Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/pk/rsa/rsa_verify_hash.c @ 1790:42745af83b7d
Introduce extra delay before closing unauthenticated sessions
To make it harder for attackers, introduce a delay to keep an
unauthenticated session open a bit longer, thus blocking a connection
slot until after the delay.
Without this, while there is a limit on the amount of attempts an attacker
can make at the same time (MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP), the time taken by dropbear to
handle one attempt is still short and thus for each of the allowed parallel
attempts many attempts can be chained one after the other. The attempt rate
is then:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / <process time of one attempt>".
With the delay, this rate becomes:
"MAX_UNAUTH_PER_IP / UNAUTH_CLOSE_DELAY".
author | Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com> |
---|---|
date | Wed, 15 Feb 2017 13:53:04 +0100 |
parents | 6dba84798cd5 |
children |
line wrap: on
line source
/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file rsa_verify_hash.c RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 or v2 PSS signature verification, Tom St Denis and Andreas Lange */ #ifdef LTC_MRSA /** PKCS #1 de-sign then v1.5 or PSS depad @param sig The signature data @param siglen The length of the signature data (octets) @param hash The hash of the message that was signed @param hashlen The length of the hash of the message that was signed (octets) @param padding Type of padding (LTC_PKCS_1_PSS, LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5 or LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5_NA1) @param hash_idx The index of the desired hash @param saltlen The length of the salt used during signature @param stat [out] The result of the signature comparison, 1==valid, 0==invalid @param key The public RSA key corresponding to the key that performed the signature @return CRYPT_OK on success (even if the signature is invalid) */ int rsa_verify_hash_ex(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hashlen, int padding, int hash_idx, unsigned long saltlen, int *stat, rsa_key *key) { unsigned long modulus_bitlen, modulus_bytelen, x; int err; unsigned char *tmpbuf; LTC_ARGCHK(hash != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(sig != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); /* default to invalid */ *stat = 0; /* valid padding? */ if ((padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) && (padding != LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) && (padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5_NA1)) { return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_PADDING; } if (padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5_NA1) { /* valid hash ? */ if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } } /* get modulus len in bits */ modulus_bitlen = mp_count_bits( (key->N)); /* outlen must be at least the size of the modulus */ modulus_bytelen = mp_unsigned_bin_size( (key->N)); if (modulus_bytelen != siglen) { return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET; } /* allocate temp buffer for decoded sig */ tmpbuf = XMALLOC(siglen); if (tmpbuf == NULL) { return CRYPT_MEM; } /* RSA decode it */ x = siglen; if ((err = ltc_mp.rsa_me(sig, siglen, tmpbuf, &x, PK_PUBLIC, key)) != CRYPT_OK) { XFREE(tmpbuf); return err; } /* make sure the output is the right size */ if (x != siglen) { XFREE(tmpbuf); return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET; } if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) { /* PSS decode and verify it */ if(modulus_bitlen%8 == 1){ err = pkcs_1_pss_decode(hash, hashlen, tmpbuf+1, x-1, saltlen, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, stat); } else{ err = pkcs_1_pss_decode(hash, hashlen, tmpbuf, x, saltlen, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, stat); } } else { /* PKCS #1 v1.5 decode it */ unsigned char *out; unsigned long outlen; int decoded; /* allocate temp buffer for decoded hash */ outlen = ((modulus_bitlen >> 3) + (modulus_bitlen & 7 ? 1 : 0)) - 3; out = XMALLOC(outlen); if (out == NULL) { err = CRYPT_MEM; goto bail_2; } if ((err = pkcs_1_v1_5_decode(tmpbuf, x, LTC_PKCS_1_EMSA, modulus_bitlen, out, &outlen, &decoded)) != CRYPT_OK) { XFREE(out); goto bail_2; } if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) { unsigned long loid[16], reallen; ltc_asn1_list digestinfo[2], siginfo[2]; /* not all hashes have OIDs... so sad */ if (hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen == 0) { err = CRYPT_INVALID_ARG; goto bail_2; } /* now we must decode out[0...outlen-1] using ASN.1, test the OID and then test the hash */ /* construct the SEQUENCE SEQUENCE { SEQUENCE {hashoid OID blah NULL } hash OCTET STRING } */ LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER, loid, sizeof(loid)/sizeof(loid[0])); LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_NULL, NULL, 0); LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE, digestinfo, 2); LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, tmpbuf, siglen); if ((err = der_decode_sequence(out, outlen, siginfo, 2)) != CRYPT_OK) { /* fallback to Legacy:missing NULL */ LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE, digestinfo, 1); if ((err = der_decode_sequence(out, outlen, siginfo, 2)) != CRYPT_OK) { XFREE(out); goto bail_2; } } if ((err = der_length_sequence(siginfo, 2, &reallen)) != CRYPT_OK) { XFREE(out); goto bail_2; } /* test OID */ if ((reallen == outlen) && (digestinfo[0].size == hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen) && (XMEMCMP(digestinfo[0].data, hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OID, sizeof(unsigned long) * hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen) == 0) && (siginfo[1].size == hashlen) && (XMEMCMP(siginfo[1].data, hash, hashlen) == 0)) { *stat = 1; } } else { /* only check if the hash is equal */ if ((hashlen == outlen) && (XMEMCMP(out, hash, hashlen) == 0)) { *stat = 1; } } #ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK zeromem(out, outlen); #endif XFREE(out); } bail_2: #ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK zeromem(tmpbuf, siglen); #endif XFREE(tmpbuf); return err; } #endif /* LTC_MRSA */ /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */