view libtomcrypt/src/pk/dsa/dsa_sign_hash.c @ 994:5c5ade336926

Prefer stronger algorithms in algorithm negotiation. Prefer diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 (2048 bit) over diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 (1024 bit). Due to meet-in-the-middle attacks the effective key length of three key 3DES is 112 bits. AES is stronger and faster then 3DES. Prefer to delay the start of compression until after authentication has completed. This avoids exposing compression code to attacks from unauthenticated users. (github pull request #9)
author Fedor Brunner <fedor.brunner@azet.sk>
date Fri, 23 Jan 2015 23:00:25 +0800
parents 0cbe8f6dbf9e
children f849a5ca2efc
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis
 *
 * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic
 * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner.
 *
 * The library is free for all purposes without any express
 * guarantee it works.
 *
 * Tom St Denis, [email protected], http://libtomcrypt.com
 */
#include "tomcrypt.h"

/**
   @file dsa_sign_hash.c
   DSA implementation, sign a hash, Tom St Denis
*/

#ifdef MDSA

/**
  Sign a hash with DSA
  @param in       The hash to sign
  @param inlen    The length of the hash to sign
  @param r        The "r" integer of the signature (caller must initialize with mp_init() first)
  @param s        The "s" integer of the signature (caller must initialize with mp_init() first)
  @param prng     An active PRNG state
  @param wprng    The index of the PRNG desired
  @param key      A private DSA key
  @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int dsa_sign_hash_raw(const unsigned char *in,  unsigned long inlen,
                                   void   *r,   void *s,
                               prng_state *prng, int wprng, dsa_key *key)
{
   void         *k, *kinv, *tmp;
   unsigned char *buf;
   int            err;

   LTC_ARGCHK(in  != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(r   != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(s   != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL);

   if ((err = prng_is_valid(wprng)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
   }
   if (key->type != PK_PRIVATE) {
      return CRYPT_PK_NOT_PRIVATE;
   }

   /* check group order size  */
   if (key->qord >= MDSA_MAX_GROUP) {
      return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
   }

   buf = XMALLOC(MDSA_MAX_GROUP);
   if (buf == NULL) {
      return CRYPT_MEM;
   }

   /* Init our temps */
   if ((err = mp_init_multi(&k, &kinv, &tmp, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK)                       { goto ERRBUF; }

retry:

   do {
      /* gen random k */
      if (prng_descriptor[wprng].read(buf, key->qord, prng) != (unsigned long)key->qord) {
         err = CRYPT_ERROR_READPRNG;
         goto error;
      }

      /* read k */
      if ((err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(k, buf, key->qord)) != CRYPT_OK)                 { goto error; }

      /* k > 1 ? */
      if (mp_cmp_d(k, 1) != LTC_MP_GT)                                                 { goto retry; }

      /* test gcd */
      if ((err = mp_gcd(k, key->q, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK)                                  { goto error; }
   } while (mp_cmp_d(tmp, 1) != LTC_MP_EQ);

   /* now find 1/k mod q */
   if ((err = mp_invmod(k, key->q, kinv)) != CRYPT_OK)                                 { goto error; }

   /* now find r = g^k mod p mod q */
   if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->g, k, key->p, r)) != CRYPT_OK)                           { goto error; }
   if ((err = mp_mod(r, key->q, r)) != CRYPT_OK)                                       { goto error; }

   if (mp_iszero(r) == LTC_MP_YES)                                                     { goto retry; }

   /* now find s = (in + xr)/k mod q */
   if ((err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(tmp, (unsigned char *)in, inlen)) != CRYPT_OK)      { goto error; }
   if ((err = mp_mul(key->x, r, s)) != CRYPT_OK)                                       { goto error; }
   if ((err = mp_add(s, tmp, s)) != CRYPT_OK)                                          { goto error; }
   if ((err = mp_mulmod(s, kinv, key->q, s)) != CRYPT_OK)                              { goto error; }

   if (mp_iszero(s) == LTC_MP_YES)                                                     { goto retry; }

   err = CRYPT_OK;
error: 
   mp_clear_multi(k, kinv, tmp, NULL);
ERRBUF:
#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
   zeromem(buf, MDSA_MAX_GROUP);
#endif
   XFREE(buf);
   return err;
}

/**
  Sign a hash with DSA
  @param in       The hash to sign
  @param inlen    The length of the hash to sign
  @param out      [out] Where to store the signature
  @param outlen   [in/out] The max size and resulting size of the signature
  @param prng     An active PRNG state
  @param wprng    The index of the PRNG desired
  @param key      A private DSA key
  @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int dsa_sign_hash(const unsigned char *in,  unsigned long inlen,
                        unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen,
                        prng_state *prng, int wprng, dsa_key *key)
{
   void         *r, *s;
   int           err;

   LTC_ARGCHK(in      != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(out     != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(outlen  != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(key     != NULL);

   if (mp_init_multi(&r, &s, NULL) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return CRYPT_MEM;
   }

   if ((err = dsa_sign_hash_raw(in, inlen, r, s, prng, wprng, key)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      goto error;
   }

   err = der_encode_sequence_multi(out, outlen, 
                             LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL, r, 
                             LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL, s, 
                             LTC_ASN1_EOL,     0UL, NULL);

error:
   mp_clear_multi(r, s, NULL);
   return err;
}

#endif

/* $Source: /cvs/libtom/libtomcrypt/src/pk/dsa/dsa_sign_hash.c,v $ */
/* $Revision: 1.12 $ */
/* $Date: 2006/12/04 22:27:56 $ */