view libtomcrypt/src/pk/rsa/rsa_sign_hash.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d

Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection slot until after the delay. Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate is then: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>". With the delay, this rate becomes: "MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com>
date Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100
parents 6dba84798cd5
children
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis
 *
 * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic
 * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner.
 *
 * The library is free for all purposes without any express
 * guarantee it works.
 */
#include "tomcrypt.h"

/**
  @file rsa_sign_hash.c
  RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 and v2 PSS sign hash, Tom St Denis and Andreas Lange
*/

#ifdef LTC_MRSA

/**
  PKCS #1 pad then sign
  @param in        The hash to sign
  @param inlen     The length of the hash to sign (octets)
  @param out       [out] The signature
  @param outlen    [in/out] The max size and resulting size of the signature
  @param padding   Type of padding (LTC_PKCS_1_PSS, LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5 or LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5_NA1)
  @param prng      An active PRNG state
  @param prng_idx  The index of the PRNG desired
  @param hash_idx  The index of the hash desired
  @param saltlen   The length of the salt desired (octets)
  @param key       The private RSA key to use
  @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int rsa_sign_hash_ex(const unsigned char *in,       unsigned long  inlen,
                           unsigned char *out,      unsigned long *outlen,
                           int            padding,
                           prng_state    *prng,     int            prng_idx,
                           int            hash_idx, unsigned long  saltlen,
                           rsa_key *key)
{
   unsigned long modulus_bitlen, modulus_bytelen, x, y;
   int           err;

   LTC_ARGCHK(in       != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(out      != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(outlen   != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(key      != NULL);

   /* valid padding? */
   if ((padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) &&
       (padding != LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) &&
       (padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5_NA1)) {
     return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_PADDING;
   }

   if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) {
     /* valid prng ? */
     if ((err = prng_is_valid(prng_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) {
        return err;
     }
   }

   if (padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5_NA1) {
     /* valid hash ? */
     if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) {
        return err;
     }
   }

   /* get modulus len in bits */
   modulus_bitlen = mp_count_bits((key->N));

  /* outlen must be at least the size of the modulus */
  modulus_bytelen = mp_unsigned_bin_size((key->N));
  if (modulus_bytelen > *outlen) {
     *outlen = modulus_bytelen;
     return CRYPT_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;
  }

  if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) {
    /* PSS pad the key */
    x = *outlen;
    if ((err = pkcs_1_pss_encode(in, inlen, saltlen, prng, prng_idx,
                                 hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, out, &x)) != CRYPT_OK) {
       return err;
    }
  } else {
    /* PKCS #1 v1.5 pad the hash */
    unsigned char *tmpin;

    if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) {
      ltc_asn1_list digestinfo[2], siginfo[2];
      /* not all hashes have OIDs... so sad */
      if (hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen == 0) {
         return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
      }

    /* construct the SEQUENCE
        SEQUENCE {
           SEQUENCE {hashoid OID
                     blah    NULL
           }
         hash    OCTET STRING
        }
     */
      LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER, hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OID, hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen);
      LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_NULL,              NULL,                          0);
      LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo,    0, LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE,          digestinfo,                    2);
      LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo,    1, LTC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,      in,                            inlen);

      /* allocate memory for the encoding */
      y = mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->N);
      tmpin = XMALLOC(y);
      if (tmpin == NULL) {
         return CRYPT_MEM;
      }

      if ((err = der_encode_sequence(siginfo, 2, tmpin, &y)) != CRYPT_OK) {
         XFREE(tmpin);
         return err;
      }
    } else {
      /* set the pointer and data-length to the input values */
      tmpin = (unsigned char *)in;
      y = inlen;
    }

    x = *outlen;
    err = pkcs_1_v1_5_encode(tmpin, y, LTC_PKCS_1_EMSA, modulus_bitlen, NULL, 0, out, &x);

    if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) {
      XFREE(tmpin);
    }

    if (err != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
    }
  }

  /* RSA encode it */
  return ltc_mp.rsa_me(out, x, out, outlen, PK_PRIVATE, key);
}

#endif /* LTC_MRSA */

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