view libtomcrypt/notes/rsa-testvectors/pss-int.txt @ 1902:4a6725ac957c

Revert "Don't include sk keys at all in KEX list" This reverts git commit f972813ecdc7bb981d25b5a63638bd158f1c8e72. The sk algorithms need to remain in the sigalgs list so that they are included in the server-sig-algs ext-info message sent by the server. RFC8308 for server-sig-algs requires that all algorithms are listed (though OpenSSH client 8.4p1 tested doesn't require that)
author Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
date Thu, 24 Mar 2022 13:42:08 +0800
parents 6dba84798cd5
children
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# =================================
# WORKED-OUT EXAMPLE FOR RSASSA-PSS
# =================================
#
# This file gives an example of the process of
# signing a message with RSASSA-PSS as
# specified in PKCS #1 v2.1.
#
# The message is an octet string of length 114,
# while the size of the modulus in the public
# key is 1024 bits. The message is signed via a
# random salt of length 20 octets 
# 
# The underlying hash function in the EMSA-PSS
# encoding method is SHA-1; the mask generation
# function is MGF1 with SHA-1 as specified in 
# PKCS #1 v2.1.
# 
# Integers are represented by strings of octets
# with the leftmost octet being the most
# significant octet. For example, 
#
#           9,202,000 = (0x)8c 69 50. 
#
# =============================================

# ------------------------------
# Components of the RSA Key Pair
# ------------------------------

# RSA modulus n: 
a2 ba 40 ee 07 e3 b2 bd 2f 02 ce 22 7f 36 a1 95 
02 44 86 e4 9c 19 cb 41 bb bd fb ba 98 b2 2b 0e 
57 7c 2e ea ff a2 0d 88 3a 76 e6 5e 39 4c 69 d4 
b3 c0 5a 1e 8f ad da 27 ed b2 a4 2b c0 00 fe 88 
8b 9b 32 c2 2d 15 ad d0 cd 76 b3 e7 93 6e 19 95 
5b 22 0d d1 7d 4e a9 04 b1 ec 10 2b 2e 4d e7 75 
12 22 aa 99 15 10 24 c7 cb 41 cc 5e a2 1d 00 ee 
b4 1f 7c 80 08 34 d2 c6 e0 6b ce 3b ce 7e a9 a5 

# RSA public exponent e: 
01 00 01 

# Prime p: 
d1 7f 65 5b f2 7c 8b 16 d3 54 62 c9 05 cc 04 a2 
6f 37 e2 a6 7f a9 c0 ce 0d ce d4 72 39 4a 0d f7 
43 fe 7f 92 9e 37 8e fd b3 68 ed df f4 53 cf 00 
7a f6 d9 48 e0 ad e7 57 37 1f 8a 71 1e 27 8f 6b 

# Prime q: 
c6 d9 2b 6f ee 74 14 d1 35 8c e1 54 6f b6 29 87 
53 0b 90 bd 15 e0 f1 49 63 a5 e2 63 5a db 69 34 
7e c0 c0 1b 2a b1 76 3f d8 ac 1a 59 2f b2 27 57 
46 3a 98 24 25 bb 97 a3 a4 37 c5 bf 86 d0 3f 2f 

# p's CRT exponent dP: 
9d 0d bf 83 e5 ce 9e 4b 17 54 dc d5 cd 05 bc b7 
b5 5f 15 08 33 0e a4 9f 14 d4 e8 89 55 0f 82 56 
cb 5f 80 6d ff 34 b1 7a da 44 20 88 53 57 7d 08 
e4 26 28 90 ac f7 52 46 1c ea 05 54 76 01 bc 4f 

# q's CRT exponent dQ: 
12 91 a5 24 c6 b7 c0 59 e9 0e 46 dc 83 b2 17 1e 
b3 fa 98 81 8f d1 79 b6 c8 bf 6c ec aa 47 63 03 
ab f2 83 fe 05 76 9c fc 49 57 88 fe 5b 1d df de 
9e 88 4a 3c d5 e9 36 b7 e9 55 eb f9 7e b5 63 b1 

# CRT coefficient qInv: 
a6 3f 1d a3 8b 95 0c 9a d1 c6 7c e0 d6 77 ec 29 
14 cd 7d 40 06 2d f4 2a 67 eb 19 8a 17 6f 97 42 
aa c7 c5 fe a1 4f 22 97 66 2b 84 81 2c 4d ef c4 
9a 80 25 ab 43 82 28 6b e4 c0 37 88 dd 01 d6 9f 

