Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/pk/rsa/rsa_sign_hash.c @ 994:5c5ade336926
Prefer stronger algorithms in algorithm negotiation.
Prefer diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 (2048 bit) over
diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 (1024 bit).
Due to meet-in-the-middle attacks the effective key length of
three key 3DES is 112 bits. AES is stronger and faster then 3DES.
Prefer to delay the start of compression until after authentication
has completed. This avoids exposing compression code to attacks
from unauthenticated users.
(github pull request #9)
author | Fedor Brunner <fedor.brunner@azet.sk> |
---|---|
date | Fri, 23 Jan 2015 23:00:25 +0800 |
parents | 0cbe8f6dbf9e |
children | f849a5ca2efc |
line wrap: on
line source
/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. * * Tom St Denis, [email protected], http://libtomcrypt.com */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file rsa_sign_hash.c RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 and v2 PSS sign hash, Tom St Denis and Andreas Lange */ #ifdef MRSA /** PKCS #1 pad then sign @param in The hash to sign @param inlen The length of the hash to sign (octets) @param out [out] The signature @param outlen [in/out] The max size and resulting size of the signature @param padding Type of padding (LTC_PKCS_1_PSS or LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) @param prng An active PRNG state @param prng_idx The index of the PRNG desired @param hash_idx The index of the hash desired @param saltlen The length of the salt desired (octets) @param key The private RSA key to use @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int rsa_sign_hash_ex(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen, unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen, int padding, prng_state *prng, int prng_idx, int hash_idx, unsigned long saltlen, rsa_key *key) { unsigned long modulus_bitlen, modulus_bytelen, x, y; int err; LTC_ARGCHK(in != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(out != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(outlen != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); /* valid padding? */ if ((padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) && (padding != LTC_PKCS_1_PSS)) { return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_PADDING; } if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) { /* valid prng and hash ? */ if ((err = prng_is_valid(prng_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } } /* get modulus len in bits */ modulus_bitlen = mp_count_bits((key->N)); /* outlen must be at least the size of the modulus */ modulus_bytelen = mp_unsigned_bin_size((key->N)); if (modulus_bytelen > *outlen) { *outlen = modulus_bytelen; return CRYPT_BUFFER_OVERFLOW; } if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) { /* PSS pad the key */ x = *outlen; if ((err = pkcs_1_pss_encode(in, inlen, saltlen, prng, prng_idx, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, out, &x)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } } else { /* PKCS #1 v1.5 pad the hash */ unsigned char *tmpin; ltc_asn1_list digestinfo[2], siginfo[2]; /* not all hashes have OIDs... so sad */ if (hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen == 0) { return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG; } /* construct the SEQUENCE SEQUENCE { SEQUENCE {hashoid OID blah NULL } hash OCTET STRING } */ LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER, hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OID, hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen); LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_NULL, NULL, 0); LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE, digestinfo, 2); LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, in, inlen); /* allocate memory for the encoding */ y = mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->N); tmpin = XMALLOC(y); if (tmpin == NULL) { return CRYPT_MEM; } if ((err = der_encode_sequence(siginfo, 2, tmpin, &y)) != CRYPT_OK) { XFREE(tmpin); return err; } x = *outlen; if ((err = pkcs_1_v1_5_encode(tmpin, y, LTC_PKCS_1_EMSA, modulus_bitlen, NULL, 0, out, &x)) != CRYPT_OK) { XFREE(tmpin); return err; } XFREE(tmpin); } /* RSA encode it */ return ltc_mp.rsa_me(out, x, out, outlen, PK_PRIVATE, key); } #endif /* MRSA */ /* $Source: /cvs/libtom/libtomcrypt/src/pk/rsa/rsa_sign_hash.c,v $ */ /* $Revision: 1.9 $ */ /* $Date: 2006/11/09 23:15:39 $ */