }

   /* set key type (in this case it's CRT optimized) */
   key->type = PK_PRIVATE;

   /* return ok and free temps */
   err       = CRYPT_OK;
   goto cleanup;
errkey:
   rsa_free(key);
cleanup:
   mp_clear_multi(tmp3, tmp2, tmp1, q, p, NULL);
   return err;
}

#endif

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