# ---------------------------------
# Step-by-step RSASSA-PSS Signature
# ---------------------------------

# Message M to be signed:
85 9e ef 2f d7 8a ca 00 30 8b dc 47 11 93 bf 55 
bf 9d 78 db 8f 8a 67 2b 48 46 34 f3 c9 c2 6e 64 
78 ae 10 26 0f e0 dd 8c 08 2e 53 a5 29 3a f2 17 
3c d5 0c 6d 5d 35 4f eb f7 8b 26 02 1c 25 c0 27 
12 e7 8c d4 69 4c 9f 46 97 77 e4 51 e7 f8 e9 e0 
4c d3 73 9c 6b bf ed ae 48 7f b5 56 44 e9 ca 74 
ff 77 a5 3c b7 29 80 2f 6e d4 a5 ff a8 ba 15 98 
90 fc 

# mHash    = Hash(M)
# salt     = random string of octets
# M'       = Padding || mHash || salt
# H        = Hash(M')
# DB       = Padding || salt 
# dbMask   = MGF(H, length(DB))
# maskedDB = DB xor dbMask (leftmost bit set to
#            zero)
# EM       = maskedDB || H || 0xbc

# mHash:
37 b6 6a e0 44 58 43 35 3d 47 ec b0 b4 fd 14 c1 
10 e6 2d 6a 

# salt:
e3 b5 d5 d0 02 c1 bc e5 0c 2b 65 ef 88 a1 88 d8 
3b ce 7e 61 

# M':
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 37 b6 6a e0 44 58 43 35 
3d 47 ec b0 b4 fd 14 c1 10 e6 2d 6a e3 b5 d5 d0 
02 c1 bc e5 0c 2b 65 ef 88 a1 88 d8 3b ce 7e 61 

# H:
df 1a 89 6f 9d 8b c8 16 d9 7c d7 a2 c4 3b ad 54 
6f be 8c fe 

# DB:
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
00 00 00 00 00 00 01 e3 b5 d5 d0 02 c1 bc e5 0c 
2b 65 ef 88 a1 88 d8 3b ce 7e 61 

# dbMask:
66 e4 67 2e 83 6a d1 21 ba 24 4b ed 65 76 b8 67 
d9 a4 47 c2 8a 6e 66 a5 b8 7d ee 7f bc 7e 65 af 
50 57 f8 6f ae 89 84 d9 ba 7f 96 9a d6 fe 02 a4 
d7 5f 74 45 fe fd d8 5b 6d 3a 47 7c 28 d2 4b a1 
e3 75 6f 79 2d d1 dc e8 ca 94 44 0e cb 52 79 ec 
d3 18 3a 31 1f c8 97 39 a9 66 43 13 6e 8b 0f 46 
5e 87 a4 53 5c d4 c5 9b 10 02 8d 

# maskedDB:
66 e4 67 2e 83 6a d1 21 ba 24 4b ed 65 76 b8 67 
d9 a4 47 c2 8a 6e 66 a5 b8 7d ee 7f bc 7e 65 af 
50 57 f8 6f ae 89 84 d9 ba 7f 96 9a d6 fe 02 a4 
d7 5f 74 45 fe fd d8 5b 6d 3a 47 7c 28 d2 4b a1 
e3 75 6f 79 2d d1 dc e8 ca 94 44 0e cb 52 79 ec 
d3 18 3a 31 1f c8 96 da 1c b3 93 11 af 37 ea 4a 
75 e2 4b db fd 5c 1d a0 de 7c ec 

# Encoded message EM:
66 e4 67 2e 83 6a d1 21 ba 24 4b ed 65 76 b8 67 
d9 a4 47 c2 8a 6e 66 a5 b8 7d ee 7f bc 7e 65 af 
50 57 f8 6f ae 89 84 d9 ba 7f 96 9a d6 fe 02 a4 
d7 5f 74 45 fe fd d8 5b 6d 3a 47 7c 28 d2 4b a1 
e3 75 6f 79 2d d1 dc e8 ca 94 44 0e cb 52 79 ec 
d3 18 3a 31 1f c8 96 da 1c b3 93 11 af 37 ea 4a 
75 e2 4b db fd 5c 1d a0 de 7c ec df 1a 89 6f 9d 
8b c8 16 d9 7c d7 a2 c4 3b ad 54 6f be 8c fe bc 

# Signature S, the RSA decryption of EM:
8d aa 62 7d 3d e7 59 5d 63 05 6c 7e c6 59 e5 44 
06 f1 06 10 12 8b aa e8 21 c8 b2 a0 f3 93 6d 54 
dc 3b dc e4 66 89 f6 b7 95 1b b1 8e 84 05 42 76 
97 18 d5 71 5d 21 0d 85 ef bb 59 61 92 03 2c 42 
be 4c 29 97 2c 85 62 75 eb 6d 5a 45 f0 5f 51 87 
6f c6 74 3d ed dd 28 ca ec 9b b3 0e a9 9e 02 c3 
48 82 69 60 4f e4 97 f7 4c cd 7c 7f ca 16 71 89 
71 23 cb d3 0d ef 5d 54 a2 b5 53 6a d9 0a 74 7e 

# =============================================