view libtomcrypt/src/pk/pkcs1/pkcs_1_oaep_encode.c @ 1902:4a6725ac957c

Revert "Don't include sk keys at all in KEX list" This reverts git commit f972813ecdc7bb981d25b5a63638bd158f1c8e72. The sk algorithms need to remain in the sigalgs list so that they are included in the server-sig-algs ext-info message sent by the server. RFC8308 for server-sig-algs requires that all algorithms are listed (though OpenSSH client 8.4p1 tested doesn't require that)
author Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
date Thu, 24 Mar 2022 13:42:08 +0800
parents 6dba84798cd5
children
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis
 *
 * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic
 * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner.
 *
 * The library is free for all purposes without any express
 * guarantee it works.
 */
#include "tomcrypt.h"

/**
  @file pkcs_1_oaep_encode.c
  OAEP Padding for PKCS #1, Tom St Denis
*/

#ifdef LTC_PKCS_1

/**
  PKCS #1 v2.00 OAEP encode
  @param msg             The data to encode
  @param msglen          The length of the data to encode (octets)
  @param lparam          A session or system parameter (can be NULL)
  @param lparamlen       The length of the lparam data
  @param modulus_bitlen  The bit length of the RSA modulus
  @param prng            An active PRNG state
  @param prng_idx        The index of the PRNG desired
  @param hash_idx        The index of the hash desired
  @param out             [out] The destination for the encoded data
  @param outlen          [in/out] The max size and resulting size of the encoded data
  @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int pkcs_1_oaep_encode(const unsigned char *msg,    unsigned long msglen,
                       const unsigned char *lparam, unsigned long lparamlen,
                             unsigned long modulus_bitlen, prng_state *prng,
                             int           prng_idx,         int  hash_idx,
                             unsigned char *out,    unsigned long *outlen)
{
   unsigned char *DB, *seed, *mask;
   unsigned long hLen, x, y, modulus_len;
   int           err;

   LTC_ARGCHK(msg    != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(out    != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(outlen != NULL);

   /* test valid hash */
   if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
   }

   /* valid prng */
   if ((err = prng_is_valid(prng_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
   }

   hLen        = hash_descriptor[hash_idx].hashsize;
   modulus_len = (modulus_bitlen >> 3) + (modulus_bitlen & 7 ? 1 : 0);

   /* test message size */
   if ((2*hLen >= (modulus_len - 2)) || (msglen > (modulus_len - 2*hLen - 2))) {
      return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_SIZE;
   }

   /* allocate ram for DB/mask/salt of size modulus_len */
   DB   = XMALLOC(modulus_len);
   mask = XMALLOC(modulus_len);
   seed = XMALLOC(hLen);
   if (DB == NULL || mask == NULL || seed == NULL) {
      if (DB != NULL) {
         XFREE(DB);
      }
      if (mask != NULL) {
         XFREE(mask);
      }
      if (seed != NULL) {
         XFREE(seed);
      }
      return CRYPT_MEM;
   }

   /* get lhash */
   /* DB == lhash || PS || 0x01 || M, PS == k - mlen - 2hlen - 2 zeroes */
   x = modulus_len;
   if (lparam != NULL) {
      if ((err = hash_memory(hash_idx, lparam, lparamlen, DB, &x)) != CRYPT_OK) {
         goto LBL_ERR;
      }
   } else {
      /* can't pass hash_memory a NULL so use DB with zero length */
      if ((err = hash_memory(hash_idx, DB, 0, DB, &x)) != CRYPT_OK) {
         goto LBL_ERR;
      }
   }

   /* append PS then 0x01 (to lhash)  */
   x = hLen;
   y = modulus_len - msglen - 2*hLen - 2;
   XMEMSET(DB+x, 0, y);
   x += y;

   /* 0x01 byte */
   DB[x++] = 0x01;

   /* message (length = msglen) */
   XMEMCPY(DB+x, msg, msglen);
   x += msglen;

   /* now choose a random seed */
   if (prng_descriptor[prng_idx].read(seed, hLen, prng) != hLen) {
      err = CRYPT_ERROR_READPRNG;
      goto LBL_ERR;
   }

   /* compute MGF1 of seed (k - hlen - 1) */
   if ((err = pkcs_1_mgf1(hash_idx, seed, hLen, mask, modulus_len - hLen - 1)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      goto LBL_ERR;
   }

   /* xor against DB */
   for (y = 0; y < (modulus_len - hLen - 1); y++) {
       DB[y] ^= mask[y];
   }

   /* compute MGF1 of maskedDB (hLen) */
   if ((err = pkcs_1_mgf1(hash_idx, DB, modulus_len - hLen - 1, mask, hLen)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      goto LBL_ERR;
   }

   /* XOR against seed */
   for (y = 0; y < hLen; y++) {
      seed[y] ^= mask[y];
   }

   /* create string of length modulus_len */
   if (*outlen < modulus_len) {
      *outlen = modulus_len;
      err = CRYPT_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;
      goto LBL_ERR;
   }

   /* start output which is 0x00 || maskedSeed || maskedDB */
   x = 0;
   out[x++] = 0x00;
   XMEMCPY(out+x, seed, hLen);
   x += hLen;
   XMEMCPY(out+x, DB, modulus_len - hLen - 1);
   x += modulus_len - hLen - 1;

   *outlen = x;

   err = CRYPT_OK;
LBL_ERR:
#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
   zeromem(DB,   modulus_len);
   zeromem(seed, hLen);
   zeromem(mask, modulus_len);
#endif

   XFREE(seed);
   XFREE(mask);
   XFREE(DB);

   return err;
}

#endif /* LTC_PKCS_1 */


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